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Abstract
The Growth of Public Expenditure in Korea, 1953-1991
Eui - Seob Kim
As in most other developed countries, the growth of the public sector has 
become an important issue in the economic and political debate of Korea in recent 
years. In 1953 the public sector was relatively small compared to other developed 
countries, but since the end of the Korean War, the public sector has grown 
dramatically. Over the last four decades, governments have exerted an enormous 
influence on the level and allocation of scare resources in the economy. 
Especially, since the early 1960s, government involvement in the economy has 
increased rapidly to promote export and economic growth.
Although the public sector has played an important role during the Korean 
modernisation process and public expenditure has grown rapidly, few studies 
have been carried out to explain the sustained growth of public expenditure in 
Korea. This thesis seeks to explain the nature and causes of the growth of 
government expenditure in Korea for the period of 1953 -1991.
This thesis reviews nine alternative theories of government growth which 
attempt to explain the observed phenomenon of the rising trend in public 
expenditure. After reviewing theories of public expenditure growth, we analyse 
the applicability of these leading hypotheses on public expenditure behaviour with 
data taken from Korea during the period 1953-1991.
Our empirical study shows that Wagner's hypothesis of expanding state 
activity is more reliable than Peacock and Wiseman's displacement effect 
hypothesis in explaining the Korean case. Moreover, our empirical research 
indicates that the income effect, the relative price effect and the lagged 
dependent variable are the main causes of the expansion of government 
expenditure in Korea over the study period.
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Introduction
Since World War n, the public sector in developed economies has grown 
rapidly. Whether measured in absolute levels of expenditure or relative to the 
economy, all industrialised countries have experienced substantial growth of the 
public sector. A number of theories have been used to account for the growth in 
public expenditures. Many authors have tried to explain the observed 
phenomenon of the rising trend in government expenditure. By using a variety of 
theoretical and statistical tools, political scientists and economists have 
attempted to identify and explain the nature, causes and consequences of 
government growth.
Wagner's Law, Peacock and Wiseman's displacement effect hypothesis, 
Baumol's disease, election and bureau voting, and the political business cycle are 
the most frequently cited explanations for the growth of the public sector. Many 
researchers have examined the empirical verification of these hypotheses and 
found mixed results. Some authors have found evidence for the hypothesis, 
while others have not found conclusive support for the hypothesis.
As far as empirical studies on public expenditure growth are concerned, most 
studies have concentrated on developed countries. Although the public sector 
played an important role during the development process, few studies have been 
carried out to explain the sustained growth of public expenditure in developing 
countries. Partly due to the lack of long-run reliable data, empirical studies on 
government expenditure growth in developing countries have been neglected.
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Like other developing countries, few studies have been devoted to explain the 
time-pattem growth of public expenditure in Korea. The aim of this thesis is to 
explain the sources of the growth of government expenditure in Korea for the 
period 1953-1991. For the whole study period, we try to explain the 
expenditure development in Korea, both in absolute terms and relative to the 
economy.
Chapter 1 reviews the literature concerning the growth of public expenditure. 
Since the literature in this field is so immense, this is not an exhaustive review 
(see Larkey, Stolp and Winer (1981)). Instead, we attempt to provide an 
overview of the literature on government growth. Two classes of models are 
discussed briefly in this chapter. The first classes of models are historical- 
development models. Historical-development models attempt to explain how 
government expenditure has behaved and grown over the long-term: i.e., they are 
concerned with the time-pattem of public expenditure development. The second 
classes of models can be described as microeconomic or public choice models. 
Public choice models emphasise the political decision-making process and include 
the relevant aspects of the institutional structures that ultimately give rise to 
public expenditures.
Chapter 2 deals with some measurement problems which mainly arise when 
we investigate the changes in the level and size of government activity over time. 
Several different measures have been commonly used to explain the growth of the 
public sector in the economy. Different measures of the size of the public sector 
would lead to different conclusions about the size and growth of the public 
sector. Due to multidimensional nature of public sector activities, we cannot 
express all the various forms of government activities in a single aggregate 
measure.
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Chapter 3 describes the historical background of the growth of the public 
sectdr in Korea during the period 1953-1991. Using recently available data, 
this chapter attempts to explain the growth of public expenditure at both the 
aggregate and individual programmes in Korea since 1953. By examining the 
changes in the structure of government expenditure, we can explore the changing 
role of the public sector during the Korean modernisation process. This chapter 
provides a framework that will be examined in the next chapters.
Chapter 4 examines the validity of Wagner's Law in the Korean economy. As 
shown in chapter 3, Korea seemed to be a good case study to test the Wagner 
hypothesis because the pressures from rapid industrialisation and urbanisation 
contributed to the expansion of government expenditure. In this chapter, by 
employing a recent advanced econometric technique (cointegration analysis), we 
examine the empirical verification of Wagner's Law on data taken from Korea 
for the period 1953-1991.
Chapter 5 investigates the merits of the Peacock and Wiseman hypothesis as an 
explanation of the growth of public expenditure in Korea. Like Wagner's Law, the 
Peacock and Wiseman hypothesis remains one of the most frequently cited 
explanations for the growth of public expenditure. This chapter examines the 
displacement effect on government expenditure in the context of social 
disturbances caused by the two political crises in Korea. By adopting recent 
time-series modelling technique (ARMA technique), we attempt to explain the 
movement of the time-series behaviour of government expenditure in Korea over 
the period 1953-1991.
Chapter 6 illustrates how econometric analysis can be used to test the various 
hypotheses of public expenditure growth. At the first section, we discusses six
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different explanations of government growth. At the second section, we examine 
the empirical evidence of the source of government growth in Korea. Through 
this discussion, we attempt to identify the important determinants of the growth 
of government expenditure in Korea for the period 1963 to 1991.
Finally, we provide a brief summary of our study and some concluding remarks. 
We also suggest some related issues which may provide the basis for further 
research.
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Chapter 1 Theories of Public Expenditure Growth
1.1 Historical-Development Models
1.1.1 Wagner’s Law
One of the earliest attempts to explain the growth of government spending was 
that undertaken by the mid-nineteenth century German political economist, 
Adolph Wagner (1835-1917). Writing in the process of a period of rapid 
urbanisation and industrialisation, Wagner recognised a tendency for the growth 
of the public sector in a number of Western industrializing countries. Although 
some other scholars before Wagner had mentioned the growing importance of 
government activities, he was the first economist who recognised a positive 
relationship between the process of economic development and the size of the 
public sector, and translated such observation into general theory. Based on his 
empirical observations about expenditure growth, Wagner formulated "the law of 
expanding state expenditures" and it is now known as 'Wagner's Law".
Despite its importance, very little of Wagner's work has been translated into 
English. Only three extracts from Finanzwissenschaft (first published in 1883 in 
Leipzig) have been translated and published in Musgrave and Peacock (1958). 
Based on his empirical studies, Wagner inferred that public expenditure would
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inevitably increase of a faster rate than national output in a progressive state. 
According to his own words, Wagner’s Law can be summarised as follows:
The "law of increasing expansion of public, and particularly state, activities" becomes 
for the fiscal economy of the law of the increasing expansion of fiscal requirements. 
.... That law is the result of empirical observation in progressive countries, at least in 
our Western European civilisation; its explanation, justification and cause is the 
pressure for social progress and the resulting changes in the relative spheres of 
private and public economy, especially compulsory public economy. Financial 
stringency may hamper the expansion of state activities, causing their extent to be 
conditioned by revenue rather than the other way round, as is more usual. But in 
the long run the desire for development of a progressive people will always overcome 
these financial difficulties (Wagner in Musgrave and Peacock (1958), p.8).
From the above summary, it is clear that Wagner put forward a causal 
relationship between the level of economic development and the growing role of 
the state where "the pressure for social progress" requires an expansion of 
government activity. Also he seems to recognise the universality of the law in 
Western developing countries.
Wagner saw three main reasons why government activities would increase 
over time (see Bird, 1971, p.2). Firstly, Wagner thought that the process of 
industrialization would bring not only the growing complexity of society but also 
the growing needs for public regulative and protective activities. As a result of 
the increased complexity of society in the process of development, the state 
needs to expand administrative, legal and other protective services. 
Consequently public spending would increase from the continued increase in 
defence expenditure or from the growth of government expenditure on domestic
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economic activities. This growth of public expenditure would also occur as a 
result of the increase in population density and urbanisation.
Secondly, Wagner foresaw a relative expansion of “cultural and welfare” 
expenditures, most particularly for education and redistribution of income. He felt 
that as a result of social progress citizens are more concerned about 
distributional issues and these desires would lead to a more equitable 
distribution of income. Wagner and many subsequent authors assumed that these 
government activities constituted superior goods with the income elasticity of 
demand greater than unity. Therefore, as real income increases in the economy, 
public expenditures for these services rise more than proportionately.
Thirdly, Wagner noted that technical progress and scale economics of 
production would create a number of private monopolies and that would make 
government ownership preferable to private. He contended that the increasing 
scale of technologically efficient production would lead the government to 
undertake certain economic services of which the private sector could no longer 
supply. For example, railroad construction required heavy capital investments 
and could not be provided through private accumulation.
Since the publication of English translations of Wagner's Law, many researchers 
have examined the empirical verification of the law. Partly due to the vagueness 
of his own ideas and partly because of the limited translation of his writings, 
Wagner's Law has been subjected to varying interpretations. Although Wagner's 
original ideas were broad and his visions were concerned with the historical 
development of public economy, subsequent researchers have interpreted the 
law in narrow terms. 1 This is particularly the case as a result of Bird (1971). 
In his paper, Bird states that " as per capita income rises in industrializing 
nations, their public sectors will grow in relative importance. ... Wagner's vision
1 Fora recent review article of Wagner's Law, see Gemmell (1993).
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of the rise in state activity - and the (assumed) accompanying rise in 
government expenditures as a proportion of national income... " (pp.70 - 71). 
This interpretation is concerned with the income elasticity hypothesis: the 
elasticity of government expenditure to GNP needs to be significantly positive.
Since the mid 1960s, many researchers have adopted two basic statistical 
approaches to test the validity of Wagner's Law: (i) time-series or (ii) cross- 
section analysis. The first approach has examined the growth of government 
expenditures and growth of national income in a given particular country over 
time. On the other hand, the second approach has examined government 
expenditure patterns across a number of different countries with different level of 
development at the same point in time.
Early studies of Wagner's Law predominantly employed a cross-section 
approach. For example, Martin and Lewis (1956) , one of the earliest analyses 
of the growth of government expenditure, were concerned with cross-sectional 
comparisons of government activity at different levels of economic development. 
During the 1960s, Gupta (1968) and Musgrave (1969) have also used cross- 
section data. Especially, Musgrave (1969) found that cross-section evidence for 
high income countries did not support Wagner’s hypothesis, and wrote that “the 
evidence remains puzzling and in need of further explanation..." (pp. 122-124) . In 
the 1970s, Diamond (1977 b) examined the applicability of Wagner's law to Less 
Developed Countries (LDCs) by analysing the relationship between the relative 
size of the public sector and per capita income. He divided the comprehensive 
sample of forty-one developing countries into three subgroups (Africa, Asia, South 
and Central America) and estimated the income elasticity of public expenditures 
for those three groups. Empirical results were disappointing and he did not find 
support for the law in LDCs. Rather he notes that government expenditure in 
LDCs is influenced by political and ideological factors which cannot be explained
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by empirical analysis. In the 1980s, Abizadeh and Gray (1985) also examined the 
validity of Wagner’s Law with pooled time-series, cross-section data for 53 
countries grouped into poor, developing, and developed countries. Although most 
previous empirical studies have employed a single independent variable to reflect 
the level of economic development, they have included additional industrialisation 
measures (such as agricultural ratio, openness and the development of financial 
intermediaries) in their model. They found that Wagner’s Law only applied to 
the developing countries. Wagner's Law was not relevant for highly developed 
and underdeveloped countries.
Due to the non-availability of long-term time-series data, cross-section analyses 
have been used to test Wagner's Law. However, these cross-section tests of 
Wagner’s Law have been criticised because Wagner's thesis is essentially a 
dynamic law describing the growth of government over time within a country. 
Especially, Bird was critical about cross-section studies and noted that "there is 
nothing in any conceivable formulation of Wagner's law which tell us country A 
must have a higher government expenditure ratio than country B simply because 
the level of average per capita income is higher in A than B at a particular point 
in time. ... Inferences drawn from international cross-section comparisons ... are 
thus completely irrelevant" (Bird, 1971, p. 10).
Time-series studies of Wagner's law have been carried out for the United 
States, the UK, Germany, Canada and many other countries.
After examining the early empirical studies of the law, Bird (1971) concludes 
that "it appears that Wagner's law holds in aggregate terms for most periods of all 
countries mentioned, and... the evidence,such as it is, must be considered mildly 
favourable to Wagner's law" (p.8). For developing countries, Goffman and Mahar 
(1971) have studied the public expenditure behaviour of six Caribbean countries 
and have found that Wagner’s law could not adequately explained the growth 
pattern of government expenditures in these countries. Rather, as determinants of
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public expenditures in developing countries, they have suggested the importance 
of other factors such as the demonstration effect and the rapid changes of political 
philosophy.
It was Gandhi, V.P. (1971) who suggested the five different versions of 
Wagner's law that have been empirically examined. Although the validity of these 
studies remains controversial, subsequent researchers have examined several 
different formulations of Wagner’s hypothesis. In particular, Mann (1980) has 
undertaken an econometric test of Wagner's law for the case of Mexico with six 
different versions, and found weak support for Wagner's hypothesis. Although 
Mann's study has suffered from numerous econometric problems, subsequent 
researchers have concentrated on a test o f Wagner's Law with these six 
alternative formulations. 2
Until the early 1980s, most researchers have used nominal values to test 
Wagner's Law. If the relative prices between the private and public sector 
remain unchanged, the choice will not make any difference. But due to the 
relative price effect, the income elasticity of government expenditures estimated 
by nominal ratio would result in biased outcomes.
Beck (1979, 1982, 1985) have argued that since the price of public goods has 
been rising more rapidly than the price of private goods, the real size of the 
public sector has declined in some industrialised countries. This hypothesis was 
endorsed by Pluta (1981). Using similarly weighted government expenditure data 
for twenty developing countries, Pluta (1981) also finds the declining real public 
sector size in some developing countries. They note that test of Wagner's Law 
using nominal values is liable to produce biased outcomes.
Recently, Ram (1987) has overcome these problems by using real income data 
for 115 countries during 1960-1980. By using the Summers-Herston data, Ram
2 Problems of time-series econometric tests for Wagner's Law will be discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 4.
10
calculated the elasticity of government expenditure to GDP and found that "the 
cross-section results seem to refute Wagner's hypothesis, but in time-series analysis 
the hypothesis seems to be supported in about 60 per cent of the countries and 
rejected in the other 40 percent" (p.203). More recently Gemmell (1990), using 
more updated real income data during 1960-1985 for 117 countries, tests Wagner's 
law. Compared with Ram's study, Gemmell finds only about 7 per cent support for 
Wagner's law. He argues that Ram's study is biased because of the omitted 
variables such as the relative price or population effects.
Although Wagner's Law contained many insights about the growth of public 
expenditure during the process of development, his model has suffered from many 
criticisms on the theoretical foundations.
In the first place, Wagner's model was framed to explain the growth of public 
expenditure on the historic context of nineteenth century Europe, especially a 
newly united and urbanised Germany. Wagner's observations occurred in a period 
of technical progress, rapid urbanisation and a democratisation of society. 
Therefore, Wagner's model cannot explain the growth of government during 
periods of static and declining growth of economies. In particular, as argued by 
Peacock and Wiseman (1961), Wagner did not take war into account.
Secondly, as pointed out by Bird (1971) and Afxentiou (1982), Wagner’s law 
was formulated within his teleological view of how the state ought to operate as 
the economy developed. Wagner assumes that the process of social development 
leads inevitably to the growth of the public sector not as the result of individual 
and organisational choices. Therefore, Wagner supports the organic theory of the 
state which embodies a general-wili of its own preference. From this perspective, 
the state has its own preferences, and it is somehow superior to those of the 
individuals who make up the state. Due to this kind of view, Wagner's model did
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not contain a theory of public choice and Wagner ignored the collective decision 
making process.
Thirdly, it has been argued that Wagner's model is a demand side explanation of 
the growth of public expenditure. Although Wagner was aware of the problems 
of financing public expenditures, his argument was largely confined to the 
demand side for public goods and services. We need to incorporate supply side 
explanations into Wagner's model.
1.1.2 Displacement Effect
While Wagner attempted to generalise the behaviour of government spending 
by examining the growth pattern of public expenditure during the process of 
development, Peacock and Wiseman (hereafter P-W) adopted an inductive 
approach to explain the growth of public expenditure in the UK. In contrast to 
Wagner's demand side approach, P-W introduce the supply side into the public 
expenditure determination process and treat the growth of government spending 
as the direct result of social disturbances - most notably by war. P-W reject 
Wagner's theory of the organic state and emphasise the political nature of the 
decision making process, namely that 'governments like to spend more money, 
that citizens do not like to pay more taxes, and that governments need to pay 
some attention to the wishes of their citizens' (P-W 1961, p.xxxiii). Before the 
modem public choice theory was well established, P-W tried to analyse the 
growth of government expenditure in the UK with a public choice perspective.
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By looking at the time-pattem of British public expenditure over the period of 
1890-1955, P-W observed that public expenditure in the UK grew in discrete 
steps rather than continuously and the pattern of growth was characterised as a 
discontinuous series. Especially, during the period of social upheaval, the pattern 
of government expenditure would be disturbed. After the disturbance is over, 
public expenditure does not fall to the pre-disturbance level. Rather public 
expenditure is displaced upwards and remains on a much higher plateau level. P- 
W referred to this upward shift in public expenditure as the "displacement 
effect". Their own definition of the displacement effect is as follows:
“When societies are not being subjected to unusual pressures, people's ideas about 
tolerable burdens of taxadon,translated into ideas of reasonable tax rates, tend also to 
be fairly stable. — There may thus be a persistent divergence between ideas about 
desirable public spending and ideas about the limits of taxation. This divergence may 
be narrowed by large scale social disturbances, such as major wars. Such disturbances 
may create a displacement effect, shifting public revenues and expenditures to new 
levels. After the disturbance is over new ideas of tolerable tax levels emerge, and a 
new plateau of expenditure may be reached, with public expenditures again taking a 
broadly constant share of gross national product, though a different share from the 
former one” (P-W, 1961, p.xxiv).
From these P-Ws arguments, we can find that the major explanation of the 
displacement effect lies in the concept of the tolerable burden of taxation. 
According to P-Ws view, people can have ideas about the desirable level of 
public expenditure which are quite different from their ideas about tolerable 
burden of taxation. In normal times, people's ideas about desirable burdens 
of taxation tend to be fairly stable. However, during the period of crisis, 
people would accept new ideas of tolerable tax levels, and generally become
13
more tolerant to a higher level of taxation. This rising level of taxation results 
in a further shift in the level of public expenditure - a new plateau of public 
expenditure.
In P-Ws view, there are two aspects of the displacement effect. On the one 
hand, there is an inspection effect. Wars and social disturbances impose new 
obligations on governments and this leads to more emphasis upon the collective 
provisions of public services such as payments of pensions, debt interest and 
other social service benefits which were not identified before. On the other 
hand, P-W also argued another effect, called the concentration process. This 
process relates to the tendency of the concentration of power over public 
expenditure in the hands of central government. P-W view the period of social 
upheavals as increasing pressures for the process of public expenditure 
centralisation.
In their original study of public expenditure growth in the UK, P-W simply 
plotted the growth pattern of public expenditure against time and did not 
attempt to test the statistical significance of their displacement hypothesis. As 
they wrote "our speculations were not always stated in unambiguous fashion from 
the point of view of testing and our general empirical method was the visual 
inspection of charts" (P-W, 1979, p. 13). Subsequent researchers, however, 
have employed econometric techniques to test the validity of displacement effect. 
As Tussing and Henning (1979, 1991) point out, statistical tests of the 
displacement hypothesis fall into two groups; the first group has tested 
parameter stability across sub-periods and the second group has used time and 
dummy variables.
Gupta (1967), the first to devise statistical tests for the P-W hypothesis, 
examined the displacement hypothesis by testing whether significant shifts had
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occurred in the absolute level of public expenditure for periods of time before 
and after social upheavals (especially War and the Great Depression). He 
interprets the displacement effect as implying the possibility of an upward shift 
as well as change in income elasticity of public expenditure after social 
disturbance. He finds significant differences in both slope and intercept 
parameters before and after disturbances. In contrast to Gupta, Pryor (1968) 
adopted a simple dummy variable technique to test the displacement hypothesis. 
To capture the effect of time on public expenditures, he includes time as an 
explanatory variable in his model. On the basis of his empirical studies, he 
concludes that "the displacement which occurred was entirely due to increases for 
defence and war related purposes" (Pryor, 1968, p. 445).
Diamond (1977), a colleague of P-W, reviewed the displacement literature 
and criticised those previous empirical tests of the hypothesis. According to his 
own words ; "the Peacock-Wiseman analysis of displacement can be interpreted 
as a theory of th e"structural break". Thus the ceteris paribus assumption that 
tastes, preferences, and institutions remain constant is denied" (p.396). 
Later, this interpretation is also asserted by P-W and P-W state that "they 
ignore supply considerations and/or they use econometric techniques appropriate 
to the evaluation of marginal changes.... The P-W displacement effect is a theory 
o f structural breaks. ... It is the changes in these parameters that constitute the 
•break'" (P-W, 1979, p. 16).
Since P-W and their colleagues have revised their original view of the 
displacement hypothesis as a structural break or structural theory, many 
subsequent researchers have examined the hypothesis by studying whether the 
values of the parameters of the relevant expenditure functions will be changed 
between the periods before and after the social disturbances. Most recent
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empirical studies3, using econometric techniques, have produced somewhat 
conflicting results about the existence of displacement effect generated by the 
crisis. This lack of evidence for the displacement effect casts doubt on the 
general applicability of the hypothesis to explain the time pattern of public 
expenditure in many countries. Furthermore, there have been many criticisms 
about the precious meaning and validity of the displacement effect hypothesis.
If the P-W hypothesis is concerned solely with the shifts in public spending 
caused by the World Wars, then the hypothesis does not seem to be useful in 
explaining the growth pattern of government expenditures in certain post-war 
periods. Since government expenditure has grown substantially during the past 
half century in many western developed countries, the P-W hypothesis cannot 
be used to explain the growth of government spending in the 1960s and 1970s in 
western countries.
In addition to this problem, there has been great confusion about what is 
meant by a "displacement''. As Diamond (1977) points out, different 
researchers have different views of what a 'displacement' is and how to define 
a 'social upheaval' . Originally, P-W (1961) considered war as the most 
pronounced form of social upheaval. Subsequent researchers, however, have 
extended the concept of social disturbances to include other types of the crisis 
such as ; the Great Depression (Gupta (1967), Bonin et al. (1969)), a non-global 
crisis (Nagarajan (1979) ), the world-wide recession of 1974-5 (OHagan (1980)), 
internal revolution (Bahl, Kim and Park (1986)), and even two oil crises (Nomura 
(1991)). Those different interpretations of the hypothesis have led to great 
confusion when trying to test for the hypothesis and have produced 
conflicting evidence of the displacement effect.




This approach to the growth of government is best represented by the works 
o f Herber (1967), Rostow (1971) and Musgrave (1969). Those authors 
distinguish between several stages of economic growth and examine the 
changing role of the public sector during the process of development. The 
concern of those studies is to explain the relationship between public 
expenditure and the level of economic development. For them, the process of 
economic development is a major determinant of the observed tendency of public 
expenditure growth.
Herber (1967) argues that since Wagner’s law is concerned with industrializing 
countries, the discussion of the hypothesis should be restricted within the limits 
of such progressive nations. Further, he suggests that the relative size of 
government may even fall depending on the particular stage of economic growth.
Herber proposes a three-stage theory of public expenditure growth. He 
distinguishes between three stages of development; i) the pre-industrial stage, ii) 
the stage of industrialisation, iii) the post-industrial stage. According to his 
view, subsistence goods such as food, clothing and housing which are provided by 
the private sector would be more vital to the consumers than public goods at the 
pre-industrial stage. Thus, in the first stage of economic development, the real 
output of the private sector tends to increase by a larger amount than the 
output of public goods.
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In the second phase, when the economy enters an industrialisation stage, 
Wagner's law comes into effect. Public expenditures play an important role at 
this stage and the public sector provides social infrastructure overheads such as 
communications, transportation, education and other investments in human 
capital. Since these social capital items are provided by the public sector, 
there would be a more than proportionate rise in government spending ( income 
elasticity of public expenditures is greater than unity).
Finally the economy enters the third stage of development, the post-industrial 
phase. Government has already provided those economic goods which it could 
supply with an efficiency advantages, and society may be resisting a "too large" 
public sector. Thus, for Haber's view, the relative size of government is 
expected to decline during the post-industrial stage.
Although Herbert stage theory seems to be inspired by the Rostow's stage 
hypothesis, Herbert model of public expenditure growth is different from and 
even contradictory to Rostow's model.
Haber's stage - 1 seems to include Rostow's first two pre-take-off phases. 
In Rostow’s model, the public sector plays an important role at the early stages of 
development for providing some minimum essential social infrastructure to 
develop the economy from pre-take-off into the middle stages of economic 
growth. Since public capital formation is of particular importance at those stages 
and public sector investment as a percentage of the total investment is found to 
be high, there would be a more than proportionate rise in government 
expenditure.
In the third stage, Herber expects that the proportion of government 
expenditures to GNP tends to fall in the post-industrial period. In contrast, 
Rostow's claims are that after the economy enters the maturity stage the 
appropriate structure of public expenditure will be changed from expenditure on 
infrastructure to increased expenditures on education, health and social welfare
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services. Beyond the drive to maturity, the economy reaches the stage of high 
mass-consumption. In this stage, government must deal with welfare and 
growth problems and public expenditures for those items (such as income 
maintenance programmes and policies designed to redistribute welfare) will grow 
significantly relative to other items of public expenditures and also relative to 
GNP. Thus, in Rostow's model, the relative size of government is expected to 
increase during the post - industrial stage.
Like Herber andRostow, Musgrave (1969) proposes a development model of 
public expenditure growth. Musgrave's model, however, seems to be the most 
prominent one because he suggests a more detailed model which can explain the 
changing role of the public sector during the development process. 4
To explain the different budgetary function at each stage, Musgrave 
distinguishes between three stage of development and also disaggregates 
government expenditures into public consumption, investment spending and 
transfer payments. With regard to public investment expenditure, he argues that 
the relative share of public sector investment would increase at the early stage 
of development because a high level of capital formation is needed to increase 
productivity in the economy and public expenditures on infrastructure (such as 
transportation and irrigation facilities) are of particular importance at low level 
of development. In the middle stage of development, the public sector continues 
to supply social overhead capital but at this stage public investment is 
complementary to private investment. Especially, at later stages of 
development, the ratio of total investment to GNP rises, while the relative share 
of public investment falls. Musgrave also emphasises the role of public 
financing because the private saving rate is very low at the early stage of 
development.
4 For a more detail discussion of Musgrave's model, see Gemmell (1993).
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On public consumption expenditure, Musgrave claims that as the economy 
develops, more resources need to be devoted for government consumption 
expenditure because government consumption goods satisfy secondary needs as 
opposed to private expenditures. He argues that as private consumption 
increases it would require complementary public services to provide adequate 
facilities and that the growing complexity of economic organisation would also 
create another kind of public activity. Thus, Musgrave suggests that a larger 
public goods share would emerge over the development period.
Finally, Musgrave examines the changing share of transfer payments during 
the development process. According to his view, the ratio of transfers to GNP 
would fall as per capita income rises if the purpose of redistributional policy is 
to reduce absolute poverty. If, however, transfer policies seek to reduce 
relative inequality rather than absolute poverty, the relative share of transfers 
would remain unchanged over the development process.
In addition to these economic factors, Musgrave also suggests social condition 
and political factors as the major determinants of public expenditure 
development. Although he admits the importance of those non-economic factors, 
Musgrave (1969) argues that the impact of those factors is not predictable like 
economic factors and writes " The theory of expenditure growth remains a 
fascinating but somewhat elusive problem. Even if economics factors only are 
considered, it is difficult to arrive at an expenditure law. ... Disaggregation is 
needed as hypotheses differ with regard to capital, consumption, and transfer 
outlays, and the weights of these components are subject to change, so that the 
overall pattern is left in doubt" (p. 122).
Development models are trying to explain the changing pattern of evolution of 
public expenditures during the course of development. Herber, Rostow and 
Musgrave have tried to establish certain hypotheses about the behaviour of public
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expenditure which can be deduced from examination of a large number of 
different stage of development. Their views contain a lot of insights in 
explaining changes in the relative size of government and variations in the mix of 
public services during the process of development. However, there have been 
few empirical studies as to why the relative size of public expenditure should rise 
or fall during the development process. Most of development models have not 
been tested properly.
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1. 2 Public Choice Models
1.2.1 The Median Voter Model
Whilst historical-development models outlined in the previous section were 
useful studies to find out the determinants of government expenditure, they were 
with few exceptions devoid of any appreciation of the theory of political process. 
Although these studies have contributed to the explanation of public expenditure, 
they have been criticised for employing ad hoc models with little basis on the 
theory of public choice. They have, however, pointed to the influence of per 
capita income, urbanisation, demographic change and population growth. These 
early studies ignored some important variables which are assumed to be the major 
determinants of government expenditure in public choice theory.
Public choice theorists apply the same behavioural assumptions of economics 
(the rational choice paradigm of human behaviour) to the analysis of political 
phenomena. By examining the demand side of the public expenditure equation and 
the supply side of the behaviour of government, public choice economists have 
attempted to develop a credible model of the determination of public expenditure. 
Based on the public choice methodology, they claim that demand and supply of 
public policies can be mediated through political institutions. In contrast with 
the neo-classical approach which assumes the role that perfect competition has 
played for markets, the public choice perspective emphasises the political 
decision-making process as an essential component of the government 
expenditure equation. In public choice analysis, politics and institutions do
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matter in determining the level of public expenditure, so that public choice 
models include the relevant aspects of the institutional structure within which 
public expenditure decisions are taken. Thus public choice models provide a 
solid foundation for the analysis of public sector behaviour and also produce 
testable hypotheses which are most easily translated into an empirical verifiable 
form. Since public choice models provide a foundation for a theory of political 
structure, we can use them to judge the desirability of different fiscal institutional 
designs.
One of the most solidly established models in the public choice theory is the 
median voter model of Downs (1957) and Black (1958). In the simplest version 
of the model, if voters have single-peaked preferences about different levels of 
government expenditures and if political parties provide their proposed levels of 
expenditures to maximise the probability to win the election, then public 
expenditure would be the median of the various expenditure levels most preferred 
by the median voter - in this case the median voter is the decisive voter. 
Therefore, in the simple median voter model, the most important determinant of 
the level and size of government expenditure is the preference of the median 
voter.
Although there had been several early attempts to use an explicit public choice 
model (such as Bowen (1943) and Downs (1957)), it was the work of 
Borcherding and Deacon (1972) and Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) that 
provided an empirically verifiable model of public expenditure. Based on the public 
choice approach, they develop a more specified expenditure equation - the median 
voter demand function. The model of Borcherding and Deacon and Bergstrom 
and Goodman has most widely been used for empirical analysis of public
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expenditure. Attention has been given to the estimation of the median voter’s 
demand function.5
Following the work of Borcherding and Deacon (1972) and Bergstrom and 
Goodman (1973), the demand function of public expenditure can be written in 
the following form:
G* = aT.hY.cU*
where G* is the quantity demanded of public services, Tm is the median voter's 
tax price of public goods, Ym is after tax income of the median voter, Ui is the 
error term and a, b, and c are parameters.
In this function, demand depends on the median voter's income and tax price. 
Since the median voter cannot be identified directly, many studies assume that the 
median voter has the median income. The tax price is calculated by multiplying 
the price of unit cost of government services by the tax share of the median voter. 
Since public output (G*) can not be measured directly, we need to calculate the 
variable on the basis of public expenditures. But due to the scale economies or 
diseconomies in production and the degree of publicness of collective goods, 
public expenditures are not a simple linear transformation of public output. The 
more people join to consume a given public service, the lower will be the level of 
service consumed by median voter. To evaluate the degree of publicness of public 
goods, Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) examine the following "crowding" 
parameter.
G* = GN-d
5 For a recent review article of the median voter model, see Holcombe (1989).
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where G is a total quantity of public good, N is the size of population and d is the 
crowding parameter. If d is zero, G represents a pure public good. On the other
hand, if d = 1, then it is a pure private good. Intermediate values ( o < d < 1)
imply quasi publicness or quasi privateness in consumption.
With these qualifications, we can derive the following public spending equation:
G*P* = a P* (tP*)b YrocUj 
where P* is the price of a unit of public services.
Although the variables G* and P* are not directly measurable, the product G*P* 
(public spending per taxpayer) is observable; it is public expenditure. The price of 
P* of a unit of G* is equal to PN, where P is the price of a unit of G. After 
substitutions are made and taking a logarithmic transformation,we can write a 
government expenditure function for the median voter:
log E = a + (1+b) log P + b log tm + d (1+b) log N + c log Ym + Ui
where E is the level of public expenditure (i.e. G*.P*).
From the above equation, per capita public spending (in real term) may be 
written as:
log (E/N) = a0 + a1log(Ym/Y) + a2logtm + a3logP + a4logN + Uj 
where Y„/Y is the median level of income relative to average incomes.
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From these public expenditure equations, we can estimate the coefficients 
econometrically; the price elasticity of demand (b), the income elasticity of 
demand (c) and the congestion parameter (d).
We can also identify the following explanations for the relative growth of 
government expenditure:
i) per capita income increase and the income elasticity of public expenditure is 
greater than unity
ii) redistribution of income will raise the median relative to the mean ( aj > 0 )
iii) changes in tax structure may result in a decrease in the tax burden of the 
median voter ( aj < 0 )
iv) due to the Baumol effect ( a3 <0)
v) due to low publicness of public goods ( a4 > 0 )
Many researchers have estimated public expenditure equation by using a variety 
of data sets and there have been a wide range of values reported in the 
literature. According to Rubinfeld's study (1987, p.608), estimates of the price 
elasticity of demand are generally very low, lie between -0.2 to -0.4. The 
income elasticity of demand for public goods varies from about 0.4 to 1.3 but 
most are substantially less than 1. The empirical results of estimating the 
median voter model are not conclusive; in some cases, the evidence is consistent 
with the model but in many others, the results are inconsistent with the 
hypothesis. For example, many early studies have found support for the median 
voter hypothesis; examples are Pommerehne and Schneider (1978, p.389)6, and
6 The resulting equation in the Pommerehne and Schneider model is
(the figures in brackets are t-statistics) 
log (E/P) = -11.09 + 1.29 logYm - 0.70 log tm - 0.631og P
* (6.97) (10.84) (7.93)
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Inman (1978). In contrast, Jackson (1990) has tested the model using time 
series data for the UK, France, Canada and the USA and has found 
disappointing results.
Although the median voter model provides many useful insights in explaining the 
growth of public spending, it has suffered from a number of criticisms. First, there 
is the problem of identification of the median voter. Given some strong 
assumptions such as identical tastes, monotonic relationship between income and 
public spending, the median voter is the person in the community occupying the 
house of median value or receiving the median income (Bergstrom and Goodman, 
1973). However, if the demand function for public goods is not monotonic or if 
voters have different tastes, then we cannot identify the median voter in this way. 
The actual identity of the median voter still remains a serious problem for the 
empirical testing of the model.
Second, the problem in the estimation of the demand function for public goods 
arises if public expenditures are financed by distortionary taxes. On the method 
of finance, Borcherding and Deacon (1972) simply assume that public goods are 
financed by non-discriminatory taxes and the tax share of the median voter is 1/N 
where N is the number of population. However, Wildasin (1989) argues that when 
public goods are financed by distortionary taxes, these tax distortions lead to 
errors in the estimation of the demand function. According to his criticism, if 
there exists a marginal cost of public funds, the estimated coefficients of the 
elasticity will be biased and will not reflect the median voter demand. In these 
circumstances, the true tax price is not just the tax share of the median voter. It 
must include the welfare cost of distortionary taxes.
Third, the most important limitation of the model is that the median voter model 
is clearly only a demand-side model in the public sector. The simple median voter 
model implies that the public sector produces what the median voters want. Many 
writers have criticised that the median voter model as being too simple a
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framework for the analysis of complex political institutions. The model ignores 
the supply side of the public sector, especially the role of politicians and 
bureaucrats. This approach of the political decision-making process is still , 
however, the subject of disputes. As pointed out by Jackson (1990, 1993), we 
need to extend the median voter model to include some important aspects of 
political institutions to develop a complete supply and demand model of the 
public sector.
1.2.2 Redistribution of Income and Wealth
In the early 1970s, the median voter model was accepted in public choice as 
descriptive for the analysis of public sector demand. By the end of that decade, 
however, it has been criticised by many writers. These writers argue that the 
median voter model ignores the redistributional aspects of government activities. 
Especially, since government spending for redistribution has increased rapidly in 
western industrialised countries, they looked at the expansion of the public sector 
by focusing the role of the redistributive function of government. They argue 
that since public expenditure reflects the activities of the welfare state and is also 
an instrument of redistribution policy, a more credible model of the determination 
of public expenditure must analyse government's redistributive activities.
Although their study is weakest in its empirical aspects, Aranson and Ordeshook 
(1981) criticised the median voter model and emphasised the role of 
redistribution policy in the expansion of the public sector. For example, they make
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the following statement: "This redistributive effect of government activities, and 
especially of regulation, is crucial for modelling the associated political processes. 
... The regulatory preference of the median voter now becomes entirely irrelevant, 
and legislative activity - committee politics - prevails both empirically and 
theoretically" (Aranson and Ordeshook, 1981, p.82). As Aranson and 
Ordeshook point out, public choice theorists need to analyse the redistributive 
motive of government activity for providing the basic explanation of the growth of 
public expenditure.
Meltzer and Richard (1978, 1981, 983) develop a more elegant model which 
emphasises voter's demand for redistribution as an important determination of the 
growth of government. They assume that all government expenditures have a 
redistributive component. The voters whose incomes are below the median will 
vote for an expansion of in public spending because they benefit if income above 
the mean are taxed and public services are distributed to them. Therefore if the 
median voter's income falls relative to the mean, then the size of government 
increases. In their model, government grows when suffrage is extended in a 
country because the extension of the franchise increases the number of voters 
below the median income who benefit from income redistribution. These new 
voters will support candidates who favour more redistribution. In the Meltzer and 
Richard model, increased inequality of income and the extension of suffrage are the 
main causes for the growth of government. Later, in their article (1983), they 
found empirical support for their hypothesis.
Compared with other writer's models, Peltzman (1980) has presented the most 
sophisticated model of the growth of government. While Peltzman also recognises 
the role of government as a redistributer of income, he analyses the vote-gathering 
and coalition formation processes more deeply which support the expansion of 
the public sector. In his model, increased equality of income is a major source of
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the growth of government because the more equal the distribution of income 
among groups, the more bargaining strength they would have and they can 
articulate support for more public spending. For example, he suggests the growth 
of the middle class is an important source of government growth. Peltzman 
argues the spread of education is an important factor in reducing the inequality of 
income and thus leading to the growth of public spending. Unlike the Meltzer and 
Richard model which rests on increasing inequality, Peltzman's model emphasises 
increasing equality of income as a main determinant of the growth of government. 
Peltzman finds empirical evidence for his hypothesis and his model explains a 
great deal of the growth of government in several industrialised countries.
Both Meltzer-Richard and Peltzman have examined the role of redistribution 
policy in the expansion of the public sector. They assume that most government 
expenditures are aimed at redistribution - even public consumption expenditure 
on goods and services. In their empirical works, they claim that the data they 
examine empirically fit their model. Although some other writers do not provide 
empirical evidence in support of their hypotheses, they also emphasise the role of 
government as a redistributor of income and wealth (see Brunner (1978), 
Aranson and Ordeshook (1981) and Lindbeck (1985)).
Although those wealth redistribution models have offered a different explanation 
for the growth of the public sector, some authors have argued that the pure wealth 
redistribution model is incomplete because the model ignores some important 
features of the political institutions. The pure model neglects the role of pressure 
groups, bureaucrats, and other political and constitutional institutions which affect 
the size of government. The pure wealth redistribution model needs to incorporate 
these supply-side factors. Public choice theorists argue that the size of 
government has increased far greater than is necessary to achieve redistribution. 
For example, Buchanan and Tullock (1977, p. 150) writes "The public sector
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may be indeed be "out of control" in the sense that its development is no longer 
related to the desires of the ultimate purchasers of governmental services."
Due to the multidimensional character of government activities, it is difficult to 
rationalise all government expenditures as purely aimed at redistribution. For 
example, the pure wealth redistribution model cannot explain the rapid growth of 
public employment in the government sector in many developed countries. 
Therefore, as Mueller notes (1989, p.333), "The hypotheses put forward so far, 
which attempt to explain the growth of government in simple redistributional 
terms, are inadequate. Some additional elements are needed to complete the 
story. Two villains often mentioned as instrumental in the growth of government 
are interest groups and bureaucrats."
1.2.3 Fiscal Illusion
Many authors have introduced the concept of fiscal illusion to explain the 
growth of government. They argue that if government can design certain methods 
of public financing that make citizens think they pay less taxes than they actually 
pay, then fiscal illusion occurs and this illusion leads to an increase in public 
budgets because citizens do not perceive the true cost of government program. 
Those writers emphasise the institutional structure of public financing as an 
important determinant of government expenditure.7
^ For a comprehensive review article of the fiscal illusion hypothesis, see Oates (1988).
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Drawing on earlier work by an Italian scholar, A. Puviani, Buchanan (1967) 
has developed the fiscal illusion hypothesis into a positive theory of government. 
In his book, Buchanan examined various sources of revenue which are less visible 
to citizens and can create fiscal illusion. In particular, Buchanan stresses the 
complexity of the revenue system as a main source of fiscal illusion. According to 
his analysis, complex revenue structures containing many small taxes rather than a 
few larger ones will reduce the perceived tax burden and can create illusory 
effects ( Buchanan, 1967, p. 135 ). If, for example, public revenues are raised 
from a single-base revenue structure, the taxpayer would surely be more 
conscious of the tax burden associated with public services. However, if public 
expenditures are raised from a more complex revenue structure, then it is more 
difficult for the taxpayer to perceive the true tax prices of public services and it is 
likely that they underestimate their tax burdens. The hypothesis implies that a 
more complex revenue structure will lead to an expansion in public budget.
Although he does not test the hypothesis with econometric techniques, Goetz 
(1977) reviews the various forms of fiscal illusion and notes that the revenue 
structure in which governments raise revenues can affect the level and composition 
of public budgets. According to Goetz’s study, the major form of fiscal illusion 
comes in the form of indirect taxes and of debt finance which can create illusory 
effects.
Richard Wagner (1976) attempted the first empirical studies for the fiscal 
illusion hypothesis, using the 50 largest US local government data. He proxies the 
complexity of the tax structure by a measure of simplicity: the Herfindahl index
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that is widely used in industrial organisation theory. Wagner's measure of the tax 
simplicity ( S ) is written:
S = X R i2
«=1
where Rj is the proportion of total city revenues generated from tax 
source i. The simpler the tax structure, the larger the value of S. In the extreme, 
if only one tax is used to raise revenue, S is equal to 1. The fiscal illusion 
hypothesis posits a negative coefficient for S. Using the Herfindahl index as the 
measure of the illusion variable, Wagner (1976) finds that the simplicity of tax 
structure is associated with lower levels of public expenditure, thus supporting 
the fiscal illusion hypothesis.
While R. Wagner finds empirical evidence for the illusion hypothesis, 
subsequent econometric studies have produced mixed results. Munley and 
Greene (1978) re-examines Wagner's model, using a sample of US cities much 
like that of Wagner. They find that the empirical result is sensitive to the 
specification of the equation (especially the omission of population), thus the 
estimated coefficient is not supportive of Wagner's hypothesis.
In another study of public spending for higher education in the US, Clotfelter 
(1976) finds no correlation between the complexity of the tax structure and the 
level of public expenditure. The estimated coefficient of the Herfindahl index is 
not significantly different from zero, suggesting that the fiscal illusion hypothesis 
does not apply to public higher education. In his empirical study, Clotfelter 
suggests that a heavier reliance on visible revenue (direct taxation) has a 
depressing effect on public spending relative to reliance on invisible source 
(indirect taxation) because in the case of visible revenue, taxpayers have a more
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certain perception of the cost of publicly provided goods. Pommerehne and 
Schneider (1978), using data from the 110 largest Swiss municipalities, have 
examined the fiscal illusion hypothesis and found that the coefficient of the 
Herfindahl index had the expected negative sign and statistically significant. In 
addition to this empirical evidence, they also find that the fiscal illusion effect is 
much stronger in democracies with referendum compared with no public 
referenda. Breeden and Hunter (1985) offer evidence for the fiscal illusion 
model. Using data from 37 large US cities, they have examined the relationship 
between the tax structure and the size of the public budget. By estimating the 
commonly cited fiscal illusion model, they found that the coefficient of the 
Herfindahl index was negative and statistically significant, thus supporting the 
fiscal illusion theory.
In addition to the revenue complexity hypothesis, Buchanan (1967) also 
proposes the income elasticity hypothesis and notes that "In a period of rapidly 
increasing national product, that tax institution characterised by the highest 
elasticity will tend, other things equal, to generate the largest volume of public 
spending " (p.65). According to the income elasticity hypothesis, more income- 
elastic tax structures lead to higher levels of public expenditure because of a fiscal 
illusion effect. Oates (1975) has done the first empirical studies for the 
income elasticity hypothesis. Using data from state and local governments in 
the US from 1960 to 1970, he examined the relationship between tax elasticity 
and local government expenditure growth. He found a positive and statistically 
significant relation of tax elasticity with expenditure growth and the effect of tax 
elasticity on the growth of public spending was most significant at the local level 
of government. Craig and Heins (1980) also found a positive relationship 
between the income elasticity of the tax system and the level of expenditure, 
supporting for the elasticity theory in their test of state government revenue. 
However, DiLorenzo (1982) , using a sample of 66 local governments in the US,
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found that expenditure growth was negatively related to an income-elastic tax 
system. He attributes this to Tiebout-like migration effects caused by a higher tax 
burden. Based on his empirical evidence, DiLorenzo casts doubt on the validity 
of the elasticity hypothesis.
From the above discussion, we can see that the empirical results of the various 
studies of the fiscal illusion hypothesis are somewhat mixed. Many scholars 
have attempted to develop a model based on public choice theory to explain the 
hypothesis that the illusion-inducing revenue structures lead to higher levels and 
rates of growth of public expenditure. They claim that fiscal illusion is another 
important source of budget expansion. Researchers have offered empirical 
evidence for the hypothesis. However, in many other cases, the evidence is not 
consistent with the illusion hypothesis. These mixed empirical results lead Oates 
(1988) to conclude that "although all five cases entail plausible illusion hypotheses, 
none of them have very compelling empirical support" ( p. 78 ).
Since there is no strong empirical evidence for the hypothesis, it has been 
widely suggested that the fiscal illusion hypothesis is not sufficient to explain 
much of the growth of government in many countries. Especially when we look at 
the tax revolt in European countries and the United States in the 1970s, it seems 
doubtful that taxpayers consistently misperceive their prices.
In these respects, the fiscal illusion hypothesis does not by itself explain the 
whole picture of the growth of government. To explain the complex phenomenon 
such as the growth of government, the fiscal illusion model needs to be combined 
with some other alternative hypotheses.
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1.2.4 Bureaucracy
The growth of bureaucracy has been claimed by many scholars to be another 
important source of budget growth. In contrast with demand side explanations 
such as the median voter model, the bureaucracy model focuses on the influence 
of bureaucratic power in determining the level and relative size of public 
expenditure. For example, the median voter model of the demand for public 
expenditure assumes that politicians and bureaucrats are neutral, and they do not 
exercise their independent power over how much public output to be produced. 
However, the demand side analysis of the determinants of public expenditure has 
been criticised as somewhat unrealistic because that approach ignores the 
discretionary power of governmental and bureaucratic agencies.
For the last several decades, many writers have argued that bureaucrats are 
motivated by their own self-interest and they also have their own preferences. 
These writers have also asserted that bureaucrats are budget-maximisers and 
bureaucrat's' preferences influence the size and the growth of public expenditure. 
Therefore, many analysts have attempted to extend the simple demand side 
model to include the bureaucratic influence on public spending levels.
The most widely cited economic model of bureaucracy is that of Niskanen 
(1968, 1971, 1975). In contrast to the traditional approach to public
administration which emphasises the public interest as the distinguishing 
characteristics of bureaucrats, Niskanen presents a formal model of bureaucracy 
based on a public choice perspective. Niskanen's approach is that the bureaucracy 
can be modelled in much similar ways to those employed by economists studying 
the behaviour of individuals in the private business. Since Niskanen was the first
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who studied the influence of bureaucrats on budget growth within the public 
choice framework and his model was widely used as an analytic approach to the 
bureaucracy, we will examine his model of bureaucracy in this section.
The Niskanen model rests on the following two central assumptions: (1) 
bureaucrats maximise the size of their budgets subject to the constraint that the 
budget must cover the costs of production. (2) bureaucrats posses both 
discretionary and monopoly powers over the supply of their outputs. Under 
these assumptions, Niskanen proposes the budget-maximising bureau model 
which implies that bureaucrats would maximise budgets as a way of maximising 
utility. In his model, power, pay and prestige are all assumed to be positive 
functions of the bureaucrat's budget. According to his own words, "salary, 
perquisites of the office, public reputation, power, patronage, output of the 
bureau, ease of making change, and ease of managing the bureau. All of these 
variables ... are a positive monotonic function of the total budget of the bureau 
during the bureaucrat's tenure in office" (Niskanen, 1971, p. 3 8). In short, the 
main implication of Niskanen's model is that bureaucrats use their monopoly 
powers in order to increase budget and output levels that are above the socially 
optimal level. Budgets will be excessive in the Niskanen model.
Like other economic models, Niskanen's model is built around the notion of 
supply and demand. The Niskanen model can be stated more formally in the 
following terms.
Demand for the bureau's output is assumed to come from the legislature. The 
legislature places a value on different levels of output and offers a schedule of 
budgets, B, equal to this total evaluation. The legislature's budget evaluation 
function represents the maximum budget that the legislature is willing to grant to
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the bureau for a specific output. This produces the legislature’s budget evaluation 
curve (TB) such as:
TB = aQ - bQ2 ( a and b > 0 ) (1)
where Q is the level of bureau output 
a and b are constants
On the supply side, output is produced by a monopolistic bureau whose head is a 
budget-maximising bureaucrat. The cost of producing each level of output 
(TC) is given by:
TC = cQ + dQ2 ( c and d > 0 ) (2)
It is assumed that the cost of producing output is known only by the bureaucrats 
and not by the legislature, i.e. the distribution of knowledge is asymmetric. The 
legislature knows the public benefit schedule but they cannot see the true cost of 
providing public services. Thus the bureaucrat acts to secure the largest budget 
that he can for his bureau, subject to the constraint that he must be able to deliver 
the Q which he promises. How do legislatures and bureaucrats interact to arrive at 
a decision? As clearly indicated in his model, Niskanen regards the bureau to be a 
monopoly supplier of Q while the legislature is a monopoly buyer (a monopsonist). 
The relationship between the bureau and the legislature is seen as one of bilateral 
monopoly. But, in his book, Niskanen (1971) goes further and argues that 
"although the nominal relation of a bureau and its sponsor is that of a bilateral 
monopoly, the relative incentives and available information, under most 
conditions, give the bureau the overwhelmingly dominant monopoly power" 
(P-30).
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The conclusions of the Niskanen model can be derived from the bureaucrat's 
constrained optimisation problem. That is the budget to be maximised subject to 
the constraint that the budget must cover the cost of production:
Maximise TB = aQ - bQ2 
Subject to aQ - bQ2 = CQ + dQ2
Optimality from the first order condition requires that the marginal benefit equals 
marginal cost
MB = MC
Differentiating (1) and (2), the socially optimal level of bureau output (or the 
legislature's optimum) is given by:
MB = a - 2bQ (3)
MC = c + 2dQ (4)
Solving forQ  from the equality of (3) and (4) produces
o = - —2 b + d
In contrast with the legislature's optimum, the bureau optimum in the budget- 
constrained condition is given by the following condition:
TB = TC
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Solving for Q from the equality o f  (1) and (2) gives
Therefore the bureau tends to produce twice as much output as the social 
optimum ( Q *  = 1 /2  Q ) .
From the above discussion, we can see that there are two solutions to the 
budget output decision, depending on the prevailing cost and demand conditions. 
These are illustrated in Figure 1.1.
Figure 1.1 Total Evaluation Function and Alternative Total Cost Functions
A
Oudijc l ( 6 )  
C o st  ( O
(
O u t p u t2o
EJfiCitni
s o l u t i o n
C o s t  C O n s i / d i i t c J  
s o l u t i o n
Ocit'.di.J c o n s u a m e d  
s o l u t i o n
40
To derive the social optimal condition, we need two additional assumptions: 
that the legislature's total evaluation of Q is an accurate reflection of the underlying 
society's evaluation, and that the cost used represents the minimum social costs 
of supplying Q. (1) Under these assumptions, the social optimum occurs where 
the marginal social benefit to the legislature equals to the marginal social cost of 
supply. In Figure 1, this is where the slope of total evaluation function (B) equals 
the slope of total cost function (C). The social optimum occurs at Q = (a-c) / 
2(b+d). (2) Under the cost-constrained conditions, the bureaucrat can secure the 
level of output for which the budget is large enough to cover costs. It corresponds 
to Q=(a-c) / (b+d) and it is twice the social optimal output. (3) Under the 
demand-constrained conditions, the bureau will make the unconstrained choice 
and secure the maximum budget Q=a/2b. This is the maximum budget that the 
bureaucrat can secure and it produces an even greater amount of social waste.
The Niskanen model has provided a large set of hypotheses concerning the 
level of government budgets, the production efficiency of bureau and the 
consequences of the bureaucratic structure. The main implication of his model is 
that when government services are supplied by monopolistic bureau, then the level 
of public output and the budget size will be higher than that which is socially 
optimal. In the pure Niskanen model, government will be too large. Niskanan's 
results provide some important policy implications to those who wish to find 
alternative institutional arrangements that have a capacity for improving social 
efficiency. Niskanen's model also suggests that there will be efficiency gains on 
moving away from monopoly bureau and towards competitive market supply.
While Niskanen was the first who proposed the budget maximisation model 
within public choice framework, and his work was widely cited in the 
bureaucracy literature, many scholars have criticised the central behavioural 
assumptions of Niskanen's simple model. In particular, many commentators
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have raised questions about the two assumptions and suggested that those 
assumptions are unrealistic and cannot be acceptable. They have altered the 
original simple Niskanen model and attempted to incorporate a more complex 
bureaucratic motivation into a revised model.
The basic criticism of Niskanen’s model has centred around the assumption of 
budget maximisation. As clearly pointed out by Niskanen, it is assumed that 
there exists a positive monotonic relationship between the size of budget and the 
salary of bureaucrats. But many authors have argued that this assumption is 
too narrow and bureaucrat's salaries are not solely a function of the size of 
the budget. For example, in the USA, Breton and Wintrobe (1975) assert that 
the salary of bureaucrats and other benefits may be greater in the small bureaux 
than in larger ones. In the Canadian government, they also find that the salaries 
of bureaucrats in the Department of finance are greater than in much larger 
bureaux such as Health and Welfare. Furthermore, they argue that some 
bureaucrats may prefer budget cuts as a means to their promotion.
After examining the UK civil service, Jackson (1982) notes that "Moreover, 
if, as in the UK, the bureaucrat's salary, perquisites etc. are not related to budget 
size" (Jackson, 1982, p. 133). He asserts that the salaries of UK bureaucrats is 
fixed irrespective of the size of the bureau's budget. Later, Jackson (1985) has 
also criticised Niskanen's specification of the bureaucrat's utility function. 
According to Jackson's view, the bureaucrat's utility function is much more 
complex than those proposed by Niskanen and bureaucrats may pursue other 
goals such as a relative expansion of slack instead of large budget. In his own 
words, "some bureaucrats might prefer to maximise their leisure time - in 
particular their 'on the job leisure'. This organisational slack or economic rent 
will be taken out in the form of long lunch breaks, unnecessary and lengthy 
committee meetings and an avoidance of change" (Jackson, 1985, p. 184).
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Migue and Belanger (1974) have also attacked the simple Niskanen model and 
pointed out that if the increase in the budget size comes at the expense of other 
utility enhancing items such as a quiet life, bureaucrats are not necessarily 
budget maximisers. Using the notion of organisational slack, they have revised 
the simple Niskanen model to include some other motives (such as economic 
rents, excess revenues or discretionary profit) that limit the bureaucrat's desire 
to maximise the size of budget. Since the Migue-Belanger model of 
bureaucracy, the pursuit of slack, X-inefficiency and risk aversion have been 
put forward as the most plausible goals of bureaucratic behaviour.8 For this 
reason, many analysts have argued that the complex nature of the bureaucrat's 
preference function makes it impossible to deduce any behavioural characteristics 
of public bureaux.
Aside from the problem of the budget maximisation hypothesis, many 
criticisms have focused on the assumption of bureau bargaining power. In 
Niskanen's model, bureaucrats posses the monopoly power over the supply of 
their output. Niskanen assumes that the bureau is a monopolist supplier of public 
services, and only the bureau knows the true cost of producing output. Due to 
informational advantage, bureaucrats posses overwhelming bargaining power 
in relation to the sponsor and they are in a position to make an all-or-nothing 
offer to the sponsor that maximises the bureau's budget. The bureaucrat is all 
powerful in the pure Niskanen model, whilst the sponsor has very little power.
However, a large group of writers has argued that this is empirically 
unacceptable assumption. Breton and Wintrobe (1975) have pointed out that 
sponsors posses monitoring devices which enable them to control the bureau's 
budget maximisation. They argue that sponsors will invest in devices to reduce
8 For a more detail discussion of X-inefficiency and slack resources, see Mueller (1989, 
p.257) and Wyckoff (1990).
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the bureau's budget. These monitoring devices include the close examination 
of proposed budgets, the creation of budgetary watchdog agencies and the 
use of various monitoring agencies.
In the similar way, McGuire (1981) suggests that sponsors have more 
information and power than bureaucrats because sponsors in the US local 
government are heavily involved in the budgetary process and they are more 
educated about the production function of local public services than 
bureaucrats. McGuire also finds that price elasticities of demand for public 
services are almost less than unity and these empirical results are not consistent 
with Niskanen's model that bureaucrats seek to maximise budgets.
Moreover, Miller and Moe (1983) have emphasised the role of the sponsor in 
determining the size of budget. They argue that if the sponsor can conceal his 
demand from the bureau, then the sponsor is able to control the bureau's budget. 
To curb over-provision caused by bureaucrats, Miller and Moe stress a 
legislative constraint on budget maximisation.
In contrast to the US bureaucrat of Niskanen's model, several British 
scholars, led by Jackson (1981, 1985) and Cullis and Jones (1993) argue that 
there are more checks and accountability for the bureau in the UK. Jackson 
emphasises the role of the legislature and the complex organisational structure 
in the UK budget system such as the Westminster model and the Cabinet 
decision-making process.
Although Niskanen's model has come under attack, some empirical studies 
have been done to test the budget maximisation hypothesis. One difficulty with 
testing Niskanen's model is that it requires the optimum size of public budget. 
In a review article, Niskanen (1975, p.638) himself notes that "no available 
study, to my knowledge, directly addresses the oversupply hypothesis". 
However, some indirect tests have been done by several analysts.
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For example, Deacon (1979) have examined the cost difference between the 
private and public sector and found that non-competitive local government in 
Los Angeles can increase budgets by as much as 25 percent.
Borcherding (1977) also offers evidence that the public sector producers 
charge higher prices than the competitive suppliers. He also finds that the cost 
differentials between private and publicly owned firms will be narrowed if the 
public producers face more competition. These findings lead him to conclude 
that "it appears that waste is directly related to a bureau's monopoly power. 
The removal of an activity from the private to the public sector will double its 
unit costs of production" (Borcherding, 1977, p. 62). Borcherding's conclusion 
implies that competition may force the bureaucrat to reveal his true cost 
function to legislature which allows them to control the bureau's budget.
Romer and Rosenthal (1978, 1979 a, 1982) have found empirical evidence 
for the Niskanen model. Using the notion of a 'reversion budget', they have 
analysed the formation of school budgets in Oregon. In Oregon school 
districts, school boards can increase the budget size by proposing larger 
budgets at an annual referendum. If the proposed budget fails, the budget 
reverts back to the level set by law, so that if the reversion level is below the 
level favoured by the median voter, the larger budget is accepted. According 
to their empirical studies, referenda pass budgets from 16.5 to 43.6 percent 
higher than most preferred by the median voter. Romer and Rosenthal's studies 
have provided the most strong empirical evidence for the budget maximisation 
hypothesis.
Most empirical studies for Niskanen's model have dealt with the case in the 
USA. Recently, however, Cullis and Jones (1993) have tested the Niskanen 
model in the UK. Using annual data for the period 1948-89 in the UK, they 
have examined the relationship between the number of bureaucrats and the 
relative size of government and found that the growth of bureaucrats in the UK 
has a negative effect on the share of government in national income. Based on
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these empirical findings, they conclude that "while bureaucrats cannot be cast 
as paragons of all economic virtues, they are surely not repositories of all 
economic vices either" (Cullis and Jones, 1993, p. 101).
Similarly, after examining the empirical evidence in support for the budget- 
maximising model of bureaucracy, Conybeare (1984, p.486) notes that "In 
general, the empirical studies offer little support for the budget maximisation 
hypothesis."
Public choice model of bureaucracy has provided an important proposition 
that the activity of bureaucrats is a significant variable in explaining the growth 
of the public sector. Many scholars have attempted to develop the economic 
model of bureaucracy and to analyse the influence of bureaucratic behaviour on 
public sector budgets. However, as yet, we do not have a well-developed 
dynamic theory of bureaucratic behaviour. Moreover, the hypothesis that 
bureaucratic power leads to larger budgets is yet to be tested. Most empirical 
studies have adopted an indirect method to test the bureaucratic power 
hypothesis. The study of bureaucracy has just begun to raise some basic 
questions and to develop models to explain the role of the bureaucracy in the 
public sector. We need a more adequate model of bureaucracy and further 
research in this field.
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1.2.5 Baumol's Model
In 1967, Baumol proposed a model of unbalanced growth which is now a 
classic model of public sector growth. In his model, Baumol argued that because 
government is inherently a labour-intensive sector, productivity increases in 
government are presumed to be smaller than those for other areas of the economy 
(which are typically more capital intensive). Because of technological 
differences between the two sectors and due to low rates of productivity growth 
in the public sector, there would exist productivity disparities. If so, the relative 
cost of government services would rise over time, and this could lead to a 
steadily growing share of the public sector.
Baumol attempted to explain the growth of government by analysing 
unbalanced growth (or lagging productivity) between the public and private 
sector. Since the Baumol hypothesis of low productivity has provided a useful 
insight to explain the relative expansion of the public sector, his model has 
attracted considerable attention for a wide array of applications. In this section, 
we will examine the Baumol hypothesis of unbalanced productivity growth.
Baumol (1967) divided the economy into two sectors: one progressive and the 
other non-progressive (stagnant) sector. The progressive sector is characterised by 
a cumulative increase in productivity per man-hour, and in this sector, 
technological progress and innovations cause an exponential rise in output over 
time. In the non-progressive sector, however, labour productivity increases at a 
slower rate than that in the progressive sector. An important aspect of the non- 
progressive sector is that technological change can be introduced only as an 
exceptional case. Thus, Baumol's model implies that there exists a productivity
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differential between the two sectors and the low rate of productivity increases in 
the public sector is the main cause of public sector expansion.
Since labour is the only factor input in the Baumol model, the productivity 
differential between the two sectors can be explained by the key role that is played 
by labour in the production activity. In the progressive sector (for example, the 
manufacturing sector) "labour is primarily an instrument". Along with innovation 
and capital accumulation, capital can be substituted for labour without reducing 
the level of output. However, in the non-progressive sector (for example, the 
personal service industry and the local public sector in particular), "labour is itself 
the end product" (Baumol, 1967). In the non-progressive sector, labour services 
are themselves part of the product and the quality of products is judged in terms of 
the amount of labour input. If we reduced labour input in the non-progressive 
sector, the quality of product would be changed.
An example of the problem of introducing technological changes into non­
progressive sector was suggested by Alan Peacock (1969, p.325) in the following 
remarks:
“Removing Judge Brack from the cast of Hedda Gabler would certainly reduce 
labour input to Ibsen's masterpiece but it would also destroy the product. Nor could 
one increase the productivity of the cast by performing the play at twice the speed.”
Another example is the class size for teachers. As pointed out by Baumol
(1967, p.416) himself, teachers cannot be easily replaced by machines because
teachers should pay personal attention to the students in the class. Despite some
innovations in teaching methods, there is some limit for the class size.
Therefore, the production function of the non-progressive sector is 
characterised by high labour intensity as compared to the progressive sector. 
Technological progress for improving labour productivity in the non-progressive 
sector is limited. These non-progressive activities include the service industries
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(such as restaurants, leisure time activity and the performing arts) and a lot of 
local public services (such as education, health care, police and fire protection). 
Productivity increases in the non-progressive sector are inherently difficult to 
achieve and they take place at a slow rate. Due to the innate lack of 
productivity growth and the limitation of technological change, the unit costs of 
these services would rise over time relative to those in the progressive sector.
The Baumol hypothesis of unbalanced growth can be stated more formally in the 
following way. The output of the non-progressive public sector (X,) is produced 
only by labour inputs (L,) which has a constant level of productivity. In the 
progressive private sector, on the other hand, labour productivity grows at an 
exponential rate r, which produces an exponential growth in the output of this 
sector (X2). Thus, the production functions can be written
where X2 is the output of the private sector Lj is labour used in the private 
sector, r is the rate of technological progress, t is a time subscript, and a,x and 
are constant terms.
From equations (1) and (2), we can derive the ratio of non-progressive sector 
(government) output to total output
a)
X* = (a, e») Lj, (2)
Xu a\Lu
Xu + Xn a\L\t + (a2ert)L2t (3)
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The wage rates between the two sectors are assumed to be equal, and they 
increase in line with labour productivity in the private sector. Then
w, = w0 e* (4)
where wtis the wage rate in period t and w0 is a constant.
The unit costs in the public sector (Clt) follow from equation (4):
(woen)Lu woe*
C i  < = -------------------= ----------
ci\L\t a\ (5)
The unit costs in the private sector (C*,) are
^  _  (woe*)L2t _  wo
{a2e*)L2t Q2 (6)
We can now derive the relative costs between two sectors :
Ci, _ Woe* I Wo _ ci2
C2, a\ <22 a\ (7)
Hence the unit costs of output in the public sector (Cu) will steadily increase 
with the rise of productivity, while the unit costs in the private sector(C2t) will 
remain constant.
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From these equations, we can see some important properties o f the Baumol 
model. First, if the ratio o f public sector output to total output (equation 3) is to 
remain constant, then labour must be transferred from the private to the public 
sector. Second, if labour resources are transferred from the private to  the public 
sector, public sector exhaustive expenditure o f which a large proportion is spent 
on wages and salaries will rise faster than private sector expenditure because the 
same money wage rate is paid in both sectors but productivity o f the public sector 
is lagging behind that o f the private sector.
In the Baumol model o f unbalanced growth, the price o f public sector output 
relative to private sector output will increase over time. Due to differential 
productivity between the public and private sector, the relative prices o f public 
sector outputs will rise with the passage o f time (the cost disease arguments). It 
has been known in public expenditure analysis as "the relative price effects". In 
national income accounts, the relative price effect means that the relative price o f 
public sector inputs rises faster than the price o f private sector output; i.e. the 
price deflator for government expenditure rises faster than the GNP deflator. 
Therefore, in the published national accounts figures, the nominal ratios o f 
government expenditure to GNP tend to rise, while real ratios decline over time 9
Since the seminal contribution by Baumol (1967) to the study o f public 
sector growth, many researchers have tested the Baumol productivity disparity 
hypothesis.
Bradford, Malt, and Oates (1969) were the first who examined the rate o f 
growth o f productivity o f the public sector. Using data for US cities, they have 
examined the trend o f the unit costs o f four local public services (education, 
police, fire and hospitals). Bradford-Malt-Oates found that due to a low rate o f
9 These statistical ratios of the public sector's share in GNP are discussed further in 
Chapter 2.
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productivity growth, the unit costs o f providing these local public services rose 
at 5 to 7 percent annual rate over the 1947-1967 period and rising costs were 
much more intense in local governments than those in the rest o f the economy. 
Estimating the changes o f the unit costs o f public sector output, they have 
provided indirect evidence for the Baumol model.
Similarly, Spann (1977 ) tested the Baumol hypothesis and found that "the 
degree o f accuracy is reasonably good" because the model predicts the 
increased rate o f growth in government expenditure for the period 1950-60. 
Spann also found that the annual price increase o f public sector output was 1.5 
percent during this period. His empirical results support for the Baumol cost 
disease hypothesis.
Contrary to the empirical support for the Baumol model, Gramlich (1982) 
argues that in the US federal government, public sector productivity has risen 
during the 1970s. By citing some empirical studies (The Civil Service 
Commission and The Office o f Personal Management), Gramlich suggests that 
there are some positive productivity increases in the US public sector (about 1.2 
percent to 1.7 percent over the 1967-1979 period). These positive rates o f 
productivity increases in the public sector lead him to conclude that "there is 
nothing to activate the Baumol model, and little reason to  fear that it will lead to 
progressively larger shares o f output devoted to the public sector" (Gramlich, 
1982, p.298).
Pommerehne and Schneider (1982) have tested the Baumol hypothesis o f 
lagging productivity for Switzerland. Using local government expenditures data 
from 48 Swiss municipalities for the period 1965-1975, they have estimated 
actual (7.85 percent) and predicted (7.69 percent) growth rate o f government 
expenditure for the 1965-1975 period. They find that the model's overall
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performance is good and the results are statistically significant. Their empirical 
findings are favourable for the Baumol model in Switzerland.
In his original work, Baumol (1967) did not give empirical evidence for the 
basic model o f unbalanced growth. Recently, however, Baumol et al. (1985) 
offer evidence that the relative price o f government sector outputs has risen for 
at least four decades. Using national account data, Baumol-Blackman-Wolff 
(1985) calculate sectoral rates of productivity growth in the US economy for 
the period o f 1947-1976. They find that productivity growth in the public sector 
(especially government industry and government enterprise) has lagged behind 
that o f the private sector by 2.5 percent per year over the study period. This 
empirical evidence supports the original Baumol model.
The Baumol model has provided a useful insight into why the public sector 
grows rapidly relative to the private sector. In his model, the cause o f 
unbalanced growth comes from the greater labour intensity in the public sector 
compared with the private sector. On the supply side, the Baumol model can 
explain the growth o f government exhaustive expenditures with the lagging 
productivity hypothesis. The relative price effect is also an important 
determinant o f the growth o f public expenditure. Many researchers have 
offered evidence for the Baumol model o f unbalanced growth.
However, the Baumol model has suffered from many criticisms. In 
particular, the Baumol model ignores the institutional influences on the growth 
o f public expenditure. As Peacock and Wiseman (1979, p. 12) point out; "We 
know o f no evidence to suggest that technical barriers opposing innovation in the 
public sector are higher than in the private sector. We suspect that the institutional 
barriers are greater. — The theory tells us that bureaucrats are in charge o f
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productivity operations in which they have a monopoly o f supply and a monopoly 
o f information about the way in which supply is produced."
We need to extend the simple Baumol model to include some additional supply 
side pressures (for example, the role o f bureaucrats and interest groups).
54
1.2.6 The Political Business Cycle
Since the mid-1970s, economists have become increasingly concerned with the 
political business cycle theory. By studying the behaviour o f politicians and the 
electorate, public choice theorists have attempted to explain the interdependence 
between the economy and polity. Since its development in modem forms, the 
politico-economic model has provided some insights into macroeconomic cycles 
in price, output and employment.
The basic idea which underlies the political theory o f the business cycle is that 
voters have preferences about economic conditions which are reflected in their 
political behaviour, and that governments aim to win elections which make them 
vote maximisers; and therefore, governments manipulate the economy in order 
to increase their chances for re-election. Thus, governments seek to produce the 
most desirable economic conditions just prior to an election and postpone 
unfavourable conditions afterward. Instead o f being exogenous factors in 
economic affairs, government behaviour becomes an endogenous variable in the 
macroeconomic system because governments actively create the election cycle 
in order to improve their re-election chance.
According to the political business cycle hypothesis, the state o f the economy 
(in particular GNP growth, unemployment and inflation) influences voters 
attitudes and election outcomes: the worse the economic conditions are, the less 
the voters support for the government. The political business cycle model predicts
55
falling unemployment (rising GNP) prior to an election and rising 
unemployment (falling inflation ) afterward.
Since the best known o f politico-economic models is the work o f Nordhaus, it 
is worth to discuss the Nordhaus model in some detail. In his provocative paper, 
Nordhaus (1975) develops the basic model o f the political business cycle in its 
modem form and presents some evidence for his hypothesis. Nordhaus' 
political business cycle is based upon the following three assumptions. First, the 
economy is characterised by a Phillips curve. There exists a trade-off between 
inflation and unemployment. Second, voters are myopic and backward-looking 
in evaluating economic conditions. They are concerned only with economic 
conditions (especially the level o f unemployment and the rate o f inflation) at the 
time o f elections and heavily discount past observations. Finally, governments 
can manipulate the economy so as to improve their chances o f re-election and 
they do not have partisan objectives.10
Under these assumptions, Nordhaus shows that the incumbent government 
stimulates the economy at the election time in order to provide favourable 
economic conditions, and that the rate o f unemployment tends to  fall just before 
the election while the rate o f inflation tends to rise as a results o f the pre- 
electoral economic expansion. After the election, the government follows 
deflationary policies to reduce inflation.
Thus, in the Nordhaus version, governments deliberately cause political 
business cycles with decreasing unemployment (rising inflation) before the election, 
rising unemployment (falling inflation) afterward. Cycles in unemployment and
For the contrast between Nordhaus1 view and the views of rational partisan theory, 
see Alesina (1989), Alesina and Roubini (1992).
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inflation will be set up and the election cycles will persist as a regular 
phenomenon. The optimal political business cycle is shown in Figure 1.2. 
Although the tests are simple in design, Nordhaus (1975) provides reasonable 
evidence for his political business cycle hypothesis. He finds that ,over the 
period o f 1947-72, unemployment rates rise during the first half of 
incumbencies and fall during the second half o f each regular electoral period in 
three o f the nine countries, Germany, New Zealand and the USA.










Note: The figure is purely illustrative. For a more complicated shape, see 
Nordhaus (1975, p. 185) and Paldam (1981, p.291)
57
Since the influential work o f Nordhaus (1975), a number o f attempts have 
been made to test the political business cycle hypothesis. M ost o f the empirical 
work on political cycles has been performed on US data. While many authors 
have supported the view that macroeconomic economic conditions affect voter 
behaviour and elections outcomes, the empirical studies which have examined 
the validity o f the political business cycle theory have found mixed results at 
best.
For example, Tufte (1978) provides favourable empirical evidence that 
government pursues expansionary policies in election years. He examines the 
growth o f real income in election and non-election years from 1961 to 1972 for 
the British and American governments and finds that real income has been 
accelerated more rapidly in the election years than in other years. These 
evidence are generally consistent with the prediction o f the political business 
cycle hypothesis. Although Tufte does not provide statistical tests, he 
presents the most favourable results for the Nordhaus' political business cycle 
model.
A sophisticated econometric test is provided by McCallum (1977). Using 
seasonally adjusted quarterly US data for the period 1948 -1974, he tests for 
the existence o f the electoral cycle. It is assumed that patterns o f the 
electoral variables would be consistent with the general idea o f the political 
business cycle hypothesis. Then, he examines whether the inclusion o f a dummy 
variable provides additional explanatory power and finds that the electoral 
variable has no incremental explanatory power. With these negative empirical 
results, McCallum casts doubt on the relevance o f the Nordhaus model.
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MacRae (1977) also tests the political business cycle theory by a survey data 
for the four American governments from 1957 to 1972. By examining 
patterns o f unemployment and inflation in the US over the study period, he 
finds that the political business cycle hypothesis is only confined to the Kennedy 
and Johnson years and that there is no evidence for the electoral cycle 
during the Eisenhower and Nixon administrations. These results question the 
validity o f the empirical relevance o f the political business cycle model.
M ore rigorous econometric tests is provided by Beck (1982). Using 
seasonally adjusted monthly US data, he examines whether the government 
attempts to manipulate the economy in order to aid in an election; i.e. whether 
unemployment decreases around election dates. According to his estimates, 
there was no evidence o f falling unemployment before an election. Based on 
this negative empirical result, Beck concludes that "Macroeconomic series such as 
unemployment and inflation do not appear to shift as elections approach. ... 
Business cycles may have a political basis, but that basis must be more 
complicated than the simple picture Nordhaus and Tufte paint." (p. 208)
The empirical evidence in support o f the political business cycle theory is not 
particularly strong. Although few researchers find weak evidence o f the electoral 
cycle, it is difficult to  identify a stable and regular political business cycle. There 
are various reasons that might prevent governments from behaving as predicted 
by the political business cycle hypothesis. The derivation o f the optimal political 
business cycle strategy is complicated and governments react differently in 
different circumstances. Furthermore, if governments do not possess the 
required information for the economy and if governments cannot manipulate 
macroeconomic policies to create favourable economic condition before 
elections, there cannot be a stable electoral cycle. With regard to the behaviour
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o f governments, partisan theory suggests that different political parties have 
different preferences over the trade-off between inflation and unemployment. 
According to this partisan view, different political parties follow different policies 
which are favourable to their supporting groups and they do not behave in a 
similar way even before the election.
Reacting to these criticisms, Frey and Schneider (1978 a, b) reformulate the 
strict political business cycle model and propose a "popularity maintenance 
model". The basic assumption o f the popularity maintenance model is that 
government maximises its own utility in pursuing ideological objectives. 
However, in order to put ideological programs into action, a government has to 
remain in power and seeks to increase its popularity when its re-election chances 
are low. Consequently, in the absence o f a political crisis a government would 
pursue its ideological goals, and in the presence o f a political crisis a government 
would concentrate on securing re-election purposes rather than pursing its 
ideological goals. When there is a popularity deficit, a government will undertake 
an expansionary policy which lowers unemployment and raises the growth o f real 
income. Frey and Schneider's model is more appealing than the strict political 
business cycle because it recognises that a government would adjust its policy 
instrument according to its political and economic conditions.
In their papers, Frey and Schneider (1978 a, b) provide empirical estimate o f 
a popularity function which measures the support given the government by the 
electorate; and a reaction function which shows how government influences the 
state o f the economy in order to stay in power. They measure popularity 
through Gallop-type opinion polls. The three main macroeconomic variables 
which influence vote outcome and government popularity are the rate o f 
unemployment, the rate o f  inflation and the growth rate o f real disposable 
income. Frey and Schneider estimate the popularity (lead) and reaction (policy)
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functions and present positive empirical results on the political-economic 
interactions for the US, the UK and Germany. According to their empirical 
studies, the state o f  the economy (represented by unemployment, inflation and 
the growth o f consumption) affects the popularity o f the governing party and the 
government manipulates economic policies (like government expenditure, 
transfer payments and tax rates) to increase its re-election prospects.
Since the publication o f Frey and Schneider's paper, there has been a wealth 
o f empirical research to examine the evidence for the political business cycle in 
Western democracies. Although many authors have estimated the popularity 
and reaction functions for various countries, they have found mixed results 
for the model.11
Table 1.1 lists studies which have examined the relationship between the 
government popularity and the macroeconomic variables in several industrialized 
countries. The table shows that economic variables do influence government 
popularity. Although each variable is not significant in every study, the rate o f 
inflation and o f  unemployment and the growth o f real income have a significant 
effect on government popularity. For this table, it is seen that the rate o f 
unemployment has a larger effect on government popularity than the rate o f 
inflation. However, the estimated coefficients on unemployment and inflation 
jump around a bit. For example, in various studies, an increase in 
unemployment o f 1 per cent will decrease government popularity from 0.006 to 
6 per cent. An increase in the inflation rate has a smaller impact, varying from 
0.004 to  1.95 per cent.
1 * The empirical literature on the politico-economic model is too many to be reviewed here. 
Fortunately, Schneider and Frey (1988) have completed a comprehensive review of it.
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Table 1. 1 The Effect o f Macroeconomic Conditions on Popularity Function






United States Fair (1978) -0.68 — 0.98**
Frey (1978) -1.00* -4.03** 0.52*
Hibbs (1982) -0.017** -0.017** 0.015**
United Kingdom Frey (1978) -0.61** -6.01** 0.81**
Pissarides (1980) -0.57** -4.55** 0.26**
Hibbs (1982) 0.0038** -0.21** 0.0081
Minford-Peel (1982) 1.95 0.53
France Lewis-Beck (1980) -1.89** -0.56*
H ibbs(1981) 0.004** -0.01** 0.017**
Lafay (1984) -0.028** -0.103** 0.029**
Germany Frey (1978) -0.71** -0.91** 0.43*
Kirchgassner (1977) -0.09* -0.31** —
Hibbs (1982 ) -0.0044** -0.006** 0.0051**
Note; * Significant at 0.05 level, ** at 0.01 level, two-tailed tests.
Source: Mueller (1989, pp.280-285), Schneider and Frey (1988, pp.248-251)
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On the complex evidence, there has been a great deal o f technical debate about 
the appropriate statistical techniques and the stability o f the popularity and 
reaction functions. The main criticism is about the problems o f model 
specification and estimation o f the equations. For example, Chrystal and Alt 
(1981) have criticized the Frey- Schneider model for the UK. In their paper, 
Chrystal and Alt argue that the Frey-Schneider equation is mis-specified and 
omits some important variables (like the effect o f national income) which 
potentially affect government popularity. In contrast to the Frey-Schneider model, 
they have suggested a 'permanent income model'.
The other criticism has to  do with the stability o f the equations. Frey and 
Schneider assume that the relationship between economic factors and 
government popularity is stable, and they estimate the popularity function in 
various countries. However, many studies (Lybeck (1986), Pissarides (1980), 
Chrystal and Alt (1981)) have found that the relationship between 
macroeconomic variable and government popularity is not stable and the 
estimates o f the parameters vary between various time periods and various socio­
economic groups in a country. Based on these disappointing results, these 
authors cast doubt on the empirical validity o f  the politico-economic model.
The theory o f the political business cycle is an interesting development in 
public choice theory and offers some useful insights to understand the difference 
in the size o f government and its growth rate. Although many authors have 
found mixed evidence or the existence o f such cycle, the literature on political 
business cycle has been widely invoked. We need further research to  understand 
the full politico-economic system.
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Chapter 2 Public Expenditure; Definition and Measurement
2. 1 Introduction
In recent years, economists have shown interest in measuring the size o f
government and explaining the main factors which account for its growth.
Considerable attention has frequently focused on the relative size o f the public 
sector, the amount o f tax raised, the share o f government employees in the total 
labour force, the size o f  the public sector deficit and the means o f its control. 
All these indicators have been commonly used as measures o f government's 
activity in the economy. However, due to the lack o f a commonly agreed 
measure for capturing overall government size, different researchers so far
have used particular (or ad hoc) definitions o f these important variables.
Depending on the definitions for the size o f government and the public 
expenditure measure chosen, government size may be seen as increasing, 
constant or even decreasing. The use o f different definitions o f  public
expenditure can lead to different results about the growth o f  government. 
For example, if we compare total public expenditure at all levels o f government 
within the Korean national accounts framework, we can observe that absolute 
size o f public expenditure rose from 552.7 billion won in 1971 to 41,873.6 
billion won in 1991 - about a seventy fold increase over the period (see Table 
2.1). In contrast, if we examine public expenditure as a share o f GNP (at
64
factor cost), we can find a figure o f 17.8 percent for 1971 and 22.9 percent for 
1991, suggesting a pattern o f slow growth (see Table 2.2). In addition, if we use 
a different measure o f the size o f government, the different pattern o f the 
growth o f the public sector would emerge.
Therefore, before proceeding to examine the theoretical and empirical 
explanations o f the growth o f the public sector, we need to properly define and 
measure the size o f government because without an accurate measure it is 
difficult to evaluate its role in the economy. But many additional problems 
exist in measuring government activity. As many economists have pointed 
out, the size o f government is multidimensional in nature (see Abizadeh and 
Basilevsky (1990), Break (1982) and Stibbard (1985) ). Due to the 
multidimensional nature o f government size, no single measure can explain all 
aspects o f government activity. Several different measures have been used to 
explain the importance o f the public sector in the economy. In many cases, 
however, measures o f  the size o f government has been arbitrary. Many 
statistical measures give an incomplete picture o f the size o f the public sector 
and we need to  use great care when interpreting those statistical data.
In this chapter, the problems o f measuring and defining the relative and 
absolute size o f government will be discussed. By introducing various 
available statistical data on the size o f  government in Korea for the 1970s 
and 1980s, we seek to explain the changes in the level and structure o f 
government activities over the study period.
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2. 2 What is public expenditure?
The National Accounts - compiled by the Bank o f Korea - define the public 
sector as consisting o f general government plus public enterprises. There are 
relatively few problems about the definition o f what comprises the government 
sector (general government). General government appears in almost all 
systems o f  the national accounts and the government sector is usually defined to 
include central and local government activity. The definitions o f public 
enterprises, however, are more controversial. Different criteria are used in 
defining public enterprises and there is no general agreement on how to define 
and measure the scope o f public enterprise activity. The activities o f public 
enterprises are not included in the general government sector (A more precise 
definition o f Korean public enterprises is given in section 2.4.1).
According to  the Korean national income accounting definition, general 
government expenditure is defined to include current and capital account 
activities o f both central and local government. Prior to 1970, however, the 
activities o f public enterprises had been included in a limited way by including 
their gross capital formation as part o f public investment. Total government 
expenditure is the total consolidated spending o f general government after netting - 
off transactions within the public sector. To avoid double counting, transfers 
between the different levels o f government such as central government grants to 
local authorities are excluded in defining total public expenditure. The resulting
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aggregate is referred to as general government outlays, and these general 
government (central government and local authorities) expenditures have been 
used for international comparison.
Since the national accounts framework has been used to develop 
comparative indicators o f the size o f government in the economy, the most 
commonly used definitions o f general government expenditure have been based 
upon the national accounting systems. Even though general government 
expenditures are imperfect indicators o f the overall measure o f government 
intervention, the national accounts data on government expenditure can be used 
in the context o f other important macroeconomic variables such as GDP, 
households' consumption expenditure and implicit price deflators. Furthermore, 
they measure the scope o f the same types o f  government activity in exactly the 
same way in different countries. Therefore, the national accounts framework is 
widely used by international institutions like the OECD, European Communities, 
the IMF and other international organisations.
Within the Korean national accounts framework, total public expenditure can be 
divided into the following components.
i) government final consumption expenditure; this item includes the wage and 
salary payments to general government employees, expenditure on materials used 
in public production and spending on purchases o f the outputs from private 
producers. Among these expenditures, wage and salaries payments are the most 
important component.
ii) gross fixed capital formation; this item includes expenditure on government 
plant and equipment (land, roads, plant and machinery etc.) by general 
government.
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iii) subsidies; this item includes direct payment on current accounts by general 
government to enterprises both in the private and public corporations.
iv) current transfers; this item includes transfers to the private sector, especially 
social security benefits such as unemployment insurance payments, pensions and 
other social funds. And it also includes transfers to abroad (e.g. contributions to 
international organisations).
v) capital transfers; this item includes unrequited transfers on capital account 
by general government to  the private sector and abroad.
The above items represent the basic elements o f total public expenditures on 
which the Korean national accounts are constructed. The effect o f changes in 
composition o f public expenditure is quite different. Public sector consumption 
and investment expenditure represents the government's claim on the real 
resources o f the economy, and those expenditures are termed as exhaustive or 
resource-using expenditure. They represent the government sector's real 
consumption and investment. On the other hand, government transfer outlays 
such as subsidies, current transfers and capital transfers, represent the transfer o f 
purchasing power from one group to another and those expenditures are referred 
to as non-exhaustive or non-resource using expenditure. As far as transfer 
payments are concerned, the government does not involve the direct use o f 
resources. In effecting transfer payments, the government acts so as to achieve 
redistribution objectives.
The most recently available data on the composition o f  general government 
expenditure in Korea are shown in Table 2.1 for selected years 1971, 1981 and 
1991. The data include all general government outlays in the form of
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government final consumption expenditure, gross fixed capital formation and 
transfer payments.
Table 2.1 Composition o f Korean Public Expenditure, 1971-1991 1
1971 
In billion won %
1981 
In billion won %
1991 
In billion won %
government consumption expenditure 332.2 60.3 5,515.0 61.0 22,211.8 53.0
gross capital formation 153.8 27.8 1,993.9 22.1 11,061.7 26.4
subsidies 10.2 1.9 343.8 3.8 1,250.5 3.0
current transfers 37.1 6.7 813.5 9.0 5,859.4 14.0
capital transfers 18.4 3.3 368.5 4.1 1,490.2 3.6
total 552.7 100.0 9,034.7 100.0 41,873.6 100.0
Note; The amount figures in the table are based on current prices. 
Source; Bank o f Korea, National Accounts, 1990, 1993
As can be seen from Table 2.1, exhaustive expenditures such as government 
consumption and investment spending represent about 80 per cent o f the total
1 In the National Accounts, the Bank of Korea has not provided consistent data on 
interest payment and net lending and those components are excluded from the figures in 
table 1. Apart from the National Accounts, the Bank of Korea has compiled another data 
set for general government expenditure. In Economic Statistics Yearbook, the Bank of 
Korea has produced data on general government expenditure which includes interest 
payment and net lending. However these data date back only to 1971. See Appendix.
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government expenditure in 1991 while transfer payments account for about 20 
percent. We can also find that transfer payments (i.e. subsidies, current transfers 
and capital transfers) have increased in relative importance over the period; 12.0 
percent in 1971 to 20.6 percent in 1991.
2. 3 Measuring the size of government
Given a definition o f public expenditure based on the national accounting 
conventions, several measurement issues arise. Because o f the multidimensional 
nature o f  the concept o f the public sector, there is no single accepted measure o f 
the size o f government. For different purposes, researchers have used different 
sets o f  indicators. For example, the following issues have been discussed in the 
way o f explaining government size and growth. Should we include transfer 
payments in defining total government expenditure? Should we be concerned 
with absolute or relative size o f government expenditure and if relative size 
matters, relative to  what? Does it make any difference if government 
expenditures are measured in nominal or real values? This section will focus on 
the problem o f measurement because it is a necessary step in explaining the 
growth o f government in the economy.
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2.3.1 Forms of government expenditure
As noted in the previous section, total government expenditure can be 
broadly divided into two components; exhaustive and non-exhaustive 
expenditure. Although such a distinction is mainly a national accounting 
problem, many debates have arisen in connection with the problems o f the 
inclusion o f transfer payments in measuring total government expenditure.
Exhaustive expenditures such as government consumption and investment 
expenditure are resource-using components and those expenditures are 
exhausted in the sense that those will be consumed over a number o f 
succeeding periods. These activities o f government require real resource inputs 
and represent the government sector's real consumption and investment. Because 
these expenditures are major components o f national income, government 
consumption and investment spending have been included in both the definition o f 
the national output (GNP or GDP) and total government expenditure.
In contrast, transfer payments and subsidies merely redistribute real resources 
and these expenditures are not major components o f national income. 
Therefore, many scholars have argued that whilst transfers are included in the 
measurement o f  total government expenditure they should not be included in the 
definition o f  an expenditure/income ratio. This is to avoid double counting; i.e. 
if transfers are included in the denominator, the ratio o f government expenditure to 
GNP (or GDP) can exceed 100 per cent.
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For example, Bird (1970, p. 18) proposes that the inclusion o f transfers in 
total government expenditures will tend to exaggerate its size. Similarly, 
Chrystal and Alt (1979, p. 130), examining the government expenditure function 
for the U.K. economy, advocate that the inclusion o f transfers in government 
spending has no useful economic meaning because such a government 
expenditure to GNP (or GDP) ratio can exceed one.
Conversely, there are many authors who insist that transfer payments are 
important components o f  government expenditures and they should be included 
when measuring the government expenditure ratio. Peacock and Wiseman (1961, 
p. 5) , for example, state that "a similar ratio omitting transfers and subsidies 
would be without any general significance as a rough indicator o f  changes in 
the government's overall influence in the community over time, since transfers 
and subsidies also have to be financed and are clearly o f importance in many 
economic contexts". Buchanan and Flowers (1987, p.63) also write that
"transfer is as much a real cost as direct outlay for tanks, planes and paper clips. 
When estimating the real cost o f government, the distinction between 
productive and transfer expenditures is not useful". Recently in examining the 
growth o f government in OECD countries, Saunders (1993) adopts the relative 
size o f general government expenditure to GDP which includes transfer 
payments.
In this chapter, to analyse the overall government's control on the economy 
and measure the real cost o f government, the more inclusive definition will be
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used. The broader definition o f government expenditure which includes transfer 
payments seems to  be a better indicator o f the public sector size. It demonstrates 
the volume o f  resources that flow through the public sector budget and as such is 
a more accurate indicator o f  the total activity o f government relative to the rest 
o f the economy.
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2.3.2 Absolute Versus Relative Measures
The absolute level o f  nominal public expenditure is likely to be o f little interest 
because it does not reflect the changes o f other important magnitudes in the 
economy. As total government expenditure increases, other aggregate variables 
such as population, prices, real income and GNP (or GDP) can increase also. Thus 
if we measure changes in the size o f government sector by changes in absolute 
levels o f expenditure, then it will not reflect the changes in prices and real 
income in the economy. Therefore, to explain the pattern o f long-term growth o f 
the government sector, we need to use a relative measure rather than an absolute 
level o f government spending.
Even though the relative size is a more appropriate measure o f the size o f 
government in the economy, several scholars have used the absolute values o f 
different variables for representing the size o f government. For example, 
examining the empirical verification o f  Wagner's Law, Pryor (1968), Chrystal 
and Alt (1979), and Mann (1980) , have chosen absolute values. They have 
argued that the growth o f government can be measured by the absolute level o f 
government expenditure. At the same time, Henrekson (1988) , explaining the 
growth o f the public sector in Sweden, has concentrated on the absolute 
growth. He claims that the relative size is an inconsistent measure for the 
growth o f government.
In contrast with this view, many analysts have been concerned with the 
relative size o f public expenditure. They have argued that the size o f 
government can be measured relative to some national income aggregates.
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There are, however, several variations o f the measurement o f  the national output 
that government expenditure could be related to. Depending on the definitions of 
national incomes, the ratio can result in different values. Table 2.2 shows the 
different figures o f  measuring the relative size o f the public sector in Korea. 
The differences between the ratios depend upon whether it is GNP, GDP or NI 
that is used in the denominator and whether the denominator is measured at 
market prices or factor cost. Since the difference between GNP and GDP is 
equal to net factor income from abroad, the relative sizes between two ratios 
show only a slight difference. In the National Income Accounts, if we deduct 
capital consumption allowances and indirect taxes and add subsidies to GNP, we 
can get National Income (NI). Since NI is smaller than GNP, the ratio o f 
public expenditure to NI is larger than the ratio o f public spending to GNP.
Table 2.2 Public Expenditure Ratio in Korea, 1971-1991 (p e rc e n t)2
1971 1981 1991
Public expenditure as a proportion of GNP(market prices) 16.2 19.8 20.3
Public expenditure as a proportion of GNP(factor cost) 17.8 22.7 22.9
Public expenditure as a proportion of GDP(market prices) 16.2 19.0 20.1
Public expenditure as a proportion of GDP(factor cost) 17.8 21.6 22.7
Public expenditure as a proportion of NI(factor cost) 19.1 25.1 25.7
Note; Figures on current prices. 
Source; Same as Table 2.1.
2 The figures in Table 2.2 do not include interest payments and net lending. To 
examine the relative size of government which includes interest payment and net lending, 
see Appendix Table 2.9.
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Factor costs are less than market prices by the amount o f difference 
between indirect taxes and subsidies. Since indirect taxes exceed subsidies, the 
relative size o f the public sector measured by factor costs is larger than that of 
market prices. Thus if the denominator is made as small as possible, the relative 
size o f government becomes larger. In the Table 2.2 , therefore, the ratio of 
government expenditure to NI (at factor costs) is the largest.
The above comparison o f the ratios o f government expenditures to national 
income aggregates has led to some questions. Which is the best measure o f 
national product to  be used as the base o f comparison? Conservative economists 
and radical politicians who oppose the growth o f government will choose the 
largest ratio and argue that the public sector is too large. More liberal 
economists and some civil servants , on the other hand, will favour small 
government and focus on the small measure. What is the true relative size of 
the public sector? It seems that the choice o f national output used to measure 
the relative size o f government has been arbitrary. The relative size can increase 
either because the growth o f government expenditures has accelerated or because 
there has been a decline in the rate o f growth o f  GNP (or GDP). In the latter 
case, the relative size can increase without increasing the absolute level o f 
government expenditure. There are another arguments for using one ratio 
rather than another. Depending on the national income measure and upon the 
choice between market prices and factor cost measures, we can arrive at different 
values.
All measures are tricky and partial in nature and are, therefore, imperfect 
indicators. Due to the multidimensional nature o f government activity, no single
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measure can be the true one. But one measure can be more useful than another 
in its degree o f usefulness.
Different authors so far have employed various alternative measures for their 
own purposes in explaining the growth o f government. Among those various 
indicators, the commonly used measures o f national output are GNP and GDP. 
For example, when examining the validity o f Wagner's Law for Mexico, Mann 
(1980) has chosen GDP as a measure o f national product and concluded that 
Wagner's Law holds in aggregate terms in Mexico. Similarly, explaining 
international differences in public expenditure in OECD countries, Saunders 
(1988) has used general government expenditure to GDP as the index for the 
relative size o f government. At the same time, Borooah (1988) , investigating 
the growth o f the public sector in the UK for the period 1960-86, has also 
employed public expenditure as a portion o f GDP as a measure o f the size o f 
government.
On the other hand, many writers have argued that GNP is a more proper 
measure o f  national output. Peacock and Wiseman (1961), for example, have 
used GNP at factor cost as a more proper measurement o f national output. 
Similarly, Lewis-Beck and Rice (1985, p.5) claim that "GNP stresses the 
production o f a nation's citizens and their property, while GDP emphasises 
production within the geographical boundaries o f a nation... Because o f  our 
concern with a nation's government activity as a share o f the total economic 
activity o f  its citizenry, we choose to employ GNF'. A similar view is shown by 
Abizadeh and Basilevsky (1990) , who have adopted the ratio o f government 
expenditures to GNP as their index for the relative size o f government.
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2.3.3 Real Versus Nominal Measures
The other important measurement issue for the size o f government is related 
to the use o f real or nominal values. As government provides more public 
goods and services, total government expenditures in current terms will increase. 
But it does not necessarily mean that the government will provide more public 
goods because the unit cost o f public goods could have risen. Further, if the 
ratio o f inflation in the government sector is higher than the general price level, 
then the real size o f the public sector could decline over time. In this case, 
nominal values may overstate the true relative size o f government. To examine 
the real public sector size, we need to  deflate the current figures by an 
appropriate price index.
However, there are many problems in developing the appropriate deflator for 
the activities o f the public sector. In the case o f private goods, it is usually 
possible to define the units by which the quantities o f such goods are measured. 
Since the market could be applied to private goods, we can easily observe 
changes in prices and changes in quantities consumed. However, public goods 
and services are non-marketed so that we cannot observe market prices for 
publicly supplied goods. In addition, defining quantity units is very difficult 
because the outputs o f the public sector are intangible. Since markets do not 
operate for the consumption o f public goods, decomposing the increase in prices 
into price changes (implicit price deflator) and quantity changes is also 
extremely difficult.
78
Because o f these conceptual and measurement difficulties, many researchers 
have used the real value o f input cost rather than quantity output for calculating 
the government price deflator. Most efforts have been focused on developing the 
appropriate price (cost) deflator to measure the increase in the cost over time 
o f  providing a given basket o f public goods and services. The task o f analysing 
the real size o f the public sector has been greatly eased by the development o f 
the System of National Accounts. National Accounts usually include deflators 
for public consumption and public investment expenditure. Especially, in the 
National Accounts System, statistical efforts have been focused on the 
estimation o f a deflator for public consumption. In calculating the deflator, 
national accounts statisticians assume low (or zero) productivity growth in the 
public sector. As was shown in the Baumol (1967) lagging productivity model, 
the productivity increase in the public sector is less than that o f the private sector, 
and thus unit costs in the public sector will rise over time. Due to the relative 
price effect, the prices (cost) o f government services will rise faster than the 
prices o f private sector outputs. The ratio o f real government expenditure to 
GNP could therefore, rise less than the nominal share.
There has been a lot o f debate about the use o f real or nominal values in 
measuring the size o f  the public sector. For instance, in his extensive review o f 
the Leviathan literature, Musgrave (1981, p.86) has made a statement in favour 
o f  an unadjusted nominal ratio and concluded that "given the assumption that 
public services are worth their cost, it is the change in the nominal share that 
should be considered in measuring public sector expansion". 3 Following
3 Later, Musgrave changed his view and wrote in his textbook "the same deflator is 
applied to both GNP and government expenditures. Since the cost of public services has
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Musgrave's suggestion, Lewis-Beck and Rice (1985, p.6) claim that "the
unadjusted measure is preferable because it gives a better indication o f
government scope and power vis-a-vis the national economy". At the same 
time, Abizadeh and Basilevsky (1990, p.357) point out that "particularly if 
time series data are used, these indices still follow the same trend and as such 
will not make the results that are much different from nominal series. 
Accordingly, we include only nominal values in our subsequent analysis". Those 
researchers have favoured nominal values rather than a real ratio as a proper 
measurement o f the size and growth o f government.
But unlike these views, many scholars are not satisfied with the use o f the 
nominal ratio. They have argued that due to the relative price changes o f 
government expenditure with respect to  GNP, the numerator (government 
expenditure) and denominator (GNP) need to be deflated with separate price 
indexes. For example, Peacock and Wiseman (1961), in their study o f British 
public expenditure over the period 1890-1955, claim separate deflation o f 
public expenditure and national product, and state that "Money expenditures are 
an unsatisfactory measure o f this over periods o f changing prices; we need to 
deflate the money figures by an appropriate price index" (P-W, 1961, p. 8 ). 
Similarly, examining nine models o f government growth in the United States, 
Lowery and Berry (1983) have employed the deflated measure o f size to 
correct for inflation. However, it was Beck (1979,1982,1985) who has made 
the strongest statement in favour o f real values. Examining the long term 
patterns o f real public sector size in major developed countries with the UN
risen faster than the general price level, this multiple overstates the rise of the public 
share in real terms" (Musgrave andMusgarve, 1989, p. 114)
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data, Beck has found that nominal and real ratios have risen in all industrialised 
countries but real size has increased less than the nominal share. Especially 
because o f the relative price effect (i.e. the growth o f the government price 
deflator exceeds that o f the GNP deflator), Beck has argued that real public 
sector size has even declined over time in some countries. At the same time, 
Pluta(1981) has also employed the similarly weighted price indexes and found 
declining real public sector size in some developing countries.
Nominal and real measures have their respective merits in analysing the 
size and growth o f government. When attempting to explain the flow o f real 
resources between the private and public sector, we need to use a real 
measure. However, if we are concerned with changes in consumer's 
expenditure allocation, nominal share may be more relevant.
Table 2.3 shows some evidence o f relative price effects in Korea. It 
shows nominal and real ratios o f government consumption expenditure to (real) 
GNP for the period 1970- 1991.4 The implicit price deflator for government 
consumption expenditure and GNP (at market prices) are also presented. As 
shown in the table 2.3, the nominal share o f government consumption 
expenditure to GNP rose slightly between 1970 and 1991; 9.4 percent in 1970 
to  10.8 percent in 1991.
4 For the period 1970-1991, there were no changes in the definition or classification of  
public expenditure. The definition o f public expenditure that has been used for the 
period 1970-1991 makes all the elements o f  the series compatible with one another. We 
can examine the ratio o f government consumption expenditure to GNP over the period.
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On the contrary, real size declined from 14.6 per cent in 1970 to 9.7 per 
cent in 1991. According to the Korean National Accounts data, the price index 
o f government services rose faster than the price index for GNP. For GNP, 
the implicit price deflator rose thirteen fold; on the other hand, for government 
consumption expenditure, the deflator rose twenty-twofold over the study period. 
Due to the relative price effect, the share o f resources used for public 
consumption has actually declined in Korea.
Table 2.3 Government consumption expenditure(GeCon) and GNP (at market prices) in Korea
(In current and constant prices, as % of GNP)
GeCon/GNP 
(at current prices) 
(%)
GeCon/GNP 
(at 1985 prices) 
(%)
Relative Price 









1970 9.4 14.6 64.5 7.19 11.15
1975 11.2 13.8 80.8 22.04 27.29
1980 11.9 13.2 90.7 63.80 70.32
1985 10.4 10.4 100.0 100.00 100.00
1991 10.8 9.7 110.5 161.20 145.94
Note; * Price deflator for general government consumption expenditure divided by 
GNP (market prices) deflator.
Source; Same as Table 2.1.
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2. 4 Off-Budget Activities
Most types o f the government activities mentioned in pervious section are 
usually recorded in the national accounts. However, it should be noted that the 
statistical measures o f  general government spending derived within the national 
income framework are subject to many pitfalls and limitations. Although the 
national accounts data have a lot o f  merits in analysing the size o f government, 
they do not give a full picture o f  total activities o f government. As all 
government activities are not always included in the national accounts, the use o f 
the share o f general government expenditure in GNP will understate the extent o f 
government participation in the economy. The scope o f Korean public sector 
activity extends far beyond the general government outlays as estimated in the 
SNA. The SNA data do not encompass all o f  the important public sector 
activities and , in particular, they exclude "off-budget activities".5
In Korea, some types o f off-budget activities have grown rapidly since the 
early 1960s. During the rapid development process, when the government faced 
the choice between direct expenditures and off-budget means to achieve a given 
policy objective, executive government preferred the less visible method. These 
extra-budgetary areas o f government operation have recently received 
considerable attention. Although off-budget activities are difficult to quantify, 
we need to  include these activities in any comprehensive measure o f  the size o f
5 Off-budget activities are defined in OECD as " Activities which do not appear in 
the budgetary accounts but nevertheless have an impact on the economy" {OECD 
Observer, March 1983, p.6 ) .
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government. Three o f  those off-budget activities, public enterprises, extra 
budget accounts and tax expenditures are discussed in this section.
2.4.1 Public enterprises
The most difficult aspect o f defining the public sector is concerned with the 
definition o f  public enterprises. While public enterprises play an important role 
as employer, producer and investor, there is no general agreement on how to 
define and measure the scope o f public enterprise activities. Each country has 
used different definitions o f public enterprise for their own purposes. The 
problem o f defining and measuring the size o f public enterprises is clearly 
pointed out by Pathirane and Blades (1982, p.263) as " Few countries 
identify public enterprises separately in their national accounts publications, and 
those that do so provide little information about the criteria used in deciding 
whether or not an enterprise is public".
In Korea, the government has established or acquired public corporations as 
a development instrument during the rapid development period. Since the early 
1960s, the Korean government has established various public enterprises to 
achieve the strategic targets o f the development plan. Because o f the shortage 
o f indigenous entrepreneurial skills and o f  the poor private capital endowment, 
the Korean government has sought to  fill the gap by establishing various
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public enterprises, notably in fertiliser, mining, electricity, iron & steel industry 
and transport activities. Since the early period o f rapid economic growth, the 
Korean public enterprise sector has played a more important role in the 
economy.
While some countries have used a strict definition o f public enterprises, 
Korea has employed a rather broad definition - even including all enterprises in 
which the government ownership share is less than 50 percent (for OECD 
countries, see Saunder and Klau, 1985). Public enterprises in Korea can be 
broadly divided into four categories as shown in Table 2.4; government 
enterprises, government invested enterprises, subsidiaries o f government 
invested enterprises and other government enterprises. 6
The data shown in Table 2.4 indicate the importance o f public enterprise 
activities in the Korean economy. In 1991, there were about 88 public enterprises 
in operation, employing 374 thousands workers, approximately 2.6 percent o f 
the total employment in the non-agricultural sector. Its size is comparable to 
the other developing countries which have experienced larger share o f public 
enterprises such as India and Pakistan.
6 In this subsection, we focus only on public enterprises owned and controlled by the 
central government. There have been various types o f public enterprises at the local 
level o f government in Korea. However, no accurate statistics are collected or reported 
for local public enterprises.
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Table 2.4 Korean Public Enterprises by type (1991)




Government enterprises1) 4 72 3.7
Government invested enterprises2) 23 171 45.3
Subsidiaries of government invested enterprises3) 54 93 22.0
Other government enterprises 4) 7 39 10.9
Total 88 374 81.9
Source; Song (1992, p.411, Table 16-1 )
Note; 1) These enterprises are actually government departments and include the railway, the 
post office, the office of supply and the office of grain management.
2) These enterprises include 4 financial companies, 8 promotional and 11 productive 
companies. Among four categories of public enterprises, this type is by far the largest category 
in terms of employment, investment and valued added.
3) These enterprises include shipbuilding and heavy industry company as well as financial, 
tourism, consulting and service companies.
4) These enterprises, in which the public ownership share is less than 50 per cent, include 2 
banks, the Po-Hang Iron and Steel company and other three firms.
There are no consistent data on output values of public enterprises in Korea. 
However, we can use the share shown in the Table 2.5 as estimates of public 
enterprises contributions to GDP. Table 2.5 shows the public enterprise value 
added share in GDP between 1975 and 1990. Since 1975, the public 
enterprises represented about 9 per cent of valued added in total GDP.
86
Although the share has slightly declined in the mid-1980s, it still accounted 
for 9.4 percent o f GDP in 1990.
Table 2.5 Public enterprise value added share in GDP
1975 1980 1984 1986 1990
Public enterprise/GDP 8.3 9.1 9.7 9.0 9.4
Source; Song (1992, p.418, Table 16-2)
Although public enterprise activity is an important component o f the public 
sector, this measure has rarely been included in studies o f the size and growth 
o f government. The size o f the public sector based on national accounts data 
would under-estimate the growth o f government. The inclusion o f  public 
enterprise activities will give a different pattern o f the growth o f the public 
sector.
2.4.2 Extra-Budget Accounts and Government Funds
These categories o f  government activities have not shown up in the national 
accounts and have represented another hidden kind o f public sector activities in 
the economy. Since these extra-budget items have grown rapidly in recent years
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and exerted an important influence to the economy, the analysis o f government 
behaviour in these off-budget activities is important.
Traditionally, the Korean budgeting system has emphasised the function of 
accountability and administrative control o f government expenditure. Each year, 
the budget is presented by the Office o f Budget which is part o f the Economic 
Planning Board and submitted to the National Assembly. The annual budget 
contains a package o f public expenditure plans and tax legislation for the given 
period and is subject to statutory or constitutional restrictions. Thus, the general 
account (i.e., the annual budget) has been treated as an on-budget item.
As the government increases its role in the economy, the traditional Korean 
budget system cannot meet the needs o f  policy-makers. Off-budget activities 
such as government funds and extra budget accounts have grown rapidly since 
the early 1970s. These off-budget accounts are important components o f unified 
budget expenditures and those activities encompass various fiscal operations 
which have important economic effects. However, these extra-budgetary 
activities have not been reported in the national accounts and are often treated as 
off-budget transactions. In contrast with the annual budget, extra-budget 
activities are not reviewed by members o f  the National Assembly but are only 
subject to the approval o f their supervising ministers.
Since the early 1970s, the Korean budget system has been criticised as grossly 
inadequate because the traditional budgeting practice was not comprehensive 
enough to  analyse the overall government influence on the economy. It had been 
widely argued that the budget system should be able to facilitate the assessment 
o f the economic effects o f extra-budgetary area and that the definition o f
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government expenditure should be comprehensive enough to capture the 
government's overall influence on the economy. This dissatisfaction with the 
budget system brought about a committee inquiry into the whole system of the 
budget structure and presentation.
In 1976, a committee was established to derive the Korean government 
finance data in an internationally practised framework. Based on "A Manual on 
Government Finance Statistics" published by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), a coherent budget system was set up. Within the new budget system, the 
coverage o f government activities is comprehensive, incorporating all 
government activities, including extra-budgetary accounts, government funds 
and non financial public enterprises.
The unified system was formally adopted in 1979 for the first time in 
Korea. Figure 2.1 shows the structure o f the unified budget system and Table 
2. 6 reports unified budget expenditure data for the years 1971, 1981 and 1991.7
7 Since data on local government activities are not always available, the unified budget 
expenditure data which are compiled within the IMF framework provide a more detailed 
set of data on central government operations.
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Figure 2.1 The Unified Budget System in Korea, 1991
(Based on IM F , A Manual on Government Finance Statistics)
T Central Government T Budget T General Account
I | L Special Account (17)
| | Government Fund (32) 2)
Consolidated | |
Public Sector | L Extra -Budget Account (4) 3>
L Non financial [ Special Account (4 )4)
Public Enterprise |
L Government Fund (2) 5>
1) There were 17 special accounts such as Fiscal Investment and Loan, National 
Forestry Management, Military Personal Pension, Industrial Worker's Accident 
Insurance, National Medical Centre Management, Judicial Building Construction, and 
Road & Urban Railway Construction, etc.
2) There were 32 government funds including National Investment Fund, Foreign 
Exchange Stabilisation Fund, Defence Industry Development Fund, Industrial 
Development Fund, Small Business Establishment Fund, Coal Industry Fund,, National 
Housing Fund, Tourism Promotion Fund, National Pension Fund, Rural Area 
Development Fund, and South & North Co-operation Fund, etc.
3) There were 4 extra-budget accounts such as Foreign Loan in Kind & Service, 
Repayment o f Sub-Loan, Equity Subscription and Contingency Transfer Use.
4) There were 4 special accounts such as Grain Management, National Railroad, 
Government Supply, and Communication Service Special Account.
5) There were 2 government funds such as Grain Management and Government Supply 
Fund.
Source; Ministry o f Finance, Summary o f Financial Implementation for F Y1991, 1991
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Table 2.6 Consolidated Operation o f Central Government in Korea
1971
In billion won %
1981
In billion won %
1991
In billion won %
I. Central Government 548.5 63.6 10,189.8 67.9 40,311.5 84.9
General Account 367.0 42.6 7,228.5 48.2 26,233.0 55.3
Special Account 168.7 19.5 769.1 5.1 8,352.0 17.6
Government Fund 4.9 0.6 1,525.1 10.2 5.228.7 11.0
Extra-Budget Account 7.9 0.9 667.1 4.4 497.8 1.0
II. Non financial Public Enterprise 313.4 36.4 4,821.7 32.1 7,135.3 15.1
Special Account 139.1 16.1 2.221.5 14.8 2.436.6 5.2
Government Fund 174.3 20.3 2.600.2 17.3 4.698.7 9.9
III. Total Public Sector ( I+II) 861.9 100.0 15.011.5 100.0 47.446.8 100.0
Source;Ministry of Finance, Summary of Financial Implementation, 1979, 1987, 1991
As can be seen from Table 2.6, the central government fund has been the 
fastest growing element o f consolidated public expenditure over the last two 
decades. In 1971, central government fund amounted to 4.9 billion won which 
was only 0.6 percent o f total public expenditures. However, since the early 
1980s, the number and size o f  government funds have grown at an astonishing 
rate and amounted to 5,228.7 billion won for the fiscal year 1991. Thus, in
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1991, there were 32 public funds in operation, which constituted 11.0 percent 
o f total public expenditure. As shown in Figure 2.1, there were a variety o f 
public funds in Korea: defence industry development, small business 
establishment, national housing, rural development and tourism promotion, etc.
These government funds have been referred to as "the second budget" and 
have been a key instrument o f government policy in Korea ( For the Japanese 
case, see Bennett and Lorenzo, 1983, p. 163). In connection with 
government fiscal operations, the funds have been allocated to achieve important 
policy objectives during the rapid development process. Under this fund system, 
government makes more flexible and discretionary fiscal actions and provides 
more effective financing for government-related projects.
Since government funds are not reviewed by members o f the National 
Assembly, the government has large discretion and flexibility in the actual budget 
execution. During the 1970s and 1980s, the number and size o f public funds 
have grown rapidly. The most important funds are National Investment Fund, 
Industrial Development Fund, Petroleum Development Fund and National 
Housing Fund. National Investment Fund was introduced in 1973 for providing 
a financial support to the heavy and chemical industries. Industrial Development 
Fund was established in 1986 to provide a financial support to the balanced 
growth o f industry and improvement o f  industrial technology. Petroleum 
Development Fund was also introduced in 1986 to execute petroleum 
development project as well as management o f demand and supply for oil price 
stabilisation. Finally, National Housing Fund was created in 1981 to supply fund 
for housing construction project. This project is concerned with promotion o f 
home building and is operated by providing financial support to local
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government. These government funds contribute to the domestic capital 
formation and serves as a useful financial resources for the public investment 
(see Park (1992)).
In addition to government funds, there has been also "a third budget" in 
Korea, known as the special accounts. There were 17 special accounts in 1991 
and they accounted for 17 .6%  in total public expenditures. Like government 
funds, special accounts are also designed for supporting special projects and 
providing a stable supply o f financial resources.
While the general account is designed for the overall fiscal activities o f 
government, special accounts are designed to implement special projects and 
financial operation. The most important special accounts are Fiscal Investment 
and Financing Special Account, Grain Management Special Account, 
Government Supply Special Account and Communication Service Special 
Account. The recent budgetary performance o f  the special accounts is 
characterised by a continuous deficit. This deficit has been caused by the grain 
price support system which the government has used to support the farmer's 
income. Budget deficits in the special accounts have been financed by borrowing 
from the Bank o f Korea, resulting a money expansion (see Kim (1992)).
Since the early 1960s, the Korean government has preferred extra-budgetary 
activities, because o f their incentives and other merits. Through the creation 
o f these alternative budgets, the government can take a greater control over 
the economy's resources. Since the government can establish various extra­
budget areas without the consent o f the legislative body, they can conceal the 
expansion o f  the public sector. While there has been strict control over the
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operation o f on-budget activity , extra-budget areas o f government activities 
have been criticised for their lack o f simplicity and their controllability. 
Recently, the government has attempted to integrate extra-budget activities into 
the on-budget process to achieve greater effectiveness and ensure more 
control over the expansion o f hidden public sector activities.
2.4.3 Tax expenditures
Although tax expenditures had been widely used as an important instrument o f 
public policy, the concept o f tax expenditures was first developed in the 1960s. 
The term "tax expenditures" has been applied to the special provisions o f the tax 
laws that defer the tax liability for those who make payments or receive 
incomes in certain forms (Break, 1982). These tax expenditure systems have 
been used as tax incentives or hardship relief provisions and have taken various 
forms, such as special tax rates, tax exemption, tax deduction, tax credits and 
special tax deferral reserve.8
The tax incentives are designed to encourage certain forms o f economic 
activities or favour certain sources o f incomes. The common character o f these 
tax expenditures systems is that they reduce tax liability and hence government
8 Feldstein (1980) has used the terms "tax expenditures", "tax subsidies", and "tax 
incentives" interchangeably.
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revenue. Due to special tax provisions, tax expenditures can also influence 
government's financial positions by the amounts o f  revenue losses.
Like other off-budget activities, many o f these tax expenditures are an 
equivalent o f direct public expenditure, although it is difficult to assess the 
relative merits o f using tax incentives and direct expenditures. Even though 
there has been a lot o f debate about the desirability o f tax expenditures as an 
appropriate instrument o f public policy, tax expenditures have been introduced in 
order to achieve various economic policy objectives.
Since the mid-1960s, many countries have constructed "tax expenditure 
budgets". Especially, in Korea, the government has employed a tax expenditure 
system as an essential instrument o f economic development strategy. During 
the rapid development process, the Korean government has applied various tax 
incentives to encourage certain kinds o f economic behaviour that seem desirable 
for industrial development and other policy objectives.
The major forms o f tax expenditures in Korea have been: (1) the deductions 
o f certain expenses or exemptions in the calculation o f taxable income (for 
example, under the individual income tax, personal deductions, education 
expenses, insurance premiums and medical expenses deductions); (2) exclusions 
from taxable income (exclusions o f  interest income from public bonds, capital 
gains on financial assets, and exclusion o f acquisition tax) and (3) tax credits 
and accelerated depreciation for investment (A brief summary o f  the major tax 
incentives in Korea is given by Yun (1992) ).
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There exist several difficulties in measuring tax expenditures. Since tax 
expenditures are usually defined as deviations from the normal tax structure, 
we need to define properly the concept and nature o f that normal structure. 
However, the tax law does not define the normal tax structure and there is no 
general agreement on the concept o f taxable economic income. Due to the 
conceptual and measurement difficulties, it is difficult to quantify tax 
expenditures. Official estimates o f tax expenditure should be treated with 
caution.
In Korea, there are no official definitions or estimates o f tax expenditures. 
Only total tax exemptions for internal tax revenue and customs duties (a proxy 
measure o f  the size o f tax expenditures) have been estimated by the Ministry 
o f Finance.
Table 2. 7 shows that the revenue losses (or the amount o f tax exemptions) 
have been very large. Especially, during the early 1970s, when the Korean 
government announced its Heavy and Chemical Industry Policy, various tax 
incentives were provided to support strategic industries. In 1970, total tax 
exemptions accounted for 39.9 percent o f total tax revenue and 5.3 percent o f 
GNP. From the Table 2.7, we can also see that the ratio o f tax exemption to 
GNP has declined since 1970. The ratio fell to 4.6 per cent in 1975 and 
further to 2.1 percent in 1980. Especially , the Tax Reform ("Tax Reduction 
Control Law") in 1981 contributed to remove numerous tax exemptions, so 
that the ratio fell to 1.4 percent in 1985, much lower than earlier years. 9
9 Saunders and Klau (1985) have studied the size of tax expenditures in OECD 
countries. According to their study, in 1980, the share of tax expenditures for GDP was
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Table 2. 7 Total tax exemptions in Korea (A proxy o f the size o f tax expenditures)
1970 1975 1980 1985
total government tax exemption 
(billion won) 
tax exemption as a percentage of
145.7 463.6 765.7 1066.8
total tax revenue(%) 39.9 33.3 13.2 ** 9.0
GNP(%) 5.3 4.6 2.1 1.4
Note;** The government revised " Tax Reduction Control Law" extensively in 1981. 
Consequently, many tax reductions and exemptions were removed and the ratio 
fell from 33.3 per cent in 1975 to 13.2 per cent in 1980.
Source; Ministry of Finance, Public Finance Statistics, 1989, pp. 62-63
For the last several decades, tax expenditures have been an important policy 
instrument for Korea's development strategy. The government has provided 
various tax incentives to induce the private sector to engage in certain kinds 
o f economic activities. Nevertheless, there have been many criticisms about the 
effectiveness and desirability o f using tax expenditures as an essential element 
o f public policy. Many researchers ( for example, Yun (1992)) have argued that 
tax expenditures are less efficient than direct public expenditures because tax 
incentives are not so effective in achieving a desired policy purpose. In many
1.4 per cent in Austria and 0.9 per cent in Germany. In 1975, the ratio was 0.5 per 
cent in Japan and 9.8 per cent in the U.K.
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cases, tax incentives do not appear to have affected the behaviour o f the private 
sector even though they were actually introduced in order to encourage that 
activity. For example, Yun (1992) claims that "tax incentives do not appear to 
have affected the corporate financial structures in any significant way. Similarly, 
regarding the relocation o f industries, tax incentives often fail to provide the 
proper signals intended by the legislation; Even worse, some incentives seem to 
provide taxpayers with loopholes for realising capital gains tax free" (p. 176).
Another criticism is that there have been too many tax incentives in Korea 
during the development process. Since the early 1960s, the government has 
introduced numerous tax incentives, and tax laws have been revised very 
often. One consequence o f these tax incentives was that the tax laws became too 
complicated. Although the desirability o f using tax expenditures still remains 
as an important policy issue, tax expenditures have grown in importance partly 
because o f the constraints imposed upon the growth o f direct public 
expenditures.
2. 5 Conclusion
The emphasis in this chapter has been on describing how different measures 
o f government size have been constructed and used to  investigate the changes 
in the level and structure o f government activity in Korea over the last two 
decades. Due to the multidimensional nature o f public sector activities, it is 
impossible to express all the various forms o f government activities in a single
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aggregate measure. For different purposes, different authors have employed 
alternative measures and the ad hoc use o f different measures would lead to 
different conclusions about the size and growth o f the public sector.
Statistical measures which have been presented within the national accounts 
framework do not give the whole picture o f the total activities o f the public 
sector. Although the national accounts data have macroeconomic relevance, the 
data give an incomplete picture o f the growth o f government activities. In 
particular, they do not cover off-budget activities such as public enterprises, 
extra-budget accounts and tax expenditures. Therefore, the use o f the ratio o f 
public expenditure to GNP (GDP) in the national accounts understates the 
government involvement in the economy. Because off-budget activities are 
important components o f the total activities o f the public sector and have an 
important impact on the economy, they need to be integrated with other 
components.
There are a lot o f problems in designing a meaningful measure o f public 
sector growth. M ore research and discussion are clearly needed.
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Appendix Comparison o f  Public Expenditure Data
As noted in section 2.2, there are a variety o f way of measuring public 
expenditure. The Bank o f Korea (BOK) has compiled two different kinds o f 
public expenditure data. Following A System of National Accounts (SNA), the 
BOK has produced data for general government expenditure. According to the 
Korean national income accounting definition, general government expenditure is 
defined to include current and capital account activities o f both central and local 
government. However, in the National Accounts, the BOK has not provided 
consistent data on interest payment and net lending.
As mentioned in previous section, those components (interest payment and net 
lending) have rarely been included in the Korean national accounts data. The 
most common measure o f  public expenditure in the SNA has been current 
disbursements, current and capital expenditures, and subsidies (see Table 
2.1). These measures o f the size o f government are commonly presented as a 
share o f GNP (see Table 2.2).
Apart from the national accounts data, the BOK has produced another data set 
for general public expenditure. To measure the size o f the total public sector, the 
BOK has provided data on general government expenditure which includes 
interest payment and net lending. For purpose o f comparison with Table 2.1, 
Table 2.8 presents major components o f  general public expenditures. Since 
public expenditure data in Economic Statistics Yearbook include interest 
payment and net lending, the relative size o f the public sector shown in Table 
2.9 is larger than that o f Table 2.2.
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Table 2.8 Composition o f  Korean Public Expenditure (II), 1971-1991
1971
In billion won %
1981
In billion won %
1991
In billion won %
Public sector consumption 363.2 54.8 5,686.6 46.7 21,052.9 40.5
Public sector investment 178.5 26.9 2,127.9 17.3 14,710.5 28.3
Subsidies & Current transfers 42.4 6.3 1,187.2 9.8 8,444.6 16.2
Capital transfers 20.9 3.2 350.5 2.9 1,117.8 2.2
Debt interest 15.6 2.4 593.0 4.9 1,481.0 2.9
Net lending 42.5 6.4 2,241.7 18.4 5,192.3 10.0
Total 663.1 100.0 12,186.9 100.0 51,999.1 100.0
Source; Bank o f Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, 1981, 1990, 1993
Table 2.9 Korean Public Expenditure Ratio (II), 1971 -1991 (per cent)
1971 1981 1991
Public expenditure as a proportion of GNP(market prices) 19.4 26.8 25.2
Public expenditure as a proportion of GNP(factor cost) 21.3 30.6 28.4
Public expenditure as a proportion of GDP(market prices) 19.4 25.7 25.0
Public expenditure as a proportion of GDP(factor cost) 21.3 29.2 28.2
Public expenditure as a proportion of NI(factor cost) 23.0 33.9 31.9
Note; Figures on current prices.
Source; Bank o f Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, 1981, 1990, 1993
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Chapter 3 The Growth and Pattern of Public 
Expenditure in Korea
3. 1 Introduction
Despite its obvious importance, the study o f the long-term growth o f public 
spending in developing countries appears to have received a little interest among 
public finance economists. Partly due to the lack o f reliable historical data on 
public expenditure and national output in developing countries, most such studies 
have been based on a cross-sectional approach (for example, see Martin and 
Lewis (1956), Musgrave (1969), Enweze (1973) and Heller and Diamond 
(1990) ). A cross-sectional approach, however, provides little insight into the 
causes o f the long-term growth and time pattern o f public expenditure in a single 
country. Since the growth o f the public sector is a process o f a postulated change 
over time in a particular country, it seems more useful to study the development 
o f one government over time.
This chapter presents an effort to extend time-series analysis o f the growth 
and pattern o f public expenditures in Korea during the thirty-nine year period 
1953-1991. Using recently available data, this chapter is concerned with long­
term changes in the relative size o f the public sector and the growth o f public 
expenditure at both the aggregate and individual programmes (functional and 
economic composition) in Korea since 1953. By examining long-term trends o f
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public expenditure and by analysing the causes o f these developments, we will 
explore the changing role o f the public sector during the Korean modernisation 
process.
Korean experience is o f particular interest because the public sector has exerted 
an enormous influence on the level and allocation o f resources during the 
development process. Over the past four decades, taxation and public spending 
have been used as an important policy instrument for mobilising and allocating 
scare resources. Especially, since the early 1960s, government involvement in the 
economy has increased rapidly to promote export and economic growth.
Since time-series studies o f  the growth o f public expenditures in developing 
countries are relatively rare in the literature, a study o f Korean public 
expenditure growth will contribute to stimulate further research in other case 
studies.
3. 2 The Aggregate Level of Public Expenditure
As already pointed out in the previous chapter, there are several difficulties in 
measuring and analysing long-term changes o f the relative size o f the public 
sector. One o f the most serious problems is that definitions o f public expenditure
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change over time. In this section, we will employ the Korean national income 
accounting definition o f  public expenditure. In order to examine long-term trend 
o f the ratio o f public expenditure to GNP for the period 1953-1991, we define 
public expenditure to be the sum o f  total government expenditures excluding any 
expenditures o f public enterprises and netting-off transactions between the 
different level o f government.
Several measures o f public sector size based on this definition o f public 
expenditure to GNP over the period 1953-1991 are shown in Table 3.1. As can 
be seen in the Table, public expenditure growth in Korea over the past four 
decades has been significant at the aggregate level. Especially when the data are 
considered in current prices, we can observe the rapid growth in public 
expenditure. Viewed in current prices, public expenditure rose from 4.29 billion 
won in 1953 to 41873.60 billion won in 1991 ; a growth about 9760%.
After deflating the data to adjust for price inflation, public spending in real 
terms rose from 728.02 billion won in 1953 to 28367.55 billion won in 1991: 
overall growth has been 39 %. This growth in real public spending has been at a 
faster rate than GNP.
Adjusting the data still further to account for the increase in population, we can 
find that real per capita government expenditure rose eighteen fold over the past 
thirty nine years (359.71 million won in 1953 to 6556.24 million won in 1991).
When we consider total public expenditures in relation to the Gross National 
Product (GNP), it appears that the relative size o f the public sector (in current 
prices) has more a doubled during the period from 8.96 per cent in 1953 to 20.26 
per cent in 1991 (As mentioned in previous chapter, these ratios are arbitrary).
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Viewed in constant prices, the ratio o f public spending to GNP has increased from 
8.72 to 20.23 per cent. This latter fiscal behaviour is important because it seems 
to give some support to  Wagner's hypothesis that the share o f public sector tends 
to grow as the economy develops.
Table 3.1 Measures o f Public Sector Size
GNP Public Spending(G) Per Capita Spending G/GNP
(In Billion Won) (In Billion Won) (In Million Won) (% )
Current Constant(1985) Current Constant(1985) Current Constant(1985) Current Constant
1953 47.88 8346.92 4.29 728.02 2.12 359.71 8.96 8.72
1961 294.18 11367.43 55.72 2002.57 21.63 777.21 18.94 17.62
1971 3416.70 27128.00 552.70 4102.68 168.08 1247.66 16.18 15.12
1981 45528.10 55354.30 9034.70 10740.19 2333.16 2773.59 19.84 19.40
1991 206681.20 141623.20 41873.60 28367.55 9677.73 6556.24 20.26 20.03
Note; * Series spliced to current SNA where appropriate 
Source; Bank of Korea, National Accounts, Various Years
Economic Planning Board, Major Statistics of Korean Economy, Various Years
Table 3.1 has already introduced us to one aspect o f the growth o f government 
expenditure but what is the long-term pattern o f  Korean expenditure growth?
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Long-term growth o f  Korean public expenditures can be drawn and the result is 
plotted in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1, which depicts real relative size behaviour between 1953 and 1991, 
shows the pattern o f long-term growth o f the government sector. As can be seen 
in the Figure, the relative size o f the public sector has grown in an irregular 
fashion; a series o f peaks in 1961, 1979 (coinciding with political upheavals) and 
1969 (with development policy) and troughs in 1964, 1973 (restrictive budgetary 
policies). Major changes in the ratio o f public expenditure to GNP over the study 
period will be explained in more detail in next section.
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Fig u r e  3.1 P u b l i c  E xp end i t u r e  as a Sha re  of GNP, 1953-1991 ( I n  1985
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In most studies, the growth o f government means the growth o f public 
expenditure in relation to GNP. This development has been depicted in Figure
3.1. However, even though the long-term pattern o f total government 
expenditure remains constant, the growth pattern of the major expenditure items 
can be widely dissimilar. We need to disaggregate total public expenditures into 
three main components; government consumption expenditure (GeCon), capital 
investment expenditure (GeCap) and transfer payments (GeTra).
In Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3, the growth patterns o f the three different 
components o f public expenditures are displayed for the period 1953-1991. In 
this case the three categories o f  public expenditures represent their formal 
national income accounting definitions. All components are deflated by the 
appropriate implicit price deflators. Government consumption is deflated by the 
implicit GNP deflator and government capital investment is deflated by its own 
deflator, while transfer payments are deflated by the implicit deflator for private 
consumption expenditure.
In Figure 3.4, the growth o f the main components o f public expenditures 
(calculated by the growth o f index, 1953=100) is depicted and compared to the 
growth o f GNP since 1953. As shown in the Figure, the public sector has grown 
faster than GNP over the entire period. Concerning the growth o f the different 
components o f public spending, we can find that government capital investment 
has increased the fastest. The growth o f subsidies and transfer payments had 
begun to  accelerate in the mid 1970s. In contrast, government consumption has 
increased only marginally faster than GNP over the period.
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As mentioned in the previous section, the growth pattern o f each o f the different 
component o f total public expenditures has often shown quite different. In Table
3.2, the growth rates o f the different components o f public expenditure and GNP 
for successive ten-year periods are presented. From the Table, it can be seen that 
total public expenditure (GeGov) has grown faster than GNP; i.e. GeGov has 
grown 10.69 % for the whole period compared with 7.81 % in GNP. Among 
three components o f public expenditures, government capital investment has 
grown fastest and government consumption expenditure has increased only 
slightly faster than GNP (see also Figure 3.4). Since the growth pattern o f the 
different components o f the public sector is quite different, we cannot explain all 
o f the growth o f the public sector in a single model.
Table 3.2 Average Growth Rates of Public Expenditures and GNP in Korea 1953-1991
GNP GeCon GeTra GeCap GeGov
1953-60 3.73 14.13 26.36 36.65 15.42
1961-70 8.84 4.82 15.07 29.77 8.56
1971-80 7.76 10.57 14.65 10.22 10.47
1981-91 9.52 8.50 12.90 10.84 9.81
1953-91 7.81 9.11 16.41 20.41 10.69
GeCon; Government Consumption Expenditure, GeTra: Government Transfer Payments
GeCap; Government Capital Investment Expenditure, GeGov; GeCon+GeTra+GeCap 
Source: Bank of Korea, National Accounts, Various Years
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3. 3 Changes in the Composition o f Public Expenditures
The aggregate data presented in the previous subsection are useful to analyse 
the nature o f the overall growth o f  Korean public expenditure. However, as many 
authors have argued, a more useful analysis can be obtained through 
disaggregation (see Bird (1970), M usgrave (1969) and Saunders and Klau 
(1985) ). Since changes in government expenditure shares between different 
expenditure components reflect changes in budgetary priorities, a comparison o f 
expenditure shares over time can give us some informations about the relative 
importance o f particular programme. By examining the changes in the structure o f 
government expenditure, we can get further insight into the changing role o f the 
public sector in the economy.
Korea has experienced some important changes in the structure o f government 
expenditure over the last four decades. In this section, long-term changes in 
government expenditure shares between different programmes for the period 
1953-1991 are examined. By analysing changes in relative priorities o f public 
spending over time, we will explore the changing role o f the Korean public sector 
during the modernisation process. While there has been a lot o f debate about 
the relative merits o f  functional versus economic groupings o f public 
expenditures, tw o types o f  disaggregation have their own advantages. In this 
section, the two basic methods o f  disaggregation are chosen to explain changes 
in composition o f  public expenditure over the study period.
The post-war modernisation process in Korea can be divided into four stages as 
follows; i) 1953-60 Reconstruction Period ii)1961-1970 Rapid Growth and
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Development Strategy Period iii) 1971-1980 Heavy Industries Policies Period 
iv)1981-1991 Stabilisation Policy and Structural Adjustment Policy Period (see 
Bahl, Park and Kim (1986) Choi Kwang (1992)).
3.3.1 1953 - 1960
At the end o f  World W ar II in 1945, Korea obtained independence from Japanese 
rule. However the attainment o f independence was not a sufficient condition for 
Korea's social and economic development. The peninsula was divided along the 
38th parallel; the south and north Korea. Much o f natural resources and physical 
plant were left in the north, and in the south, agriculture was a major industry. The 
division o f Korean peninsula has influenced the social and economic condition 
since 1945.
During the transition period from 1945 to 1948, the U.S.militray 
administration ruled South Korea . The important aims o f socio-economic policy 
under the American military administration were self-defence and social stability. 
Budgetary priorities were given to  defence and general administration. More than 
sixty percent o f government expenditures was spent to defence and political 
stability (justice & policy). The fiscal structure during the period o f American
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military administration has influenced the future growth and composition o f 
Korean public expenditures-especially heavy burden o f defence expenditure.
In 1948, the first Korean government was established, and the first Korean 
President Sung-Man Ree inaugurated. Two years later , the Korean War broke 
out. The Korean War, which lasted for three years between 1950 and 1953, 
destroyed nearly all o f  the economy's productive potential. The economic and 
social damage done by the w ar was undoubtedly substantial.
In Korea, the period 1953-1960 was characterised as post-war reconstruction. 
After the end o f the Korean war in 1953, the government initiated an effort to 
rebuild the economy and to  raise the living standards o f population who had 
suffered during the war. Meeting defence needs and maintaining a minimum 
substance level o f living conditions, the Ree government tried to prepare a socio­
economic development plan to  recover the poor economic conditions.
Reconstruction policy was carried out during a period o f political instability and 
economic underdevelopment. Per Capita Income was only $63 ( at U.S. dollars) 
in 1953 - one o f typical cases o f a poor country. Between 1953 and 1956, the 
average annual inflation rate (measured by GNP deflator) was 42.63percent. The 
domestic market was too small to induce internal investment, and unemployment 
was too high due to poor economic conditions and a rapidly growing population. 
The average annual growth rate o f real GNP for the 1953-1960 was only 
3.73 percent.
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Under these circumstances o f instabilities and uncertainties after the war, 
government reconstruction policies were faced a lot o f difficulties. The instability 
o f socio-economic conditions made the formulations o f long-run development 
plans difficult , and many short-term stabilisation policies were implemented on a 
trial-and -error basis.
Since personal income was too low at subsistence level and tax administration 
was not well developed, tax revenues were too low to afford public spending 
during the early 1950s (for example, see Figure 3.7). Due to  the low tax yields 
and minus government savings, public funds for reconstruction projects were 
supported by foreign aid. For the period 1954 - 1959, more than 50 percent o f 
reconstruction projects were funded by foreign aid particularly from the US 
counterpart funds. Those funds were obtained from sales o f Economic Aid and 
Relief Goods and they played an important role in supporting the post war 
reconstruction policy during the 1950s.
Public functions which were performed over this period were mainly confined to 
defence, economic services (the construction o f  infrastructure) and general 
administration. As can be seen in Table 3.3, the relative share o f defence 
expenditure in total public spending for the period 1953-1955 was the highest - 
48.63 percent. The shares o f economic services and general public services 
were also high; 23.0 percent and 11.95 percent respectively. Compared with the 
high burden o f defence and economic services, the social welfare function o f 
government during the 1950s was low; the share o f social welfare programme 
(health, social security, housing and other social services ) in total public 
spending was only 4.23 percent.
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The structure o f government expenditure during the 1950s revealed something 
about the circumstances after the war and about the priorities held by policy 
makers for the period1.
The 1950s is usually thought o f as a period o f economic stagnation and political 
upheaval. Due to the significant decline o f foreign assistance at the end o f the 
1950s, the government budget showed a substantial deficit and the economy faced 
a severe recession.
The Ree government collapsed following the Student Revolution in 1960 , and 
the revolution increased inflation and it also influenced the growth pattern o f 
public expenditure in the early 1960s.
After years o f social and political instability at the end o f the 1950s, the 
military government , headed by President Chung-Hee Park, came to power 
by a military coup in 1961. The military government adopted an expansionary 
policy and played an active role in promoting growth. After the political crisis 
o f  1961, many new government expenditures (especially economic development 
services) became highly desirable and the responsibility for handling social and 
economic policies came under the power o f the Park Government. The political
1 Due to the lack of reliable data on GNP and general government expenditures before 
the Korean War, I cannot examine the displacement effect associated with the war. 
Unfortunately, GNP data has been compiled after the end of the Korean War of 1953. 
For the empirical test of the displacement effect hypothesis in the context of social 
disturbances caused by the two political crises in Korea, see Chapter 5.
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crisis o f 1961 generated pressures for increased spending on social and 
economic development services (see Bahl, Park, and Kim, 1986, chapter 4).
For example, the central government expenditure on economic 
development services increased (in absolute terms) from 8.28 million won in 
1960 to 19.45 million won in 1961, an increase o f 135 per cent. In contrast, 
social welfare expenditures increased from 1.95 million won in 1960 to 3.14 
million won in 1961, an increase o f 61 per cent (see Table 3.3). It is quite 
likely that the political crisis o f 1961 changed the character o f government 
expenditure and produced an upward shift in the level o f government 
expenditures on economic development and social welfare services.
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Table 3. 3 Functional Composition of Central Government Expenditures 
(selected periods 1953-1991)
______________________ (as a percentage of total expenditure)__________
1953-55 1961-63 1971-73 1981-83 1990-91
General Public Services 11.95 11.93 18.49 9.43 8.66
Defence 48.63 25.70 25.68 27.72 19.82
Education 5.45 12.88 16.87 16.45 15.44
Health 0.64 1.12 1.32 1.23 1.74
Social Security & Welfare 2.67 5.25 4.33 6.02 8.31
Housing & Community Develop 0.68 0.94 1.41 5.21 9.67
Others Social Services 0.24 1.32 1.16 0.69 0.51
Economic Services 23.00 35.66 24.62 22.08 20.53
Unallocable & Others 6.74 5.19 6.11 11.17 15.32
Total Expenditure 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Source; 1953-1970. Bahl. Park. Kim (1986), 1971-1991; Bank of Korea
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3.3.2 1961 - 1970
The 1960s was an important period for the Korean modernisation process. It 
was since the early 1960s that Korea had experienced rapid industrialisation 
accompanying by rising real per capita income, technological advances and 
institutional changes. The "take-off' period may be dated from this period.
After years o f stagnation and political instability at the end o f the 1950s, 
President Chung-Hee Park came to power by a military coup. In 1961, the new 
government o f the Third Republic, headed by President Park, was established. The 
main aims o f economic policy under the military government were economic 
growth, stable prices and the promotion o f export industries. Compared with the 
weak government policy in the 1950s, the military government played an active 
role in promoting growth in the 1960s. Korea has transferred from one o f the 
poorest countries in the 1950s to the fastest growing economies in the 1960s.
In 1953, per capita income was only $ 63. In 1971, per capita income 
reached $288. Average annual growth o f  real GNP for the period 1963-1971 
was 9.5 per cent. On a per capita basis, real growth for the period 1963-1971 
was 6.9 per cent, compared with 0.7 per cent over the period 1954-1962.
Because the internal domestic market was so small and the development stage 
was too low, the Park government adopted an "export-led strategy" which 
favoured the growth o f  export industries. Since the early 1960s, exports were 
emphasised and the government mobilised both internal and external resources to 
support export industries. To increase exports, the government provided a lot o f 
direct subsidies and other incentives systems, including a variety o f tax incentives.
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The government's increasing role in the economy was clearly revealed in the 
execution o f the "First Five-Year Economic Development Plan" which was 
launched in 1962. With the launching o f the First Five-Year Plan, the government 
began to exert considerable influence on the economy. This plan involved 
development and co-ordination o f capital expenditure programs,and the plan aimed 
at promoting export industries. At an early stage o f  economic development, the 
government invested public funds for promoting infrastructure development. As 
can be seen in Table 3.4, public investment has expanded since the early 1960s.
The First Five-Year Plan was over-ambitious because the target o f real economic 
growth o f  7 percent per annum was too high compared to the actual growth 
performance. To achieve the growth target, the government adopted an 
expansionary fiscal policy , and it resulted in a rapid expansion of government 
expenditures. But due to bad harvests and monetary reform in 1962, the economic 
condition in the early 1960s was very weak. Especially due to the expansionary 
policy, inflation measured by WPI (Wholesale Price Indexes) rose sharply to 
20.37 percent in 1963 and to 34.36 percent in 1964.
The plan was revised in 1964. To reduce inflation , the government adopted a 
deflationary policy. The major purpose o f the deflationary fiscal policy was the 
elimination o f the fiscal deficit, which was considered as a major source o f 
inflation. The government cut expenditure in 1963 and in 1964. The 
expenditure/GNP ratio declined in 1963 and in 1964 (see Figure 3.1).
After two years o f  budgetary austerity, however, government expenditure 
entered the second expansion stage. Since 1965, the absolute and relative size o f
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the public sector has grown steadily. The share o f public expenditure in GNP rose 
again since 1965 .
In 1965, foreign aid was cut sharply and counterpart funds were decreased 
rapidly. Since many development projects, postponed during the two years 
deflationary years, had to be carried out, there existed serious pressure for 
financing public expenditure. Especially as the commencement o f the Second 
Five-Year Plan in 1967, fiscal pressure for financing government expenditure 
increased.
To meet fiscal needs during the 1960s, the government established the Office o f 
National Tax Administration (ONTA) in 1966. The ONTA was responsible for 
collecting tax and formulating tax policy and introduced an effective tax 
administration and undertook various reforms o f the tax structure. Government's 
direct cost o f collecting tax was also reduced. As can be seen in Figure 3.7, the 
structure o f financing has changed significantly since the mid 1960s. The share o f 
direct taxes has increased steadily throughout the whole period. Partly due to 
these reforms and partly to rapid economic growth in the mid 1960s, national tax 
revenues increased steadily. In contrast, the share o f government receipts financed 
by foreign aid has declined sharply since the mid 1960s.
The other important institutional change taken in this period was the 
establishment o f the Economic Planning Board (EPB). The EPB was set up in 
1961, and took over responsibility for budgeting, economic planning and resource 
mobilisation. The head o f the board was ranked as a Deputy Prime Minister. As 
deputy prime minister, the head o f the EPB played an important role in co­
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ordinating and controlling conflicts among the various economic ministries through 
the EPB's budgetary function.
Compared with the early 1950s, there has been a significant change in
composition o f  public expenditures. As shown in Table 3.3, during the early
1960s, the share o f public spending allocated to economic services and education 
has been increased. This has been balanced against a decline in defence 
expenditure (see also Figure 3.5). Especially, the share o f economic services 
was the highest; 35.66 percent for 1961-1963. It reflected the changing role o f 
fiscal policy between different stages o f development. At the early stage o f 
development, an increased level o f capital formation was needed, and budgetary 
priorities were set to raise productivity in the economy.
During the period, education expenditure was 12.88 percent o f total public 
spending. From Table 3.3, we can see that the share o f  public spending on 
education has increased continuously since the early 1960s. During the 
Korean modernisation process, education was considered as an important 
source o f economic development. Influenced by Confucian values, many
Koreans thought education as an important source o f  upward class mobility and 
to future success in their lives. Those factors contributed to the growth o f 
education expenditure.
While the share o f education expenditure has increased, the share o f social 
welfare expenditure (health, social security, housing and other social services) has 
not increased greatly. Like other developing countries, social welfare 
received a low priority for policy makers at the early stage o f development.
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Tabic 3.4 Economic Classification of Central Government Expenditures 
(selected periods 1953-1991)
______________________(as a percentage of total expenditure)__________
1953-55 1961-63 1971-73 1981-83 1990-91
Expenditure on Goods & Services 62.92 40.47 38.68 36.72 29.89
Interest Payment 0.53 0.84 2.22 5.60 3.44
Subsidies and Current Transfers 16.46 28.84 34.58 29.10 40.86
Capital Transfer 4.58 6.86 5.92 5.22 5.39
Capital Spending 6.00 12.41 12.52 7.83 8.16
Net Lending 9.52 10.58 6.07 15.53 12.27
Total Expenditure 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Source; 1953-1970, Bahl. Park. Kim(1986)? 1971-1988;Bank of Korea
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Figures Functional Composition of Central Government Expenditure, 1953-1991






The share of general public services in total central government expenditure increased from 
10.21 per cent in 1971 to 22.49 per cent in 1972. In contrast, the share of public spending on 
unallocated expenditure decreased from 12.81 per cent in 1971 to 2.48 per cent in 1972. The share 
of other government expenditures (defence, education, social services and economic services) 
remained constant. It is unlikely that there were interfunctional displacements in the early 1970s. 
For the empirical test of the displacement hypothesis, see Chapter 5.
Figure 6 Economic Classification of Centra I Government Expenditure, 1953-1991
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3.3.3 1971 - 1980
The major aims o f economic policy in the early 1970s were similar to those of 
the 1960s. Many o f the promotional policies were pursued, export-led growth 
policy continued, and the same group o f policy makers managed the economy. 
The development strategy in the 1970s was again characterised by continued 
government intervention. However, due to the two oil shocks in 1973 and 1979 
and the subsequent world-wide economic recessions, Korea also experienced some 
important structural changes. The government tried to adopt macroeconomic 
policy in response to the changes o f the internal and external economic conditions.
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With the launching o f  the Third Five-Year Economic Development Plan 
(1972-1976), the government emphasised the growth o f exports and especially the 
development o f heavy and chemical industries. To achieve the planning targets and 
to promote economic growth, the government played a much more active role in 
the economy.
1973 was an important turning point for the Korean economy. The first oil 
shock hit the economy, and inflation rose 41.97 percent in 1974. The government 
undertook a deflationary policy to reduce inflation. Efforts were made to deflate 
the economy in 1973 by reducing public expenditure and public investment. Due 
to the deflationary fiscal policy, the public expenditure/GNP ratio declined in 
1973.
It was also in 1973 that the government announced the Heavy and Chemical 
Industry Development Plan. The government considered that these industries 
were important for further economic development and export growth. The 
government undertook large scale investment projects in these industries. The 
government also supported those industries through preferential credit allocation , 
tax exemptions and government loans and subsidies programmes. In addition to 
those programmes, the government established the National Investment Fund (one 
o f the largest government funds in Korea) in 1974. Throughout the operation of 
the fund, the government provided financial resources at lower interest rates and 
supported heavy industry projects. To secure public sector financing 
requirements, the government also resorted to foreign borrowing.
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Many o f these development strategies attributed to the growth of "off-budget" 
activities2 in the 1970s. Especially, the Central Government Fund increased 
rapidly since 1973. It increased from 69.8 Billion Won in 1974 to 209.3 Billion 
Won in 1976 and to 713.4 Billion W on in 1980. It was also during the 1970s that 
public enterprise activities increased. Over the period, public enterprise investment 
accounted for more than 20 percent o f total gross investment. To support 
strategic industries , the government used various tax expenditures measures such 
as tax exemptions, tax allowances and tax credits. Although those off-budget 
activities are not included in the general government expenditures in the national 
accounts, such activities have increased greatly since the early 1970s.
Active government intervention and aggressive policy measures led to rapid 
economic growth. Between 1971 and 1979, Korea experienced rapidly increasing 
exports and GNP growth. The industrial structure changed from labour intensive 
industries in the 1960s to heavy and chemical industries in the 1970s.
Exports increased from 55 millions o f  dollars in 1962 to 1,068 millions o f 
dollars in 1971, with an average annual growth rate o f 39.0 per cent. The share 
o f the mining and manufacturing sector in GNP increased 16.0 per cent in 
1960 to 22.5 per cent in 1971, while the agricultural sector decreased from 
37.0 per cent to 26.6 per cent over the period. Heavy industries increased 
their share o f nominal manufacturing output from 38.0 per cent in 1971 to 57.0 
per cent in 1983. In contrast, light industries decreased their share from 62.0 per 
cent to 43.0 per cent over the period (see Corbo and Suh, 1992).
2 For a more detail discussion of off-budget activities, see Chapter 2.
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By the end o f the 1970s, major problems appeared. As the second oil shock hit 
the economy in 1979 and due to the following world-wide recession, the Korean 
economy faced very difficult circumstances. Excess capacity appeared in the 
heavy and chemical industries and the operation ratio o f these industries decreased 
sharply. Due to the recession in the late 1970s and excess capacity, the 
equipment in the heavy and chemical industries did not fully utilised.
To make matters worse, the assassination o f President Park in 1979 produced 
profound political upheavals. In an already difficult time, the second political 
coup occurred in 1979. President Doo-Hwan Chun came to power by a 
military coup.
Due to the poor harvest in 1980, real agricultural GNP dropped in 1980. 
Inflation measured by the WPI accelerated to 38.86 percent and 20.41 percent in 
1980 and 1981. In 1980, for the first time in nearly two decades , the Korean 
economy experienced a negative growth rate o f  -3.7 percent. All o f these 
factors had aggravated the structural difficulties by the early 1980s.
As indicated above, composition o f government expenditures in the 1970s was 
similar with that o f the 1960s. In 1971-1973, the share o f  public spending on 
general public services and education had increased; compared with the early 
1960s. The ratio o f defence expenditure remained constant. Since the number of 
U.S. troops reduced by nearly one-third in the early 1970s, the need for self - 
defence resulted in the high burden o f defence expenditure once again.
While the economy experienced rapid economic growth during the 1970s, the 
share o f social expenditures in total public spending was still too low.
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3.3.4 1981 - 1991
In September 1980, President Doo-Hwan Chun was inaugurated and the Fifth 
Republic was established. The overriding aims o f  economic policy under the Chun 
government were (i) price stabilisation, (ii) market liberalisation and (iii) balanced 
socio-economic growth.
Although all o f  these aims were emphasised during the Fifth Five-Year Socio- 
Economic Development Plan (1982-1986), the principal concern o f the new 
government was given to price stabilisation. Since the macroeconomic 
circumstances in 1979 had so deteriorated and the overall role o f the government 
in the economy was being questioned, new macroeconomic strategies were in 
order. The active government involvement in the economy during the 1970s had 
created inefficiencies and high inflation. Inflation rates (measured by WPI) 
recorded at an annual rate o f 15 per cent in the 1970s. In 1980, wholesale prices 
increased 39.0 per cent, while consumer prices rose 29 per cent. Inflation 
became a prominent objective under the Chun government. To reduce inflation, 
the government adopted a package o f  reflationary measures (restrictive monetary 
and fiscal policies) that replaced the aggressive government spending o f the late 
1970s.
In 1980 when President Chun came to  power, the ratio o f public expenditure to 
GNP was 19.48 percent. The growth o f  the public expenditure / GNP ratio in
128
1980 was mainly due to the negative GNP growth in that year. Real GNP fell by 
3.7 percent in 1980. Due to high inflation in the early 1980s, the government 
undertook a restrictive fiscal policy in 1983. The growth o f public expenditures 
was restrained and in 1984 the government froze nominal public spending at 1983 
levels. On the other hand a restrictive monetary policy was also adopted to control 
the overall money supply. As a result o f reflationary fiscal and monetary policy, 
the budget deficit as a ratio o f  GNP dropped from 5.6 percent in 1981 to 1.5 
percent in 1985, and inflation stabilised to one digit (The average annual rate of 
inflation in the 1980s was less than 10 per cent.); The average annual inflation rate 
(WPI) for 1982-1988 was 1.18 percent. During the 1980s, the relative public 
sector size remained around 20 percent to GNP.
Another new direction o f economic policy under the Chun government was 
market liberalisation. In connection with the policy objective o f reducing 
government involvement in the economy and with its emphasis on market forces, 
the government pursued de-regulation and privatisation policy. Since Korea's 
earlier growth strategy had resulted in inefficiency and unbalanced industrial 
developm ent, the government changed its policy toward more reliance on indirect 
guidance and market forces. During the 1980s, a number o f government loan 
programs were eliminated, and the government tried to reduced off-budget 
activities. The size o f extra-budget accounts had shown a continuous reduction 
and tax exemptions also reduced substantially. Public enterprises, especially 
financial sector and heavy & chemical industries, have been privatised.
It was also during the early 1980s that the need to build a welfare state 
emerged in Korea. As presented in the Fifth Plan, the government emphasised the 
policy objective; "growth with equity". Although the government resources which
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could be spent on welfare expenditures were limited, the Fifth plan was concerned 
with the promotion o f balanced growth and social development. Compared with 
the previous plans in the 1960s and 1970s, the new plan gave more priority to the 
welfare policies.
Compared with the previous three decades, there have been some changes in 
the structure o f government expenditure. Since the early 1980s, the share of 
general public services in total expenditures has declined; the share fell to 8.65 
percent in 1990-1991. Education expenditure has maintained a steady proportion 
o f total public expenditure since the early 1970s; around 16 percent for the period 
(see Table 3.3). During the rapid economic growth process, human capital has 
been regarded as an important source o f  economic growth. Within the total limit 
o f public expenditures, budget priorities were given to  human resource 
development especially through education spending.
One o f  the important changes in the composition o f  public expenditure in the 
late 1980s can be found in social welfare expenditures. Since the early 1980s, 
the major Korean social welfare system has been emerged; legal minimum wage, 
state medical insurance program, housing development program and state aid 
program to the poor. Due to these social welfare programs, welfare expenditures ( 
health, social security, housing and other social services) have increased; 13.15 
percent in 1981-1983 and 20.23 percent in 1990-1991.
Among these welfare expenditures (education, health, social security, housing 
and other social services), the largest component went to education. Although 
the share o f education spending in total government expenditures decreased 
slightly during 1971-1991, this item received 13.91 per cent o f total
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government expenditures in 1991 (see Table 3.5). Housing and community 
development expenditures grew fastest for the period 1971-1991. The rapid 
urbanisation o f the 1970s generated a great demand for housing in cities. The 
government introduced housing development program in the early 1980s and 
housing and community development spendings rose from 1.22 per cent in 1971 
to 9.20 per cent in 1991. Due to the introduction o f legal minimum wage, state 
aid program and state medical insurance program in the early 1980s, social 
security and welfare expenditures also increased 5.30 per cent to 8.53 per cent 
during the 1971-1991. However, the share o f health and other social spendings 
in total government expenditures remained constant over the period. 
Consequently, income distribution improved somewhat during 1970- 1980. An 
empirical study shows that the Gini coefficient for all households dropped from 
0.3981 in 1980 to  0.3567 in 1984 (see Corbo and Suh, 1992).
In contrast with the increase of welfare expenditures, the share o f economic 
services slightly declined. Although the relative share has declined, economic 
services expenditure shows the largest portion in total public expenditure; 20.53 
percent in 1990-1991. As in other developing countries, public capital formation 
in Korea is regarded as an important role o f the public sector.
However, even in the 1990s, the protective role o f the state is still important in 
Korea. Although the share o f defence expenditure has been declining since the mid 
1980s, the burden o f defence spending is still high in Korea. Given the 
uncertainties surrounding the Korean peninsula and taking into account the U.S. 
defence policy, it is most unlikely that Korea's defence budget will decline 
appreciably in the near future.
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General Public Services 63.525 10.21 907.700 8.91 3562.900 8.84
Defence 132.401 21.27 2849.000 27.96 7899.700 19.60
Education 99.931 16.06 1465.600 14.38 5608.800 13.91
Health 8.168 1.31 103.400 1.01 716.200 1.78
Social Security & Welfare 32.987 5.30 496.500 4.87 3438.200 8.53
Housing & Community Develop 7.595 1.22 763.800 7.50 3709.300 9.20
Others Social Services 5.518 0.89 56.800 0.56 209.600 0.52
Economic Sendees 192.412 30.92 2519.400 24.72 8332.800 20.67
Unallocable & Others 79.814 12.82 1027.600 10.08 6834.000 16.95
Total Expenditure 622.351 100.00 10189.800 100.00 40311.500 100.00
Source; Bank of Korea. Economic Statistics Yearbook, Various Years
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3. 4 Summary
This chapter examined the growth and change o f the structure of public 
expenditure in Korea during the period 1953-1991. Since time-series analyses o f 
public expenditures in developing countries are relatively rare in the literature, this 
study represents an effort to employ time-series analysis o f the growth and 
change o f public expenditure in Korea over the last thirty-nine year period.
Over the last four decades, the relative size o f the Korean public sector was 
smaller than that o f  the developed countries. However public expenditure in 
absolute terms grew significantly. The growth o f public spending was mainly due 
to the development in economic services and defence expenditure. In Korea, the 
government played an important role in promoting capital formation.
Under the particular social circumstance in the Korean peninsula, the protective 
role (national-defence) has been important. However the relatively small share in 
transfer and social expenditure during the 1960s and 1970s indicates the weak 
redistributive function o f  government.
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The time pattern o f Korean public expenditures was irregular and major changes 
were caused by political and social upheavals.
To explain the long-term pattern o f public expenditure in Korea more clearly, we 
need further research on the determinant analysis. This is the subject matter o f the 
next chapters.
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Chapter 4 Wagner’ s Law
(An Application of Cointegration Analysis for Korea)
4. 1 Introduction
Toward the end o f  the nineteenth century, Adolph Wagner (1883) formulated 
his famous law o f  increasing state activity for western industrializing countries by 
linking the growth o f  government activity to economic development. Although 
there has been some disagreement among scholars regarding the correct 
interpretation o f the hypothesis, Wagner's Law has been generally interpreted as 
follows; as per capita income increases in industrializing nations, a rising share o f 
an economy's resources will be devoted to public sector activities. Wagner's 
hypothesis, i.e., the proposition that there exists a long-run tendency for the public 
sector to grow, has become a stylized fact in public sector economics (Brown and 
Jackson, 1990, p. 122).
As explained in Chapter 1, many researchers have discussed about the correct 
interpretation o f Wagner's Law. Although Wagner's original ideas were broad, 
subsequent researchers have interpreted the law in narrow terms (especially, Bird 
(1971)).
In modem economic terms, Wagner's hypothesis has been explained in terms 
o f the income elasticity o f  demand for public goods. For Wagner, publicly 
produced goods and services are superior or income elastic wants. Therefore, as
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real income increases in the economy, public expenditure rises more than 
proportionately (the income elasticity o f public expenditure in excess o f unity).
Since the early 1960s, many studies have examined the empirical verification of 
Wagner's hypothesis. As new data sets on the relevant variables have become 
available, and more advanced econometric techniques have been developed, 
further tests o f the law have been done. The debate about the correct 
interpretation and validity o f  Wagner's hypothesis continues today. Most 
empirical studies have been based on either time-series analysis o f a single
country or cross-sectional analysis o f different countries. The empirical results o f 
Wagner's hypothesis are inconclusive. Many time-series studies find support for 
the hypothesis, compared with the lacking o f  support in most cross-section studies. 
For example, empirical studies by Bird (1971), Abizadeh and Yousefi (1988) 
confirm Wagner's law whereas studies by Wagner and Weber (1977) , Ram 
(1987), and Gemmell (1990) do not find conclusive support for the law.
Several authors have argued that Wagner's Law should be tested with time- 
series data rather than cross-section basis. Since Wagner's hypothesis is concerned 
with the long term growth o f  public expenditure in a country, they argue that 
cross-section studies cannot prove Wagner's Law. For example, Bird (1971, p. 10) 
suggests that such tests (international cross-section comparison) are "completely 
irrelevant as tests o f  a hypothesis the essence o f which is a postulated change over 
time in a particular country".
A number o f studies using time series data have been undertaken in order to 
examine a positive correlation between the growth o f  public expenditure and 
national income. In general, these empirical studies have found support for the
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law with few exceptions. However these studies have also suffered from 
numerous methodological problems which render their results o f  dubious value. 
Recently Henrekson (1992) and M urthy (1993) have criticised the problems of 
previous time-series econometric tests for Wagner's Law and suggested a 
cointegration analysis to test the validity o f  the law.
The purpose o f this chapter is to  examine the validity o f Wagner's Law in the 
Korean economy by employing a recently advanced econometric method. In 
Korea, public spending and national income have had a tendency to grow over 
the last four decades. However, unless the two variables (government 
expenditures and GNP) are cointegrated, we cannot determine a long-run 
relationship between them; i.e. the regression equation, using non-stationary 
variables, leads to the problem o f spurious regression. In this chapter, I attempt 
to test the stationarity o f  the time series data on public spending and GNP (in 
real terms) for Korea during the period 1953-1991. By employing a recently 
advanced econometric technique (unit root test and cointegration analysis), I 
attempt to examine a long-run relationship between real government expenditures 
and real GNP in the frame-work o f  Wagner's Law.
This chapter is organised as follows. Before econometric techniques are 
discussed, a brief reference o f six different versions o f Wagner's Law is made 
and the six formulations are presented. Subsequently, the econometric technique 
for stationarity and o f  cointegration analysis are explained and these techniques 
are applied to Korean data. Finally , after the presentation o f the statistical 
results, some concluding remarks are offered.
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4. 2 The Empirical Model of Wagner's Law
As in all other empirical studies, we need to choose an appropriate model for an 
empirical verification o f Wagner's Law.
Due to the complexity o f  the problems and the vagueness o f  Wagner's 
hypothesis, it is difficult to precisely define the empirical form o f the relationship 
between public expenditures and the level o f  economic development. Different 
empirical researchers have interpreted the law differently and many different 
versions o f Wagner's Law have appeared.
Following Gandhi (1971) and Mann (1980), the following six different 
versions o f Wagner’s Law have been most commonly investigated.
( i )  Peacock and Wiseman (1967) have tested the relation 
GE = f  (GNP)
where GE stands for government expenditure and GNP is gross national product. 
They briefly write Wager's Law as "government expenditure must increase at an 
even faster rate than output" (P-W, 1967, p. 17). This functional form is called 
the traditional Peacock-Wiseman version. According to this version, the elasticity 
o f GE with respect to  GNP is expected to  exceed unity.
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( i i ) Pryor (1968) has examined the relation 
GEC = f  (GNP)
where GEC stands for government consumption expenditure. To exemplify 
Wagner's spirit, Pryor (1968, p.451) asserts that "in growing economies the 
share o f public consumption expenditures in national income increases". According 
to the Pryor version, the elasticity o f  GEC with respect to GNP would be 
expected to exceed unity.
( iii ) Goffman (1968, p .359) interprets Wagner's Law "as a nation 
experiences economic development and growth, an increase must occur in the 
activities o f the public sector and that the ratio o f increase, when converted into 
expenditure terms, would exceed the rate o f  increase in output per capita". The 
Goffman version assumes a functional relationship o f  the form as follows 
GE = f  (GNP/N)
where N denotes population and GNP/N stands for gross national product per 
capita. According to  this version, the elasticity o f public expenditures with 
respect to gross national product per capita is greater than unity.
( iv ) Musgrave (1969, p.74) claims "Ever since Adolph Wagner expounded 
his law o f the expanding scale o f  state activity, economists have speculated on its 
validity and the underlying causes. The proposition o f expanding scale, obviously, 
must be interpreted as postulating a rising share o f public sector or ratio of public 
expenditure to GNP ... development o f  a country from low to high per capita 
income". The M usgrave version, the most widely accepted specification o f 
Wagner's L aw , can be written as follows
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GE/GNP = f  (GNP/N) 
where GE/GNP denotes public expenditure as a share o f GNP. According to 
Musgrave's version, Wagner's Law is validated if the ratio elasticity exceeds 
zero.
( v ) Gupta (1967) and Michas (1975) have examined the following version 
o f Wagner's hypothesis
GE/N = f  (GNP/N)
where GE/N represents government expenditure per capita. They tried to verify 
that the elasticity o f public spending per capita with respect to GNP per capita is 
greater than unity.
( vi ) The last formulation to testing Wagner's Law is the "modified" 
Peacock-Wiseman share version. It is referred to  as the modified P-W version 
because Mann (1980) converts the traditional Peacock-Wiseman formulation into a 
share version. According to the modified P-W  version, the law can be written as 
follows
GE/GNP = f  (GNP)
In the relation, if the elasticity is greater than zero, then Wagner's Law is 
validated.
These six formulations o f Wagner's hypothesis can be expressed in log-linear 
regression forms as follows:
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In GE = a  + p  In (GNP) + u (1)
In GEC = a  + 8  In (GNP) + u (2 )
In GE = a  + y  In (GNP/N) + u (3)
In GE/GNP = a  + m In (GNP/N) + u (4)
In GE/N = a  + y/\n  (GNP/N) + u (5)
In GE/GNP = a  + v In (GNP) + u (6 )
In the above equations, In stands for the natural logarithm o f  the variables, and 
the parameters a  and u are the intercept and the stochastic error term 
respectively . In the equations, the estimated coefficients o f  the independent 
variable stand for the income elasticity o f  demand for public expenditures which 
will produce different values depending on the version used. To validate 
Wagner's hypothesis the straight income elasticity requires to  be > 1  and the 
ratio income elasticity needs to  be > 0 .
Most previous empirical tests o f W agner's Law in a single country over a long 
period have used time-series data and employed the ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression technique to estimate the above elasticities. Most o f these empirical 
studies have found support for the law.
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However, they have suffered from various methodological flaws and errors. 
The conventional models have ignored the question o f stationarity. In the next 
section I will address about these issues.
4. 3 Econometric Problem
Over the last two decades, many researchers have undertaken case studies for 
their countries with the six different versions o f Wagner's Law. The case studies 
for Mexico, the United States and Canada respectively was undertaken by Mann
(1980) (later, Nagarajan and Spears (1990)), Abizadeh and Yousefi (1988), 
and Afxentiou and Serletis (1991). In order to examine the validity o f Wagner's 
Law, all o f these studies have used time-series data obtained from their countries. 
Using time-series data and employing the ordinary least squares (OLS) techniques, 
they estimated the regression coefficients. These empirical tests o f six different 
versions o f the law have found a statistically significant positive relationship 
between government expenditures and economic growth. They vindicate 
Wagner's Law.
These previous studies have contained numerous econometric shortcomings 
or misspecified equations. In estimating six different equations for Wagner's 
hypothesis, they have assumed that the time-series data used on government 
expenditure and national income are stationary and that the error terms in the 
equation are serially un-correlated. Under these assumptions, the method o f OLS
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gives estimators that are unbiased and have minimum variance; i.e. the estimated 
coefficients are consistent and have the usual asymptotic normal distribution.
However, recent advances in time series analysis and available empirical 
evidence have suggested that many macroeconomic times series are nonstationary 
in the sense that the mean and variance depend on time (Nelson and Plosser 
(1982), Schwert (1987), Maddala (1992) ).
If  a variable tends to return to  its mean level through time, the variable is said 
to be stationary. A stationary series has a well-defined mean which will not vary 
greatly with the sampling period. But if  a series tends to depart even further 
from any given value as time goes on and has a time varying mean, the time 
series is said to be nonstationary. For nonstationary time-series, we cannot use 
the term mean without referring to some particular time period.
Nonstationarity in time-series data gives rise to many econometric problems. 
Regressions involving such nonstationary variables are likely to  produce spurious 
results. When nonstationary data are being used in a regression, the results 
obtained by using these variables are likely to be spurious because the variables 
are actually unrelated. The possibilities o f  spurious regression also exist if the 
variables under consideration are not cointegrated.
To overcome the problems o f  the previous studies dealing with Wagner's 
Law, we need to  examine the stationarity o f each variables and to investigate 
the long- run relationship between government expenditure and GNP in terms 
o f cointegration analysis.
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As specified in the six different formulations o f Wagner's Law , the data 
under examination consists o f gross national product (GNP), government 
expenditure (GE) and government consumption expenditure (GEC) in real 
terms.
In addition, the data are also examined in per capita terms - per capita GNP 
(GNP/N), per capita government expenditure (GE/N)- and the share o f 
government expenditure in GNP (GE/GNP) in real terms. All six series are 
measured in real terms and transformed to natural logs1.
In the next subsection, I will test the stationarity o f the data and examine a 
long-run link between the variables in terms o f cointegration analysis, using data 
for Korea over the period, 1953-1991.
1 For a definition of the variables and data sources, see APPENDIX 1 Data 
Sources and Definations at the end of this chapter.
4.3.1 Two types of Trends
As mentioned above, many economic time series are nonstationary rather than 
stationary. Nonstationary data must be appropriately transformed so that the 
statistical condition o f  white noise for lit is satisfied. By de-trending the series, 
the disturbance term lit becomes a stationary series with mean zero and constant 
variance (e.g. Ut - IN(0, cr2)) . I f  these statistical conditions for the disturbance 
term are satisfied, then the series lit is called white nose (A white noise is a 
serially uncorrelated process ).
As pointed out by Nelson and Plosser (1982), most economic time series can 
be "trend stationary processes (TSP)"- positive or negative growth over time- or 
"difference stationary processes (DSP)'-stationary in first or higher order 
differences. Both the models exhibit a linear trend. But the appropriate method 
for de-trending is different.
If  a time series belongs to the TSP class, it can be detrended by regressing the 
series against an intercept and a time trend. I f  a time series is the DSP class, we 
can use successive differencing as a way o f  removing nonstationarity. Since 
transformations o f  the data depend upon the properties o f the variables, we need 
to know about the time-series properties o f the variables before de-trending the 
data. To test the hypothesis o f  whether the time-series used in the regression 
belongs to  the DSP class or to  the TSP class o f  models, Nelson and Plosser 
(1982) have used Dickey - Fuller tests.
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Theses tests consist o f  estimating the following regression equation
AYt = ct o + a , T  + a  2 YM + £ / ? /  AY,., + u, (7)
;=1
where Yt denotes the relevant variable, A is the first difference operator, a  0 is a 
constant, T is the time trend and ut is a stationary series with zero mean and 
constant variance.
By estimating the equation (7), we can test the joint null hypothesis ( a l = a  2 
=0 ) for each data series. In this joint test, the null hypothesis to be tested is that 
the time series belong to  the DSP class ( a x = a  2 =0) against the alternative that 
they belong to the TSP class. The failure to reject the null hypothesis means that 
the data is subject to the DSP class and it follows a random walk with a drift.
Under this null hypothesis, Dickey and Fuller (1981) provide tabulations o f 
the distribution o f the t-ratio and the values o f  the F-statistic for testing the null 
hypothesis. The critical F-values in Dickey and Fuller are much higher than those 
in the usual standard F-tables.
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Table 4.1 Dickey-Fuller Joint Hypothesis Test






LGNP 34 4.92 6.73 7.24
LGE 34 4.15 6.73 7.24
LGEC 34 2.57 6.73 7.24
LGNP/N 34 5.05 6.73 7.24
LGE/N 34 3.63 6.73 7.24
LGE/GNP 34 6.37 6.73 7.24
Notes; * The Critical F-values (the O 3  -statistic) are taken from Table VI in Dickey 
and Fuller (1981, p. 1063). The 95 per cent point of the distribution of the O 3  - 
statistic for the sample size 34 falls between 6.73 and 7.24. The lag length 4 is 
assumed in the equation2.
To test the hypothesis that the time-series o f  the six variables belong to the 
TSP (trend stationary processes) class against the alternative that they belong to 
the DSP (difference stationary processes), I use a test developed by Dickey 
and Fuller (1981). After testing the six variables used in the six different versions 
o f Wagner's Law, we report the results in Table 4. 1.
2  Although most of the reported results are besed on the lag length 4, a comparison 




Table 4 . 1 shows the number o f observations (n), the calculated F-values for the 
six variables and the critical F-values from the tables presented in Dickey and 
Fuller. As we can see, the number o f observations was 34 and the calculated F- 
values for the six variables are ranged from 2.57 (LGEC; the log o f government 
consumption) to 6.37 (LGE/GNP; the log o f government expenditure in GNP). 
The relevant critical values for the O 3  -statistic are given in Table VI in Dickey 
and Fuller (1981, p. 1063). At the 5% significance level for the sample size 
50, the corresponding critical F-value is 6.73, and for the sample size 25, the 
critical F-value is 7.24. If  the calculated F-values are less than the critical F- 
values, we cannot reject the null hypothesis and the data is subject to the DSP 
class.
From the above table, we can see that the null hypothesis ( a l = a  2 =0) 
cannot be rejected at 5 % significance level for all six variables. At the 5 per 
cent level, we failed to reject the hypothesis that the data have unit roots. 
Therefore, the DSP hypothesis seems to be accepted for all six variables 
because all o f the calculated F-values are less than the critical F-values3. 
However, if we examine the calculated variables more carefully, the calculated 
F-value for LGE/GNP (i.e. 6.37) is too high to claim that it is a pure DSP 
class o f model. The better explanation would be that the series for LGE/GNP 
is a DSP dominant mixed process.
3 In examining historical time series for the U.S. economy, Nelson and Plosser (1982) 
also find that the DSP model is more appropriate for most economic time series.
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4.3.2 Tests for Unit Roots
In the previous subsection, I examined the stationary properties o f the six 
series and found that all six series used in Wagner's Law are the DSP class o f 
models. The next step is to apply unit root tests in order to examine the order o f 
integration o f each data series.
Testing for unit roots in time series data has received considerable attention in 
recent econometric literature. Since there exists the problem o f spurious 
regression involving the levels o f the variables, we need to examine whether 
each series is stationary or whether the series has a stochastic trend. I f  a series 
contains unit roots, the time series data is not stationary and it will behave as a 
stochastic rather than a deterministic process.
Until recently, several methods o f testing for unit roots have been proposed .4  
The Dickey-Fuller (DF) test and the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test 
have been most commonly used. Pesaran and Pesaran (1991, p. 160) suggests 
that the DF and ADF test are preferable to the other tests and propose the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Regression for testing for unit roots. If we adopt The 
Dickey-Fuller (DF) test to examine the unit root hypothesis, we can simply use 
the standard tables from Dickey and Fuller (1981).
4 For example, the Dickey-Fuller (DF) test, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test, 
the Instrumental Test, and the Phillips-Perron test. For a useful survey of the unit root 
literature, see Baneijee, et al. (1993).
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In this subsection, I will apply the DF and ADF test (the most commonly 
used test) to examine the null hypothesis o f a unit root. I will be concerned 
with six series; LGNP (the log o f GNP), LGE (the log o f government 
expenditure), LGEC ( the log o f government consumption expenditure), 
LGNP/N (the log o f per capita GNP), LGE/N (the log o f per capita 
government expenditure) and LGE/GNP (the log o f the share of government 
expenditure in GNP).
A series is called "integrated o f order ct' and denoted by 1(d), if it needs to 
be differenced d  times to achieve stationary properties. A series which is 
1(0 ) (integrated o f order zero) is said to be stationary, and a series which is 
I(l)(integrated o f  order one) is a random walk.
In order to  examine whether a series is 1(1) against the alternative 1(0), we 
employ the unit roots tests developed by Fuller (1976) and Dickey and Fuller
(1981). The Dickey-Fuller (DF) test can be written as follows:
AYt = a  o + p x T  + P 2 Ym + u, (8 )
where A Yt is the first differences o f the series, T  is the linear time trend and ut 
is the normally distributed term. In equation (8 ) we can test the null hypothesis 
H0  (/?2=0) by comparing the calculated t-ratio o f whh the relevant critical 
t-ratio which is given in the bottom part o f  Table 8.5.2 in Fuller (1976, p373).
If  the calculated t-values are less then the critical t-value, then we reject the 
null hypothesis o f  unit root. In that case, the series is called as integrated o f
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order zero (i.e. 1(0)). However, if ut is not white noise and serially correlated, 
Dickey and Fuller (1981) have proposed expanding the regression equation (8 ) by 
including a lag polynomial term in AY, .  This is called the Augmented Dickey- 
Fuller Test (ADF) and can be written as follows:
AYt = a 0 +  T  + f i 2Y ul + A Y t-j +  “t (9)
j =i
where A Yt is the first differences o f  the series, T  is the linear time trend, ut 
is a white noise residual and p  is the number o f lags.
In both DF and ADF tests, the null hypothesis is that there is a unit root. A 
negative and statistically significant t-value rejects the null hypothesis in favour 
o f an alternative hypothesis that the series is stationary.
Table 4. 2 reports the calculated t-values from the DF and ADF tests on 
each variable for levels both with (panel A) and without (panel B) a time 
trend in the model. The null hypothesis is that the series is a non-stationary 
process, against the alternative hypothesis o f  a stationary process. In the case 
o f the levels o f the six variables, the null hypothesis o f non-stationarity 
cannot be rejected. All six variables in levels appear to be non-stationary . 5
5 It is not clear whether the variable, LGE/GNP, is stationary or non-stationary. 
According to the DF test with no time trend, the calculated t value of LGE/GNP is 
-2.96 and it implies the variable is stationary. The ADF test with no time trend shows 
that the variable appears to be non-stationary. However, the DF and ADF test for the first 
difference of LGE/GNP confirms that the variable is integrated of order one (I (1)).
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Applying the same tests, Table 4 .3  reports the DF and ADF statistics for 
their differences. For the first differences o f the variables, the calculated t- 
values are less than their critical values at the 5% level (both no time trend 
and time trend include) and thus they are stationary.
Therefore, we can conclude that since differencing once produces 
stationary, all the six series used in the law are integrated o f order one 
(1(1)). Once the order o f  integration has been established, then we can test 
whether there is a long-run relationship between all o f the variables; i.e. a 
cointegration analysis.
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Table 4.2 Unit Root Tests in Levels




p= 2 p=3 p=4
LGNP 2 . 2 1 1.45 1 . 1 2 0 . 6 8 0.75
LGE -0.36 0.31 -0.29 -0.07 0.48
LGEC -0.23 0.41 -0.31 -0 . 0 1 0.37
LGNP/N 2.09 1.77 1.33 0.98 0.98
LGE/N 0.003 0.51 0 . 0 1 0.08 0.79
LGE/GNP -2.96 -2.08 -2.95 -2.73 1 >—* 00
Note; The critical t-values are given in Table 8.5.2 in Fuller (1976, p.373). For 50
number of observations, the critical t-value is -2.93 at 5 per cent level of significance (No
time trend included).




p= 2 p=3 p=4
LGNP -2.54 -2.81 -3.08 -2.36 -2.93
LGE -2.25 -2.99 -2.53 -3.78 -2.76
LGEC -2 . 2 2 -2.83 -2.26 -2.92 -2.17
LGNP/N -2.35 -2.58 -2.82 -2.09 -2.73
LGE/N -1.82 -2.71 -2.09 -3.15 -2.38
LGE/GNP -3.23 -3.04 -3.75 -4.90 -3.57
Note; The critical t-valucs are given in the bottom part of Table 8.5.2 in Fuller (1976. 
p.373). For 50 number of observations, the critical t-value is -3.50 at 5 per cent level of 
significance (Time trend included).
153
Table 4.3 Unit Root Tests in First Differences




p= 2 p=3 p=4
A LGNP -4.37 -3.06 -2.98 -2.39 -1.80
A LGE -5.05 -4.49 -2.64 -3.81 -3.56
A LGEC -5.51 -4.88 -2.95 -3.63 -3.49
A LGNP/N -3.80 -2 . 6 8 -2 . 6 8 -2 . 1 0 -1.58
A LGE/N -4.92 -4.37 -2.54 -3.68 -3.33
A LGE/GNP -5.31 -4.23 -2.83 -3.91 -3.84
Note; The critical t-values are given in Table 8.5 .2 in Fuller (1976, p.373). For 50
number of observations, the critical t-value is -2.93 at 5 per cent level of significance (No
time trend included).
B. Time Trend in Model
DF ADF
p=l p= 2 p=3 p=4
A LGNP -4.83 -3.40 -2.98 -2.55 -1.85
A LGE -4.99 -4.42 -2.60 -3.77 -3.59
A LGEC -5.49 -4.78 -2.92 -3.62 -3.65
A LGNP/N -4.67 -3.37 -2.94 -2.56 -1.84
A LGE/N -4.97 -4.33 -2.56 -3.81 -3.58
A LGE/GNP -5.16 -4.24 -2.72 -3.76 -3.62
Note; The critical t-values are given in the bottom part of Table 8.5.2 in Fuller (1976, 
p.373). For 50 number of observations, the critical t-value is -3.50 at 5 per cent level of 
significance (Time trend included).
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4.3.3 Tests for Co-integration
The concept o f cointegration was first introduced into econometrics by 
Granger (1981) and further developed by Engel and Granger (1987). It is 
relevant to the problem o f the determination o f long-run equilibrium relationships 
in economics.
The basic idea o f cointegration is that if two or more series move together 
over time, combinations o f these economic variables tend to converge in the 
long run, even though they may drift apart in the short run. I f  two or more 1(1) 
variables tend to converge, or at least do not drift apart in the long run, we can 
regard these variables as defining a long-run equilibrium relationship. Thus the 
concept o f cointegration provides a theoretical foundation for dynamic 
modelling, and it also gives information about the long-run properties o f 
data.
Cointegration analysis consists o f two steps. First, before proceeding to test 
the sets o f variables for cointegration, we need to identify the order of 
integration o f each variable. Since different orders o f variables (i.e. one series is 
1(0 ) and another 1( 1 )) cannot be possibly cointegrated, we have to make sure that 
the different variables are integrated to the same degree. I f  we find that the 
individual series are integrated o f the same order, the second step is to examine 
whether these series are cointegrated.
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In the previous subsection, I used the DF or ADF unit root tests to examine 
the order o f integration o f each data series, and found that all o f the six variables 
used in six versions o f  Wagner's Law are 1(1). Since all series are integrated of 
the same order one 1(1), I can proceed on testing for cointegration .
There have been several tests for the cointegrating regression. Granger and 
Engle (1985, 1987) have proposed seven possible tests which can be used for 
cointegration testing. Among these seven tests, three main approaches have been 
most commonly used; the Cointegrating Regression Durbin-Watson (CRDW) test, 
the Dickey-Fuller (DF) test, and the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test.
Engle and Yoo (1987) suggest that in most applications the Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test is preferable to the other tests, especially in high-order 
system.
In this section, I will use the residual-based ADF method to test for 
cointegration. Testing for cointegration by the DF and ADF method entails an 
estimation o f the cointegrating regression. After estimating the equation by 
ordinary least squares (OLS) method, we can get the residuals Ut. To test 
stationarity for the series, we apply the DF and ADF tests to the residuals Ut . 
The null hypothesis o f  the cointegration test is that the series which are formed by 
the residuals o f each o f  the cointegrating regressions are not stationary; i.e. the 
time series are not cointegrated.
As noted earlier, the spurious correlation can occur by using two trended 
variables in a regression when the two variables are actually unrelated. 
Therefore, to examine the long-run properties o f  data, we need to test for
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cointegration. The concept o f  cointegration is relevant to the problem of 
determination o f long-run equilibrium relationships between variables.
Engle and Granger (1987) propose the DF and ADF test for testing the null 
hypothesis that the variables are not cointegrated. Unless the two variables 
which are used in Wagner's Law (government expenditures and GNP) are 
cointegrated, there does not exist a long-run equilibrium relationship between 
these two variables.
To test the null hypothesis o f  non-stationary (Ho: Ut- 1(1)) against the 
alternative hypothesis o f  stationary (Hj: Ut- 1(0)) o f the series o f  the residuals, I 
applied the DF and ADF test for each o f the six cointegrating regressions. Table 
4.4 reports the results o f testing for cointegration from the six cointegrating 
regressions.
Table 4.4 Co-Integration Tests 










(1) LGE=f(LGNP) 1.16 0.03 -3.40 -3.58 0.98
(2) LGEC=f(LGNP) 1.00 0.03 -3.20 -3.07 0.98
(3) LGE=f(LGNP/N) 1.53 0.05 -3.70 -3.14 0.97
(4) LGE/GNP=f(LGNP/N) 0.20 0.04 -3.52 -3.68 0.44
(5) LGE/N=f(LGNP/N) 1.20 0.04 -3.51 -3.67 0.97
(6) LGE/GNP=fTLGNP) 0.16 0.03 -3.40 -3.58 0.46
Note; The critical values of the DF and ADF test at the 5 per cent (10 per cent) 
level are -3.67 (-3.28), -3.29 (-2.90) respectively for 50 observations (Engle and Yoo (1987), 
Table 3, p. 158).
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The above results look promising because all the signs conform with a 
priori expectation and the computed DF and ADF values are reasonably large.
At the 10 per cent level o f significance, the ADF statistics suggest rejecting 
the null hypothesis o f non-cointegration. In all o f the six cointegrating 
regressions, the computed ADF values are larger than their critical values at the 
10 per cent level o f  significance. Even at the 5 per cent level, the null 
hypothesis o f non-cointegration can be rejected in four cointegrating regressions. 
(However, it should be noted that our sample size has less than 50 observations 
and the critical test values are merely suggestive).
Similar results can be obtained when we apply the DF test to the residuals 
from the six cointegrating regressions. The computed DF values are larger than 
its critical values at the 1 0  per cent level o f  significance in five cointegrating 
regressions.
Therefore, at the 10 per cent level o f significance, the DF and ADF tests 
suggest that the null hypothesis o f  non-stationarity can be rejected in six 
cointegrating regressions. The evidence suggests that government expenditures 
and GNP are cointegrated and there exists a long-run equilibrium relationship 
between these two variables.
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Table 4.4 also shows that the estimated income elasticities range from 0.16 to 
1.53. The elasticity coefficients for equation 4 (Musgrave version), and 
equation 6  (Peacock-Wiseman "modified" version) exceed zero. In equation 1 
(Peacock-Wiseman "traditionary" version), equation 2 ( Pryor version), equation 
3 (Goffman version) and equation 5 (Gupta and Michas version), the elasticity 
coefficients are greater than unity.
The evidence that the estimated income elasticities are significantly positive at 
the 5 per cent level confirms the finding that Wagner's Law is valid for Korea 
during the period under consideration.
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4. 4 Conclusion
The purpose o f this chapter was to analyse the applicability o f Wagner's law 
on data taken from Korea over the period 1953-1991 by employing the most 
recent econometric technique; the cointegration technique. Korea offered an 
excellent case study to  test the W agner hypothesis since Korea has had the 
conditions under which one might expect the law to operate.
Although empirical studies have used a variety o f models to examine the 
relationship between government expenditure and economic growth, I have used 
six different formulations o f the law.
Many previous time-series studies o f  Wagner's Law have found support for 
the law. However these studies have suffered from numerous methodological 
problems in their time-series analysis. Since they did not test the stationarity o f 
the variables, the empirical results might lead to the problem o f spurious 
regression.
To overcome the problems o f previous studies, I attempt to test the 
stationarity o f the time-series data on real government expenditures and real 
GNP. In my own test on Korean data for the period 1953-1991, I find that both 
the government expenditure variables and the income variables are integrated of 
the same order one(i.e. 1(1)). Since all six variables used in the law are 
integrated o f the same order one, I can proceed to test for cointegration.
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In a test on Korean data, I find that the government expenditure variables are 
cointegrated with the income variables and thus there exists a long-run positive 
relationship between the two variables. Under these conditions, positive income 
elasticities confirm the validity o f  Wagner's Law for Korea.
The empirical results indicate that during the study period public expenditure 
movements in Korea do explain the long-run trend in GNP in real terms.
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APPENDIX 1 Data Sources and Definitions
GE is real total government expenditure, and GE consists o f GECON (real 
government consumption expenditure), GETRA (real government transfer 
expenditure) and GECAP (real government capital expenditure). GECON is 
deflated by the implicit GNP deflator, GETRA is deflated by the implicit price 
deflator for private consumption and GECAP is deflated by its own deflator.
All expenditures and price data are from National Accounts published by the 
Bank o f Korea. Population data are from Major Statistics o f Korean Economy 
(1983,1993) published by Economic Planning Board.
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APPENDIX II
Table 4-5 Comparison o f Summary Results for the Different Lag Lengths 
( m=l ,  m=2, m=3, and m=4 )
Table A.. Dickey-Fuller Joint Hypothesis Test (II)









LGNP 5.80 6 . 0 2 3.24 4.92
LGE 4.77 3.21 7.22 4.15
LGEC 4.41 2.56 4.35 2.57
LGNP/N 6.56 6 . 2 0 3.25 5.05
LGE/N 4.32 2.26 5.18 3.63
LGE/GNP 4.62 7.32 11.99 6.37
Table B. Co-Integration Tests (II)













LGE=f(LGNP) -3.40 -3.09 -3.81 -4.85 -3.58
LGEC=f(LGNP) -3.20 -2.85 -3.40 -3.66 -3.07
LGE=f(LGNP/N) -3.70 -2.77 -3.85 -4.01 -3.14
LGE/GNP=f(LGNP/N) -3.52 -3.08 -3.93 -4.90 -3.68
LGE/N=f(LGNP/N) -3.51 -3.08 -3.93 -4.90 -3.67
LGE/GNP=f(LGNP) -3.40 -3.09 -3.81 -4.86 -3.58
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Chapter 5 Peacock and Wiseman’s Displacement Effect 
(The Displacement Effect on Government Expenditure 
of Two Political Crises in Korea)
5. 1 Introduction
Since the seminal work by Peacock and Wiseman (1961), the displacement 
effect hypothesis has been examined by many researchers. By looking at the 
relevant time-series data and the historical behaviour o f the British government 
spending for the period 1890-1955, Peacock and Wiseman found that 
government expenditures grew in discrete steps rather than continuously and 
formulated the displacement effect hypothesis. This hypothesis may help to 
explain the time path o f growth o f  government expenditure in democratic 
countries. Their definition o f displacement is closely related to large-scale 
social disturbances, such as the World Wars. Such disturbances may create a 
displacement effect, shifting public revenues and expenditures to new levels.
Many studies have examined the existence o f displacement effects in a 
number o f  countries, as a consequence o f  major social upheavals such as the 
World Wars (see Gupta (1967), Pryor (1968), Bonin, Finch and Waters 
(1969)). These studies presumably confirmed the existence o f displacement 
effect in government expenditure associated with the World Wars. However, 
very few studies have investigated the "displacement" in government spending
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resulting from the minor social upheavals o f a lesser magnitude such as internal 
revolution and political crises.
If  the displacement effect is sole linked with the major jumps in government 
spending caused by the World Wars, then the displacement hypothesis does 
not seem useful in explaining the persistent growth o f  public spending in many 
countries in the 1970s and 1980s. As pointed out by Nagarajan (1979 p. 1 0 2 ), 
"non-global upheavals" (such as a bi-lateral war, an internal revolution and an 
economic crisis) are likely to have a greater impact on the desirable level o f 
government expenditure in many developing countries. Such disturbances 
could contribute for the displacements and, during the period o f social 
disturbances, there might be radical changes in accepted ideas about the 
proper role o f government.
In this chapter, on the basis o f a time-series analysis, the Peacock-Wiseman 
"displacement effect" hypothesis is tested more rigorously in Korea for the period 
1953 to 1991. I will examine the displacement effect on government expenditure 
in the context o f  social disturbances caused by the two political crises (or 
military coup) in Korea. In section 5.2, the displacement literature is briefly 
reviewed. In section 5.3, I review and assess previous econometric tests o f 
the displacement hypothesis. In section 5. 4, based on reasonable 
interpretations o f displacement, a new test focusing on the time-series behaviour 
o f  public expenditure is developed and implemented on Korean data for the 
period 1953 to 1991. Finally, a brief summary o f the main results and 
conclusion o f the study are given in section 5.5.
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5. 2 Displacement Effect; Interpretation
Peacock and Wiseman (1961), hereafter referred to as P-W, are concerned 
with the time-pattem o f  expenditure growth. When P-W observe that the 
time-profile o f British government spending is discontinuous and displays 
stepwise features, and that the movement from one plateau to another is 
coincided with the two world wars, they are led to develop the "displacement 
effect" hypothesis. The important finding o f  P-W's study is that although public 
expenditure declines after the wars, it does not fall to the pre-disturbance 
level. Public expenditure is displaced upwards and for the period o f the social 
upheaval displaces private expenditure. This upward shift in government 
spending in relation to national income they call the "displacement effect".
The displacement effect hypothesis is based on the concept o f "tolerable 
burden o f  taxation". It is assumed that people's ideas about desirable burdens 
o f taxation remain fairly stable in normal times. P-W saw that some 
tolerable o f  taxation would act as a constraint on government behaviour and 
prevent major increases in public expenditure. According to the displacement 
effect hypothesis, the basic constraint on government expenditure is the difficulty 
o f raising taxation levels to  finance the increase in public expenditures. In 
peacetime, therefore, there might be a divergence between the desirable level o f 
public expenditure and the tolerable level o f taxation. During periods o f 
social upheavals such as wars or some large scale social disturbances, this 
divergence is likely to  be narrowed because the electorate accepts new methods 
o f raising revenue that formerly thought intolerable.
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After the disturbance is over, it is unlikely that taxes and public expenditures 
return to the old level but remain at a higher level so that the pattern o f public 
expenditures over time looks like a series o f steps. Thus, it is possible for a 
government to undertake those expenditure programs which is previously 
desired but can not be financed. P-W  also claim that a war brings into focus 
problems that were not identified before. They argued that "Wars often force 
the attention o f governments and peoples to problems o f which they were 
formerly less conscious" (P-W, 1961, p.XXXiV). P-W referred to this as the 
"inspection effect".
P-W consider the set o f other permanent factors which can influence the 
time profile o f  government spending. The three important factors which are 
examined by P-W are population change, changes in prices and changes in the 
level o f employment. According to their study, there is little difference in the 
time profile o f  government spending whether government expenditures are 
measured by per capita or not. W hen P-W  removed the influences o f 
population growth on government expenditure, the time profile o f government 
spending remained essentially unchanged (see Chart 9 in P-W, 1961, p.57).
P-W also found that prices changes had little effect on the time pattern o f 
public expenditure development. Conversion o f  the money expenditure series 
to real expenditures left the time profile o f  public spending virtually unchanged. 
When they discuss about the influence o f  changes in prices in their original 
study, their primary concern is not the effect o f  relative prices but the effect of 
general inflation on government expenditures (P-W, 1961, p.24). In more
recent study (P-W, 1979), however, P-W  claim that the productivity lag in 
the public sector is one o f  the main causes o f  the growth o f public expenditure. 
The relative price effect may be o f  importance in examining the growth of 
public expenditure.
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Finally, while P-W  find a short-run positive relationship between the growth 
of public spending and the rate o f  unemployment, they point out that "there 
was no permanent change in the level o f expenditures following upon periods o f 
high unemployment" (P-W, 1961, p .50). Furthermore, they suggest that "Even 
in the case o f heavy unemployment in the early 1930's, the percentage of 
government o f government expenditure to GNP fell again when the 
unemployment rate declined. There was no continuing displacement effect" 
(P-W, 1961, p.50).
Thus, it is clear that P-W considered that the set o f permanent factors 
(population, prices, and unemployment) could not explain the pattern o f public 
expenditure development in the UK.
Since the "tolerable burden o f  taxation" is the engine that runs the 
displacement effect, it is quite important how this concept is to be defined. If  
the P-W hypothesis is to  be testable, it is necessary to clarify more fully what is 
involved in the concept o f the tolerable burden o f taxation. In the introduction 
to their book, P-W  (1961) themselves point out that "People's ideas about 
tolerable burdens o f taxation, translated into ideas o f reasonable tax rates, tend 
also to be fairly stable. Fixed, if  low, rates o f taxation are obviously 
compatible with growing public expenditure if real output is growing, so that 
there may be some connection between the rate o f growth o f real output and 
the rate o f  growth o f  public expenditure. Much more rapid rates o f expenditure 
growth are unlikely; in settles times, notions about taxation are likely to be 
more influenced than ideas about desirable increases in expenditure in deciding 
the size and rate o f  growth o f  the public sector" (p. xxiv). As emphasised in 
this quote, P-W understood tolerable burdens o f taxation as tolerable 
(reasonable) tax rates. They argued that these tax rates could be translated into 
a certain share o f public expenditure relative to GNP.
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However, P-W  were fairly ambiguous about the precise meaning o f the 
concept o f the tolerable burden o f taxation. We can find this ambiguity in their 
following statement: "A rising real GNP per head brings increasing tax yields 
with constant tax rates, so that if people's ideas o f tolerable burdens are 
concerned with tax rates rather than total payments, ... " (p. 27). In this 
statement, P-W  identified the tolerable burden o f taxation as the real absolute 
level of public expenditure per capita.
Since the P-W's seminal work, the displacement effect hypothesis has been 
significantly reinterpreted by many researchers (especially Gupta (1967), 
Musgrave (1969), Bird (1972), and Diamond (1977)). These authors have also 
developed several forms o f  testable versions o f  the displacement hypothesis.
Gupta (1967), the first to devise statistical tests for the displacement effect, 
reinterpreted the P-W  hypothesis and developed a testable version o f the 
displacement hypothesis. Although there was no such notion in the P-W book, 
Gupta interpreted the displacement effect as implying a change o f  income 
elasticity o f government expenditure for the periods before and after social 
disturbances. In his revised version o f  the displacement hypothesis, Gupta 
found a long-run upward shift o f  public expenditure over time in several 
countries. In the new edition o f  their book, P-W  (1967) admit that "Gupta has 
subjected the displacement effect to  rigorous economic statistical scrutiny in a 
number o f countries. Gupta confirms the existence o f a displacement effect in 
other countries" (p.xiv).
As argued by Musgrave (1969), there have been considerable controversy 
over the influence o f  war expenditures on total government expenditures in the 
post-war period. Figure 5. 1 shows three possible patterns o f the post-war trend 
in government expenditure.
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FigureS. 1. The Displacement Effect - various possible formulations
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Figure 5.1 (a) represents the case where there is no long-run displacement 
effect, civilian public expenditures return to their original growth path after the 
war. Figure 5.1 (b) shows that the wartime trend o f public expenditure increase 
continues into the post-war period along with an upward shift in the level of 
civilian spending (P-W's interpretation). In the final example, Figure 5.1 (c), 
there is an increase in post-war civilian spending. However, it is only a 
temporary increase in civilian public spending until the old trend line is reached 
(Musgrave and Bird's interpretation).
Bird (1972) offers an alternative explanation o f the displacement effect as a 
ratchet effect. He adopts the ratchet effect hypothesis (following the
Duesenberry's consumption function) to  explain long-run upward shifts o f the 
government expenditure function. According to  the ratchet effect hypothesis, if 
there is a crisis and per capita income falls as in a depression, then government 
expander also declines but less rapidly. He regards the ratchet effect hypothesis 
as "more plausible in general than the completely supply-oriented tolerable 
taxes approach" (p. 460). But, Bird offers no empirical test for his own 
model and he is weak in positive contribution to the displacement hypothesis.
A close associate o f P-W, Diamond (1977) reformulates the displacement 
effect hypothesis and reinterprets it as a theory o f structural break. In his 
review article, Diamond examines previous econometric tests o f the P-W 
displacement hypothesis and criticises those econometric techniques. The essence 
o f his criticism is that the usual ceteris paribus assumption o f unchanged 
tastes, preferences and institutions after social upheaval is inappropriate to test 
for the displacement hypothesis. From his point o f view, the displacement effect 
hypothesis is interpreted as a special case o f the more general phenomenon o f 
structural break or structural change.
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Later, this reinterpretation is also asserted by P-W (1979). Since then, P-W 
and many subsequent researchers have revised their original view o f the 
displacement hypothesis and claimed its upward displacement after social 
upheavals as the major determinant o f  the growth o f government expenditure.
As pointed by Bird (1972, p.463), "the final verdict on the 'displacement 
effect'... cannot yet be handed down because an appropriate hypothesis has not 
yet been rigorously formulated and tested." At present, it is not clear 
whether it is the ratio o f  public expenditure to  GNP or government expenditure 
per capita that is suppose to change. Many researchers (Rosenfeld (1973), 
O'Hagan (1980), and Henrekson (1993)) have used the ratio o f public 
expenditure to GNP as the dependent variable. But many other studies (Gupta 
(1967), Pryor (1968), Bonin et cil (1969), Tussing and Henning (1991)) have 
employed public expenditure per capita in some form as the dependent 
variable to test for the displacement effect hypothesis.
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5.3  Previous Econometric Tests o f the Displacement Effect
In their original study, P-W  (1961) used graphical evidence to support their 
hypothesis and did not employ econometric techniques to test for the displacement 
hypothesis. As they claimed, "our general method was the visual inspection o f 
charts" (P-W, 1979, p. 13). In work subsequent to P-W's study, researchers have 
devised statistical tests for the displacement effect hypothesis.
Gupta (1967) fitted the following equation for several countries (United 
Kingdom, West Germany, U.S.A., and Sweden) for different sub-periods, before 
and after social disturbances:
In G = In a + b In Y
where G is per capita public expenditure which excludes war-related but not 
defence spending; and Y is per capita income. He then estimated statistically 
the equation. It the value calculated with the equation based on the latter period 
exceeded the value calculated with the earlier equation, Gupta claimed that an 
upward displacement had occurred.
Gupta found significant wartime displacements and confirmed the existence 
o f the displacement effect in all these countries except Sweden. Later, Nagarajan 
(1983) showed that the shift test used by Gupta is a test o f forecasting error for a 
regression model and found a shift in government spending in Sweden.
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Unfortunately, Gupta's study has suffered from many methodological 
shortcomings. 1
Other tests o f the "displacement effect" using the similar methodology to 
Gupta's are Andre and DeLorme (1978) for France and Nagarajan (1979) for 
India. While Nagarajan found support for the displacement hypothesis after the 
Indo-China war in India, Andre and DeLorme got mixed results for France.
In contrast to Gupta, Pryor (1968) interpreted the displacement hypothesis 
as implying an upward intercept shift, and tested the hypothesis by fitting the 
following equations to  the UK data:
(1) InG  = v + x T  + y A + z B
(2) In Gc = v + x T + yA + z B
(3) I n G = v +  w l n Y  + y A + z B
(4) In Gc = v + w  In Y + y A + z B
where
G = total per capita government expenditure
Gc = G minus expenditure o f  defence and war -related purposes
T = time
Y = per capita national income
A = dummy variable for World W ar I (1890-1913=0, p o s t-1913=1)
B = dummy variable for World W ar II (1890-1913,1923-1937 =0, 1950- 
1961=1)
In equation 1 and 2, government expenditures are determined by time and 
dummy variables; in equation 3 and 4, they are determined by income and some 
post-war intercept dummy variables. W hen Pryor reformulates the displacement 
hypothesis with national income per capita, he finds statistically significant 
upward displacement. However, when Pryor takes time as one o f the explanatory
1 For a recent criticism of Gupta's study, see Henrekson (1993).
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variables, he finds conflicting results. With total government expenditures
(equation 1 ), the displacement is statistically significant; but when civilian
expenditure is used (equation 2 ), the displacement effect is not significant. On 
the basis o f this finding, Pryor (1968) concludes that "the displacement which 
occurred was entirely due to increases for defence and war related purposes" 
(p.445).
The test o f Bonin et ciL (1969) is similar to the Gupta methodology. They test 
the statistical significance o f  post-war displacement in the UK by estimating the 
following two equations:
Gn = a + b Y n  + c D  + d D  Yn
Gx = a + b Y n  + c D  + d D  Yn
where
Gn = total per capita spending net o f debt , war-related , and defence 
spending
Gx = Gn net o f  spending for replacement o f  non-military public goods 
sacrificed during war-time
Y n =  per capita GNP less total per capita public expenditure
D = dummy variable for war ( 0 in pre-war period and 1 in post-war period )
DYn = dummy variable which also measures the degree o f change in slope
In contrast to Gupta, Bonin et cil. focused on post-disturbance displacement 
shifts in civilian public expenditure. To test for the pure displacement effect, 
they attempted to estimate shifts in public expenditure caused by the need to 
catch up with the backlog o f foregone peacetime spending. They tried to 
explain this effect by adjusting the post-war public expenditures series to allow 
for "replacement" spending. They found inconclusive evidence for the 
displacement hypothesis. Their findings were influenced by the choice o f 
periods and the definition o f  dependent variables. When Gn is employed, they
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found a significant slope change. However, when Gx series are employed, 
slopes o f Gx changed insignificantly.
As noted in previous section, Diamond (1977) reinterpreted the displacement 
effect as a theory o f structural change or structural break, and suggested a total 
test o f the structural stability (a joint test o f  intercept and slope coefficient). 
Diamond's criticism o f Gupta's econometric technique is that "Gupta's statistical 
tests are an incomplete test o f  the structural break hypothesis. Since a structural 
break posits two distinct regimes before and after the social upheaval, instead of 
separately testing for the stability o f the constant term and the slope coefficient, a 
total test o f  structural stability should be applied" (Diamond, 1977, p.397).
He examined the displacement hypothesis by the Chow test comparing four 
time periods: 1885-1913, 1920-1929, 1930-1938 and 1950-1970. Four time 
periods reflect three social upheavals - W orld W ar I, the Great Depression, and 
World War II. Three different measures o f  public spending are regressed on 
GNP per capita. The three categories o f  government expenditures which have 
been used for the test o f  the displacement effect hypothesis are total public 
spending, total public spending net o f  defence spending , and total public 
spending net o f war-related and defence spending. I f  both slope and intercept 
values increase between adjacent periods, Diamond concludes that there has 
been displacement.
A statistically significant Chow test result is interpretable as support for the 
upward displacement hypothesis. O f nine Chow tests performed by Diamond, 
only five were significant at the 5 % level. M ore seriously, in no case did both 
slope and intercept values increase. In one case, they both declined; in all eight 
other cases, they moved in opposite directions. On the basis o f this analysis,
176
Diamond (1977) concludes that " This means that we must reject the null 
hypothesis, and accept the alternative hypothesis that the percentage o f public 
spending in GNP is significantly greater after a social upheaval like war than the 
average before the upheaval, even after allowing for the upward trend in the series 
over the entire time period" (p. 399).
Diamond's study has not gone without criticism. In his 1977 article, Diamond 
argues that the assumption o f equal error variances before and after the 
displacement is unrealistic, and suggests the Chow test. Subsequently, in the 
same journal, W att (1978) criticises Diamond's tests. Watt argues that 
"Diamond's tests require the same assumption o f equal error variance for which he 
originally criticised Bonin et cil" (p.445). Thus, he concludes that "Diamond's 
use o f the Chow test is inappropriate in these cases and his results are placed in 
doubt" (p.448). W att proposes a Jayatissa test which is valid for cases o f both 
equal and unequal error variances in examining the displacement effect.
More extensive criticisms o f Diamond's study were suggested by Tussing 
and Henning (1979, 1991). In their 1979 review article, they argued that the 
Chow test was inappropriate to  explain an upward displacement in public 
expenditures. Since the Chow test does not distinguish between upward and 
downward displacements, it is an inadequate tool for testing any hypothesis o f 
direction o f structural change such as the displacement effect hypothesis. Hence, 
Tussing and Henning (1979) articulates that "In short, Diamond's Chow tests 
are virtually worthless as tests o f  the P-W displacement hypothesis" (p.481).
Follow-up studies by Tussing and Henning (1991) confirmed their earlier 
conclusions. Using US data for the period 1929 to  1981, they test for 
structural change o f  public expenditures before and after World War II. To test 
for structural stability between the early (1929-1945) and later (1946-1981) 
periods, they employ White's method that does not require the same assumption of
equal error variance in the two periods. The presence o f  the displacement effect 
was also tested for by using an intercept shift dummy (equal to 1 for the later 
period ) and coefficient shift dummies, one for each independent variable for the 
later periods. (This dummy variable technique is similar to  Pryor's (1968).) 
Their analysis provides no significant difference between the early and later 
period. Dummy variables were either insignificant or negatively significant, 
indicating downward displacement. Tussing and Henning (1991) concludes that 
"a structural break may not, in fact, have occurred, although stronger evidence 
exists that one did occur midway through the post-war period. We have also 
shown that if a structural break did occur at the time o f  World War II, it took a 
form inconsistent with the displacement hypothesis o f P-W" ( p.409).
As we can see from this brief review o f the displacement literature, 
empirical studies have generated conflicting evidence on the nature and 
significance o f the displacement effect on government expenditure. There are a 
number o f reasons why these conflicting results have been derived.
One possible explanation for the conflicting evidence o f the displacement 
effect lies in problems o f data. Different researchers have employed various data 
series to test for the displacement hypothesis. While P-W and Gupta take total 
expenditure less war-related expenditures as the relevant series, Bonin et al. take 
the P-W series but add replacement spending. Other authors have employed 
either total non-defence public expenditures (Tussing and Henning (1974)) or 
simply total public expenditures (Diamond (1977), Andre and DeLorme
(1978)). Furthermore, it is not clear whether the dependent variable should be 
measured in the absolute level o f  public spending per capita or the ratio of 
government expenditure to  GNP. Many researchers have used per capita 
government expenditure as the dependent variable (Pryor (1968), Nagarajan
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I(1979), Nomura (1991)), whereas other studies have employed the ratio of 
government expenditure to GNP (Rosenfeld (1973), O'Hagan (1980)).
Another source o f  conflicting results comes from the fact that different 
researchers have different views o f  what a displacement is and how to define a 
social upheaval. Although, in their original study, P-W considered war as the 
most pronounced form o f  social disturbance, they did admit the possibility of 
other types o f social upheaval, especially the Great Depression. While Bonin 
et al. (1969) and Diamond (1977) allow for possible displacement due to the 
Great Depression, Pryor (1968) do not admit it. Furthermore, subsequent 
authors have broadened the scope o f the displacement hypothesis to include 
other types o f social upheavals such as; the recession o f  1974-1975 ( O'Hagan 
! (1980)), internal revolution and hyper-inflation (Bahl, Kim and Park (1986)),
and two oil crises (Nomura (1991)). Different interpretations o f the hypothesis 
have influenced the statistical techniques and the choice o f time periods. 
Different interpretations o f the displacement effect have led to great 
confusion when trying to  test for the hypothesis and have produced conflicting 
evidence for the displacement hypothesis.
As discussed in previous section, the original P-W displacement hypothesis 
was primarily concerned with the development o f government expenditure over 
time. Since P-W  themselves took public expenditure as a function o f time, an 
appropriate treatment o f  time is o f  crucial importance in an empirical test o f the 
displacement hypothesis. The only test taking time as one o f the explanatory 
variables is that o f  Pryor (1968).2 Taking time as an explanatory variable, 
Pryor found a weak support for the displacement hypothesis. However, other 
authors who take government expenditure as a function o f income ignore the
^ Recently, Henrekson (1993) emphasises time as an important variable to examine the 
displacement hypothesis. This problem is discussed later.
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time dimension completely. These studies seems to  be a misspection of the 
original P-W displacement effect. They have not tested for the behavioural 
theory offered by P-W.
Since the original P-W thesis was concerned with the development o f 
government expenditure over time, we need to model the entire time pattern of 
expenditure growth. In order to test empirically the displacement hypothesis, 
we need to take account o f  the effect o f time on public expenditure 
development.
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5. 4 The Empirical Test
As explained in the previous section, the P-W hypothesis was concerned 
with the development o f public expenditure over time. In this section, a 
hypothesised relationship between government expenditure and time is 
formally tested.
Since the original P-W  hypothesis focuses on the time-series behaviour of 
government spending before and after social upheavals, an appropriate time- 
series model is needed to explain an upward shift in public expenditure. As is 
well known, the Auto Regressive-Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) model 
is widely used to  explain the time pattern o f growth (see Pindyck and 
Rubinfeld, 1991, p.415, and Baneijee et cil., 1993, p.13). ARIMA model was 
introduced by Box and Jenkins (1970) and they have recently found wide 
applications o f time-series models to economic forecasting. Unlike the regression 
model, the ARIMA model explains the movement o f a time series by relating it 
to its own past values and to  a weighted sum o f current and lagged random 
disturbances. The ARIMA model can be used to explain the time-pattem of 
public expenditure development.
Recently, Henrekson (1992) examines an upward displacement o f government 
expenditure in Sweden and the UK after World W ar II. Using an ARMA 
technique, he tests for the displacement hypothesis and finds no evidence for the 
P-W hypothesis. In his article, Henrekson argues that " an ARIMA analysis 
seems to be the most consistent with P-W, who assert that permanent
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influences are unlikely to give rise to general and testable hypotheses about 
government spending. Hence, within the confines o f the P-W hypothesis, I find 
that a time-series approach is the most appropriate" (Henrekson, 1992, p.52).
Following Henrekson, an ARM A technique is used to test for an upward 
displacement after the two political crises in Korea. I examine the displacement 
effect on government expenditures as a consequence o f the first political crisis 
(or military coup) which occurred in 1961, and the second political crisis which 
occurred in 1979.3
As pointed out by Nagarajan (1979, p. 103), the social disturbances caused 
by a "non-global " (or a less pronounced) crisis is likely to have a greater 
impact on the desirable level o f government expenditure in developing 
countries. The minor social disturbance such as internal revolution and political 
crises could contribute for the displacement and bring about a change in 
people's ideas o f tolerable tax burden. During the period o f the political crisis, 
there might be radical changes in people's ideas about the proper role o f 
government. It seems likely that the political crisis could cause an upward shift 
in the level o f government spending and new government expenditures could 
become desirable. After the first political crisis o f 1961 in Korea, economic 
policies adapted by the Park (military) Government might have been associated 
with a shift in people's idea about the desirable level o f government 
expenditure. The political crisis o f 1961 has generated a greater role o f the Park 
government in the sphere o f  social and development services by transferring 
more resources to the public sector. After the crisis, the responsibility for 
handling social and development programs comes under the power o f the Park 
government.
3  For the historical background of the two political crises in Korea, see Chapter 3.
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To examine the displacement effect caused by the two political crises, we 
need to construct a model. An obvious way to test for shift in government 
spending is to begin by formulating an appropriate model which can explain the 
movement o f public expenditure over time.
As pointed out by Henrekson (1993), an ARMA model can be used to 
explain the long-run growth pattern o f  public expenditure in Korea. The ARMA 
model represents the behaviour o f  public expenditure over the entire period.
In the first place, I plot the log o f  real total government expenditure per capita 
(Go / N) and the log o f  real government expenditure as a share o f real GNP 
(Go / Y). These are depicted in Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.3 . 4 These figures 
give us a good representation o f the movement o f public expenditure in Korea 
for the period 1953-1991.
^ For a detail definition of the variables and data sources, see Appendix.
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IThe model to be tested is the following:
Yt = «  + P I  + 6>1Yt. 1+ 6 2Yt_2 + e ,
where Yt = the relevant dependent variable
(log o f real total government expenditure per capita (Go / N) or 
log o f real government expenditure as a share o f real GNP (Go / Y) ) 
T = time trend
8 1 = well behaved error term
Following Henrekson (1992), I identify an ARMA (p, q) model around a 
deterministic trend for the log o f real total government expenditure per capita 
(Go / N) and the log o f real government expenditure as a share o f real GNP (Go 
/ Y) for the period 1961-1991. An ARMA model with two lags p and a time 
trend adequately represents the behaviour o f Go / N  and Go / Y. Thus, an 
ARMA (2, 0) model with trend is identified. The deterministic trend is included 
to account for the long-run growth o f  Go /  N  and Go /  Y. I assume that the 
dependent variable can be written as Yt =  a  + /? t + Yt s where Yt s is 
stationary and /? is the constant annual growth o f the deterministic trend.
Using OLS, the parameters o f an ARMA model are estimated. The results o f 
estimations for the period 1961-1991 are shown in Table 5.1, where the t- 
values are given in parentheses. For equation o f Go / N, all estimated 
coefficients are significant at the 5 % level. The coefficient for T (trend) is 
positive and significant at the 5 % level (two-tailed test). The adjusted 
coefficient o f determination is high with an R2  o f 0.97, suggesting a good 
prediction potential. However, the results for equation o f Go / Y is less
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satisfactory. The estimated coefficient for T (trend) was positive but not 
significant at the 5% level.
It is appropriate to check whether the ARMA (2, 0) model is an adequate fit. 
To test whether the estimated residuals s t are uncorrelated, I examine the 
Ljung- b o x  q  statistic5. The Ljung- Box Q statistic is significant and it 
confirms that the fitted model is adequate.
 ^ A diagnostic check for general tests o f serial correlation, particularly appropriate for 
ARMA models, is the Ljung-Box Q statistic. Box and Ljung (1978) suggest the Q
statistic to examine whether autocorrelation function is zero. The Q statistic tends to be
more reliable in small samples. If Ho is true ( s t are uncorrelated), then x 2 has
approximately a chi-square distribution with d.f. = L - p - q
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iTable 5.1 Identified ARMI model with trend for Korea, 1961-1991
Independent
variables
Parameters G o / N G o / Y
Constant a 0.97** 0.90**
(2.49) (2 .6 6 )
T P 0 .0 2 ** 0 . 0 1
(2.56) (1.65)
* , 1 . 1 0 ** 0.96**
(6.50) (5.26)
y , 2 $2 -0.37** -0.31*
(-2.19) (-1.87)
Ljung-Box Q 11.73 10.94
Degree o f Freedom 25 25
R2 0.97 0.70
SEE 0 . 1 0 0.09
Note; Figures in parentheses are t- values. * denotes significance at the 10 per 
cent level and ** denotes significance at the 5 per cent level.
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The following model is formulated to  test for the displacement effect on
government expenditure in Korea associated with the two political crises - the
first political crisis o f  1961 and the second political crisis o f 1979. Using 
dummy variables, I test for an upward shift o f government expenditure after 
the two political crises for the period o f  1953-1991:
Yt = a  + P  T + # i Yt_j + 0  2 Y t _ 2  + ^ D u n i j  + ^ 2 Dum2 + e t
where Yt = the relevant dependent variable
(log o f real total government expenditure per capita (Go /  N) or 
log o f  real government expenditure as a share o f real GNP (Go / Y ) ) 
T = time trend
Dum != dummy variable for the first political crisis (1953 - 1960 = 0 
1961-1991 =1 )
Dum2  = dummy variable for the second political crisis (1953-1978=0 
1979-1991 = 1 )
€ t = well behaved error term
The results o f  estimations for the whole period 1953-1991 are presented in 
Table 5. 2. The results for equation Go / N  are similar to those of the previous 
equations. The trend value ( T ) o f Go / N  is positive and significant at the 5 % 
level. Dummy variable for the first political crisis is also significant at the 5% level 
but the sign is negative. The results for equation Go / Y are less satisfactory. 
The trend and dummy values are insignificant even at the 10 % level.
The relevant diagnostic tests are on the whole satisfactory. The low Q- 
statistics confirm that the estimated residuals are uncorrelated.
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We did not find support for the P-W  hypothesis o f an upward shift of 
government spending after the political crises in Korea. The estimated 
coefficients o f dummy variables are all negative. This suggests that the two 
political crises in Korea led to a drop in government expenditure. The 
coefficient o f Dum j variable for Go / N  is significant at the 5 % level of 
significance. In this case, the negative effect for government spending per 
capita is significant at the 5 % level. However, other coefficients o f Dummy 
variables are not found to be significant even at the 1 0 % level o f significance.
It implies that the first political crisis o f  1961 led to a downward shift in Go / 
N by 17.0 percentage points and the second political crisis o f 1979 also led to a 
downward shift in Go/N by 5.0 percent points ( not significant). This can be 
used as a weak evidence against the P-W  displacement effect hypothesis.
The evidence for Korea over the period 1953-1991 is not compatible with 
the displacement effect hypothesis.
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Table 5.2 Results of the test for the displacement effect hypothesis due to the two
political crises in Korea, 1953-1991 (Long-Run Effect)
Independent
variables
Parameters G o / N G o / Y
Constant a 1.35** 0.87**
(3.53) (2.82)
T p 0.03** 0 . 0 1
(4.06) (1.60)
Y „ 0.92** 0.92**
(5.91) (5.51)
Y„2 $2 -0.29* -0.25
(-2 .0 1 ) (-L56)
Duirij Yi -0.17** -0.07
(-2.63) (-1.05)
Dum2 y 2 -0.05 -0 . 0 1
(-0.81) (-0.14)
Ljung-Box Q 18.41 15.70
Degree of Freedom 31 31
R2 0.97 0.74
SEE 0.08 0.09
Note; Figures in parentheses are t- values. * denotes significance at the 1 0
per cent level and ** denotes significance at the 5 per cent level.
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To examine the short-run displacement effect on government expenditure in 
Korea associated with the two political crises, the following model is also 
formulated. Using dummy variables, I examine the short-run effect of an 
upward shift of government expenditure after the two political crises for the 
period of 1953-1991:
Yt = a  + p T  + 0j  Yt_j + 0 2 Yt_ 2  + 7 1 Dummy j + y 2 Dummy2 + £ t
where Yt = the relevant dependent variable
(log of real total government expenditure per capita (Go / N) or 
log of real government expenditure as a share of real GNP (Go / Y ) ) 
T = time trend
Dummy x= dummy variable for the first political crisis (1953 - 1960 = 0,
1961-1963=1, 1964-1991=0) (Short-Run Effect)
Dummy2= dummy variable for the second political crisis (1953-1978=0,
1979-1981 = 1, 1982-1991=0 ) (Short-Run Effect)
£ t = well behaved error term
The results of estimations are reported in Table 5. 3. The results for 
equation Go / N and Go / Y are less satisfactory than those of the previous 
equations. The trend value ( T ) of Go /  N is positive and significant only at the 
10 % level. The coefficients of dummy variables for the first and second political 
crises had negative signs, contrary to the displacement effect hypothesis and 
insignificant. The results for equation Go /  Y are less satisfactory. The trend 
and dummy values are insignificant even at the 1 0  % level.
The relevant diagnostic tests are on the whole satisfactory. The low Q- 
statistics confirm that the estimated residuals are uncorrelated.
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Like the long-run displacement effect, I did not find support for the P-W 
hypothesis of an short-run upward shift of government spending after the political 
crises in Korea. The estimated coefficient of dummy variable is negative. This 
suggests that the first political crisis in Korea led to a drop in government 
expenditure even in the short-run.
It implies that the first political crisis o f 1961 led to a downward shift in Go / 
N by 7.0 percentage points and the second political crisis of 1979 also led to a 
downward shift in Go / N by 1.0 percent points ( not significant). This can be 
also used as a weak evidence against the P-W displacement effect hypothesis.
The evidence for Korea over the period 1953-1991 casts doubt on the 
usefulness of the displacement effect hypothesis.
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Table 5. 3 Results of the test for the displacement effect hypothesis due to the two
political crises in Korea, 1953-1991 (Short-Run Effect)
Independent
variables
Parameters G o / N G o / Y
Constant a 0.76* 0.90**
(2.10) (2.47)
T p 0 .02* 0.01
(2.04) (1.51)
Y,., <t> i 111** 0.95**
(7.46) (5.59)
y , .2 $2 -0.32* -0.31*
(-2.01) (-2.00)
Dummy! y i -0.07 -0.01
(-1.13) (-0.09)
Dummy2 y 2 -0.01 0.05
(-0.21) (0.80)
Ljung-Box Q 17.43 17.32
Degree of Freedom 31 31
R2 0.98 0.74
SEE 0.09 0.09
Note; Figures in parentheses are t- values. * denotes significance at the 10 
per cent level and ** denotes significance at the 5 per cent level.
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5. 5 Conclusion
Since the P-W's seminal work, many researchers have examined the relevance 
of the displacement hypothesis to explain the time profile of public expenditure 
growth in several countries. They have investigated the evidence of 
displacement effect in government spending associated with major social 
upheavals. However, few studies have examined the displacement effect in the 
context of social disturbances caused by a non-global crisis. In this chapter, I 
examine the displacement effect on government expenditure in Korea 
associated with the two political crises - the first political crisis of 1961 and the 
second political crisis of 1979.
As explained in the literature review of the displacement hypothesis, previous 
econometric tests of the hypothesis suffered from some methodological 
shortcomings. All researchers except Pryor (1968) and Henrekson (1992) 
ignore the time dimension completely, although the original P-W hypothesis 
was primarily concerned with the development of government expenditure over 
time.
To examine the displacement effect, I employ an ARMA technique. As 
pointed out by Henrekson (1992), the ARMA technique used in this chapter is 
the appropriate method for examining the time-series behaviour of public 
expenditure. An ARMA (p, q) model with trend was fitted to the data to
194
examine the movement of the time-series behaviour of government expenditure. 
The results presented in previous section show that the estimated residuals
are white noise and the model was adequately fitted.
Using dummy variables, I examine an upward shift of government
expenditure after the two political crises in Korea. The empirical results 
provide no empirical support for the displacement effect in government 
expenditure associated with the two political crises of 1961 and 1979. Instead, 
the empirical findings indicate that the first political crisis of 1961 led to a
downward shift in government spending (Go / N) and the second political 
crisis of 1979 also led to a downward shift of (insignificant).
These results disprove the hypothesised upward displacement. The 
experience for Korea in the 1953-1991 period is not compatible with the 
hypothesis that the political crises could cause an upward shift in public 
expenditure. However, it should be mentioned that empirical results of this 
study depend on the specification of the functional form and on the definition of 
public expenditure data.
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Appendix. Data Sources and Definitions
Go is general government real total expenditure which includes all types of 
public spending at all levels of government. Go consists of government 
consumption expenditure, government transfer expenditure and government 
capital expenditure. Government consumption expenditure is deflated by the 
implicit GNP deflator, government transfer expenditure is deflated by implicit 
deflator for private consumption and government capital expenditure is 
deflated by its own deflator.
Data on total government expenditure and GNP for the period 1953-1991 
are taken from various issues of National Accounts published by the Bank of 
Korea. Population data are from Major Statistics of Korean Economy (1983, 
1993) published by the Economic Planning Board.
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Chapter 6 Determinants of Government Expenditure 
Growth in Korea
6.1 Introduction
In the last few decades, the academic literature dealing with explanations for the 
growth of public expenditure has expanded greatly and new theories have 
appeared at a rapid rate. Numerous theoretical studies have attempted to explain 
the sources o f government growth, while others have tried to test these 
explanations empirically. As far as empirical research on public expenditure 
growth is concerned, most studies have concentrated on Western developed 
countries (see Lowery and Berry (1983), Lybeck (1986), Lybeck and Henrekson 
(1988), Henrekson (1992), Gemmell (1993)).
Although the public sector played an important role during the development 
process, few studies have been devoted to the time-pattem growth of public 
expenditure in developing countries. M ost empirical studies attempting to explain 
the growth of government in those countries are based on a cross-section 
approach. In the case of Korea, few empirical studies have been carried out to 
explain the growth of the public sector. Compared with the appearance of an 
increasing number of studies devoted to many Western developed countries, the 
Korean case has been neglected for a long period.
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In this chapter, I will attempt to explain the growth of the Korean government 
sector with an exploratory positive analysis since the early 1960s. In the first 
section, I shall discuss six explanations suggested by theories of public finance and 
public choice. In the following section, these explanations are tested by 
econometric analysis with Korean data over the period from 1963 to 1991. The 
time period is chosen because of data availability. By using appropriate measures 
of the public sector, by testing the several models over the same time period, and 
by using the same estimation procedures, I shall try to identify the main 
determinants of public expenditure growth in Korea. Through these tests, in the 
final section, I will evaluate my empirical results and examine the limitations of my 
studies.
Before proceeding to my study, a few general comments are in need. First 
while I examine these six explanations as separate models, I realise that they are 
not a complete study of public sector growth in Korea. Since the theoretical 
literature in this field is so immense, I cannot test all possible models. I have 
chosen those that are most commonly cited in the public finance literature. 
Second an empirical analysis for Korean government growth is constrained by the 
lack of adequate data. Much reliable data have been published since the early 
1960s (Especially consistent data about economically active population are 
available only after 1963). Therefore the empirical results of my studies are 
considered as preliminary work, and further research is needed on Korean 
government growth, for which few empirical studies exist.
6. 2 Models of Government Growth
In western industrialised countries, the growth of the public sector has become 
an important issue and there have been a great variety of theoretical approaches to 
this issue. Despite this, only a few proposed theories have been developed to be 
subject to empirical tests. Some researchers stress economic development, while 
others emphasise the institutional factor and several authors emphasise political 
explanation. In the matter of explanations of public sector growth, there does not 
exist a single generally accepted theory. All theories are more or less partial in 
nature, and each of them have some relevance to explain the growth of the public 
sector.
In this section, among those various hypotheses concerning determinants of 
public expenditure growth, I will consider 'non-institutional' and 'institutional' 
explanation (Borcherding (1985), Neck and Schneider (1988), Hackl, Schneider 
and Withers (1993) ). The former approach (non-institutional explanation) 
contains economic variables of a structural character. This type of explanation 
involves a-political factors and it embraces theories of government activity such as 
Wagner's Law, Baumol's relative price hypothesis and the median voter model. 
The latter approach (institutional explanation) is a more institutionally oriented 
explanation. It involves the political and institutional structure of government
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activity. It embraces theories of election and bureau-voting, interest group, fiscal 
illusion, stabilisation policy and centralisation of power.
6.2.1 Structural and Economic Determinants
To explain the causes of the expansion of government , a model is needed 
which can examine the predicted effects on public spending by changes in certain 
independent variables.
An economic structural model explains the determinants of government size by 
focusing on the underlying determinants of individual preferences for government 
produced goods and the cost conditions for publicly provided goods. For an 
empirical test, the main variables to be included in this model are relative prices, 
population and income . 1 In a broader perspective, we may also include some long 
term structural variables (For an empirical test of the economic structural model 
of government activity, see Neck and Schneider (1988)).
The change in relative prices between the public and private sector will 
influence both the demand and supply side of public goods. Like the demand 
function for private goods, there is a price effect in the demand for public goods. 
As the prices of publicly provided goods increase, ceteris paribus, the demand for
1 In this chapter, the choice of explanatory variables is decided not only by theoretical 
considerations but also the availability o f data. Hence, empirical results of this study is 
considered as preliminary work.
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public goods will be reduced. Although it is possible to derive an implicit tax price 
for publicly provided goods, the prices of public goods are rarely observable. On 
the supply side, the effects of relative price changes on public expenditure have 
been studied by Baumol (1967). According to Baumol's hypothesis, due to the 
inherent nature of the public sector , productivity advances in the public sector are 
very difficult, so the relative cost of production of public goods tends to rise 
secularly. It will lead to an increase in the relative price of public output. This 
phenomena has been known as "Baumol's Disease" (for a more detailed 
explanation of the Baumol model, see Chapter 1). To test Baumol's relative price 
effect, I will use the relative price of public goods to GNP as measured by the ratio 
of the implicit deflator for public consumption expenditure to GNP deflator 
(RELAT). A positive effect on government expenditure is expected.
The income effect on public goods is typically hypothesised to be positive, 
because as income increases the demand for public goods rises by the same 
amount. In fact, W agner (1883) formulated a law of expanding state activity, one 
of the most frequently mentioned explanations of government growth (for a more 
detailed discussion of the Wagner Law and an empirical test of the law, see 
Chapter 1 and Chapter 4). W agner predicted that the growth in real income would 
result with the relative expansion of public expenditures on certain income-elastic 
demands such as spending on culture, education and the redistribution of income. 
He also asserted that economic development and modernisation would favour 
government growth being associated with real income growth. An increased 
complexity of social life and change in technology would require more state 
expenditures.
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To test the income effect, I include real GNP (GNP), and the influence of real 
GNP on government expenditure is expected to be positive. In addition to real 
GNP, I also include another explanatory variables to capture the socio-economic 
effects on public expenditures. Many researchers have suggested the following 
indicators for structural economic changes: the share of manufacture product in 
total GNP, the share of self-employed in the labour force and the share of 
women in the labour supply (for example, Neck and Schneider (1988), Lowery 
and Berry (1983)).
In Korea, reliable data on self-employed persons are not available and the 
women's participation ratio in the total labour supply is very low. Thus, as 
proxies for structural economic changes, the share of manufacture product in total 
GNP (MANU) is added to the equation. Since we hypothesise that government 
expenditure will rise as the level of industrialisation, the share of manufacture 
product in total GNP seems to be the most plausible proxies for structural 
economic changes. Mann (1980) also points out that "The technological needs 
of an industrial economy require larger amounts of capital than are forthcoming 
from the private sector. Therefore, the state has to provide the necessary capital 
funds to finance large-scale capital expenditures" (p. 189). During the rapid 
development process, the capital formation role of government was emphasised in 
Korea. Therefore, the influence of MANU on public spending (especially on 
government capital expenditure (GECAP)) is predicted to be positive.
Population is also an important determinant of public expenditure; i.e. the size 
of residential population influences public spending. In the public goods model, 
pure public goods can be supplied at zero marginal cost. Due to the characteristics 
of public goods (non-rivalness), adding more consumers of public goods does not
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increase marginal costs. Furthermore, if economies of scale exist and it can 
induce lower costs of public goods, negative effects of population are expected. 
However if public spending is not for pure public goods but for transfers 
expenditure, positive effects are expected. Due to low publicness of public goods, 
adding more consumers will lead to an increase in public expenditure.
As noted in Chapter 1 , the effect of population increase on public spending can 
be measured by the following crowding parameter (see Brown and Jackson, 
1990, p .138).
G*k = Gk N ^
where G*k are the utility services on the kth public good, Gk are the activities 
used to produce the kth public good, N is the size of population and d is the 
crowding parameter. If d is zero, G represents a pure private good. On the 
other hand, if d = l, then it is a pure private good. Intermediate values (0<d<l) 
imply quasi publicness or quasi privateness in consumption. Given the existence 
of external costs o f congestion, an increase in population (Popu) will result in an 
increase in expenditure, assuming that the level of output and quality of public 
services remain constant. Therefore, the coefficient of population is predicted to 
be positive. Population is measured as total resident population (POPU).
Finally, in addition to the previous variables, I include the lagged dependent 
variable (GEGOVt-1) in the model. The primary reason for this is that the 
previous level of public spending may be the principal determinant of current 
spending. According to the "incremental model" of budget decision - making, last 
year's budget is the largest determining factor of current year's budget. Neck and 
Schneider (1988) include the lagged dependent variable as the most important 
determinant of Austrian government size. Explaining the growth of government in
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IOECD countries, Saunders (1988) also includes the lagged dependent variable in 
the model because the lagged dependent variable reflects the historical and 
cultural influence on the growth of government expenditure in these countries. In 
Korea, the lagged expenditure term is considered as the major determinant of
I
government size.
We can specify the non-institutional model of structural economic determinants 
as the following form:
i
GEGOVt = F(GNPt, POPUt, RELATt, MANUt, GEGOVt-1)
For an estimable equation, I use the following logarithmic form so that the 
respective parameters show the influence on the logarithm of public expenditure:
, log GEGOVt = a  +p i log GNPt + (3 2 log POPUt + p 3  log RELATt + P 4  log MANUt
+ P 5  log GEGOVt-1 + U t (1)
where GEGOVt is government expenditure, a  is the intercept, GNPt is real 
GNP in 1985 prices, POPUt is total population in thousand, RELATt is the ratio 
of the implicit deflator for general government consumption expenditure to the 
implicit GNP deflator, M ANUt is the share of the manufacture product in GNP, 
GEGOVt-1 is the lagged dependent variable and Ut is the error term. The 
expected parameter signs are p j > 0, P 2 > 0, P 3 > 0, P 4 > 0, P 5 > 0.
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6.2.2 Election and Bureau Voting
Unlike the previous structural economic model, the institutional (or political) 
model of government growth assumes that various fiscal institutions play an 
important role in expanding government expenditures beyond the size demanded 
by the median voter. This approach tries to explain government growth by 
focusing on the role of political institutions in determining the size of the public 
sector. The models developed in an institutional approach are especially 
concerned with elections and with the role of bureaucratic self interest voting 
behaviour for public sector expansion.
The effect of an election on the size of public expenditures has been studied 
under the model of 'political business cycle' (for a brief review of the political 
business cycle, see Chapter 1). This model assumes that the length of the time 
period prior to general elections has some influence on public spending because 
incumbent governments may pursue active policies to appeal to the electorate. 
Several researchers (Frey (1978), Frey and Schneider (1978)), for example, have 
found that elected officials adopt an expansionary policy to stimulate the 
economy during pre-election periods. To examine the effect of elections on 
government expenditures, we introduce dummy variables, DUMELECT and 
DUMEY. DUMELECT is a dichotomous variable taking the value in 1 in a 
presidential election year and 0 otherwise. And DUMEY is a dichotomous 
variable that equals 1 in a congressional election year (not presidential) and 0
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otherwise. All coefficients o f these dummy variables are expected to be greater 
than zero.
The election year variable in the preceding model may capture some of the 
effects of an election on public spending. To analyse electoral voting effect more 
clearly, we need to include the voting power of government employees, to the 
model. In the 'Wagner squared' hypothesis, Buchanan and Tullock (1977) 
emphasised the effect of bureaucracy on budget growth. They argued that as 
public employees become a larger share of the work force and voting population, 
this increased voting power enables public officials to extract higher wages. 
Niskanen (1971) has also argued the importance of bureaucratic influence on 
public spending levels. He suggested that due to the monopoly power of 
bureaucrats over the supply of their outputs and due to a desire for a larger 
budget, the government budget will be increased more than that of the median 
voter's preferences. Courant, Gramlich and Rubinfeld (1979) emphasised the role 
of public employees as voters in determining public spending. They argued that 
due to the expansionary motives of bureaucrats or public employees, there exist an 
inherent tendency toward overspending. Public employees may vote for increased 
government spending to raise their salaries, improve their job opportunities, or to 
extend their bureaucratic powers. They may have a greater desire for public 
goods and would vote for high government spending. To test the bureau voting 
explanation, I include the share of government employees in the total labour force 
(PUB) as a possible explanatory variable. Following Buchanan and Tullock 
(1977), we use the number of bureaucrats (government employees) as a 
proportion of the total labour force as the measure of bureaucratic power. The 
coefficient of this variable is expected to be positive.
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Finally, lagged expenditure term is included in the model. The substantive 
justification for including lagged variable is that due to bureaucratic inertia in 
budget decision-making process, the budget in any given year is expected to 
marginal adjustments to the previous year. Last year's spending is one of the most 
important determinants of this year's spending. Such a relationship is formally 
represented in the lagged endogenous variable.
After allowing for lagged adjustment, one can specify the election and bureau 
voting model with the following equation:
GEGOVt = F(PUBt, DUM ELECTt, D U M E Y t, GEGOVt-1)
Taking logarithms and adding an error term yield the following estimable 
equation:
log GEGOVt = a  +8 i log PUBt + 8 2  DUMELECT t + 8 3  DUMEYt + 8 4  log 
GEGOVt_! + Ut (2)
where GEGOVt is government expenditure, a  is the intercept, PUBt is the share 
of government employees in the total labour force, DUMELECTt is a dummy 
variable taking the value of 1 in a presidential election and 0 otherwise, DUMEYt 
is a dummy variable that equals 1 in a congressional election and 0  otherwise, 
GEGOVt-1 is the lagged dependent variable and Ut is the error term. The 
expected parameter signs are 8  j > q, ^ 2 > 0, ^ 3 > 0, ^ 4 > 0,
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(6.2.3 Interest Groups
Other current research on the political institutional model examines the role of 
general income distribution and interest group in determining the size of 
government. According to Stigler (1970) Director's Law, public expenditures and 
taxes are linked to income class, and it is assumed that government expenditures 
are primarily directed to selfish rent-seeking transfers spending instead of 
traditional public goods spending. Director's Law ( named after its discoverer, 
Aaron Director) states that " Public expenditures are made for the benefit 
primarily of the middle classes, and financed by taxes which are borne in 
considerable part by the poor and the rich" (Stigler, 1970, p .l). Tullock 
(1971) also points out that all redistributions appear to be from the lower- and 
upper- groups of society to the middle class. Therefore, according to the 
Tullock's study, the middle classes votes for more government expenditures 
because they are the principal beneficiaries of public expenditure programmes.
Meltzer and Richard (1978, 1981), Pelzman (1980) have supported Stigler's 
hypothesis with more sophisticated models. As explained in Chapter 1, Meltzer 
and Richard (1978, 1981) strongly assume that all government expenditures have a 
redistributive component. According to their study, " government grows when 
the franchise is extended to include more voters below the median income or 
when the growth of income provides revenues for increased redistribution" 
(Meltzer and Richard ,1 9 7 8 , p .114). Therefore, in the Meltzer and Richard 
model, increased inequality of income and the extension of suffrage are the
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main determinants of the growth of government. Pelzman's model is more 
sophisticated than that of Meltzer and Richard. As noted in Chapter 1, Pelzman 
claims that the spread of education is an important factor in reducing the 
inequality of income and thus leading to the growth of government expenditure. 
In his model, increased equality of income is a major source of the growth of 
government.
Although they have different views on specific theoretical interpretation of how 
rents are sought and redistributed among different income class, they have 
attempted to derive propositions about the role of political process for enhancing 
redistribution in favour of special group. To test this hypothesis empirically, we 
need time-series data on income distribution, which is not available in Korea.
For this reason and due to the non-availability of suitable data for income 
distribution in Korea, I am going to examine the impact of interest groups on the 
size of government. In my model, I shall include several variables gleaned from 
the public choice literature. The basic hypothesis to be tested in this section is 
that the size of government is positively related to the number of interest groups. 
As the number of organised interest groups grows, we may expect an increase in 
the size of government because new interest groups bring more demands for 
publicly funded goods. Although there is no perfect measure of interest group 
strength , we want to examine the relationship between the number of interest 
groups and size of government under the assumption that interest groups are able 
to influence public policies so as to increase government size. Mueller and 
Murrell (1986) test hypotheses concerning the impact of interest groups on 
government size under the assumption that the impact of these other factors is 
additive. They claim that "the effect of interest groups on size of government
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remains as predicted in the presence of additional institutional complexity, and 
begin to test this assumption by adding several of the variables which other 
studies have posited to be determinants of the size of government" ( Mueller and 
Murrell, 1986, p. 127).
According to the public choice argument, interest groups favour government 
interventions whose benefits are targeted directly at its members, and whose costs 
are distributed by all members of society. Interest groups favour tax reductions 
and they also support the expansion of government expenditures for its members. 
Each interest group may articulate demands for lower taxes and higher subsidies 
for its own membership at the expense of the majority of society. For example, an 
industry trade association, one of the typical cases of specialised interest groups, 
may demand more subsidies and more political protection for that industry form 
the government. Log-rolling leads to coalition with other interest groups to reach 
their goals. Each interest group tries to win favours for its own membership by 
exerting a large impact through financial contributions to a political party.
The preceding arguments suggest a hypothesis that the existence of specialised 
interest groups may lead to an increase of government expenditure. As noted 
previously, the task for an empirical test of the impact of interest groups on the 
relative size of government is to seek a measure of the 'strength' of the relevant 
interest groups over time. There are several difficulties in trying to construct an 
appropriate measure of each interest group. Many researchers have employed 
proxies to examine the impact of interest groups on the relative size of 
government.
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In their cross-sectional studies, Mueller and Murrell (1985, 1986) used 
population, number of interest groups, size of bureaucracy, and start of 
modernisation as proxies for the strength of interest group. He found that the 
number of interest group is positively related to the relative size of government. 
Since they adopt cross-sectional data, its relevance for a time-series analysis 
seems questionable. Examining the growth of Swedish government, Henrekson 
(1988) used the degree of unionisation and the ratio of the sum of exports and 
imports to GDP to test for the interest group hypothesis. Recently, explaining 
the growth of the public sector in Australia, Hackl, Schneider and Withers 
(1993) used proxies by the share of agricultural employment in total 
population, the union share of total workforce and the degree of openness of the 
economy (measured as the ratio of the sum of imports and exports to GNP) as 
the measures of the strength of interest groups.
The above discussion suggests that some specific interest groups may tend to 
expand state activity in order to get benefits for their members. As pointed out 
by many researchers, it is very difficult to specify the strength of various interest 
groups. But we may identify some interest groups pursuing rent-seeking 
activities. In the Korean case, as proxies for the strengths of each interest group, 
I use the share of union member among total work force (UNION), and the 
percentage share of manufacture employment in the labour force (MANUF) (see 
Henrekson (1988), Hackl, Schneider and Withers (1993)). The coefficients of 
these two variables are expected to be positive. In Korea, each of these groups 
seek to increase government outlays for their favour. Although we take these 
variables as proxies for a measure of strength, it must be remembered that relative 
numbers are imperfect measures of interest group strength.
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A further argument on the importance of interest groups has been suggested by 
Cameron (1978). Using 18 nations cross-sectional data, Cameron examined five 
types of explanation- one economic, the second fiscal, the third political, the 
fourth institutional, and the fifth international - to account for the growth of 
government activity. He found that the degree of openness of the economy (the 
international explanation) is the main determinant of government growth in 
Western developed countries. Since a high degree of dependence on international 
trade weakens domestic control of macroeconomic policy, the resulting economic 
instability leads to an expansion of government activity. According to his study, 
there exists a strong positive relationship between the degree of openness and the 
expansion of the public economy. Cameron (1978) states that "governments can 
dampen the effects of the open economy on production, employment, and 
consumption by increasing the scope of the public economy" (p. 1250).
Openness is interpreted as a proxy for industrial concentration and the influence 
of unions on government. In the empirical estimation for the interest group effect, 
I include the degree of openness as measured by the ratio of the sum of exports 
and imports to GNP (OPEN). In the interest group model, the increase of 
openness is interpreted to result in a high industrial concentration, and leads to 
efforts by producers to protect themselves by obtaining more subsidies and more 
political protection for that industry from the government. The impact of openness 
on public spending is expected to be positive.
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The resulting estimating equation for this interest group model, allowing for 
lagged adjustment, is :
GEGOVt = F (UNIONt, MANUFt, OPENt, GEGOVt-1)
Since the logarithmic specification produces a better fit, the following 
logarithmic form is used to test the interest group hypothesis:
log GEGOVt = OC + y j log UNIONt + y 2 log MANUFt + y 3 log OPENt + y 4 log 
GEGOVt-1+Ut (3)
where GEGOVt is government expenditure, UNIONt is the share of union 
member among total work force, MANUF is the percentage share of manufacture 
employment in the labour force, OPENt is the ratio of the sum of exports and 
imports to GNP, GEGOVt-1 is the lagged dependent variable and Ut is the 
error term. The expected parameter signs are y ^ o ,  J i > 0 , 7 3  > 0 , 7 4  > 0 .
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6.2.4 Fiscal Illusion
This explanation of public sector growth is fiscal in nature. As noted by many 
researchers, this explanation emphasised the structure of the revenue system as a 
determinant of public expenditure growth. If the structure of tax system becomes 
more complex, it can affect taxpayer's perceptions of the cost of public goods, and 
hence, the size of public sector. As the revenue system becomes more complex, 
taxpayers tend to underestimate the true tax burden, and it will lead to an 
expansion of public expenditure (for a more detailed discussion of the fiscal 
illusion hypothesis, see Chapter 1 ) .
A number of illusion inducing fiscal structures have been analysed. Buchanan 
and Wagner (1977) argue that debt financing will create a fiscal illusion and will 
produce higher levels of public expenditure because taxpayers underestimate the 
future tax burden created by deficits. Wildavsky (1975) and Cameron (1978) 
suggest that a large reliance on indirect taxes can conceal the costs of public 
policy and it will produce higher levels of public expenditures. Another systematic 
bias of fiscal structures in favour of government growth is the fiscal drag or 
bracket creep effect. During a high rate of inflation, taxpayers will be moved into 
higher marginal tax brackets and it will automatically increase the true tax burden. 
Under progressive income taxation, the fiscal drag effect of inflation exists.
214
There have been several empirical studies which have examined the validity of 
the fiscal illusion hypothesis. Hackl, Schneider and Withers (1993) use a 
Herfindahl index of the complexity of the Australian tax system, the share of 
indirect tax in total tax revenues and fiscal drag (consumer price inflation) to test 
for the fiscal illusion hypothesis. Henrekson (1988) also includes the Herfindahl 
index , the share of direct taxes in total tax revenues and the rate of inflation to 
examine the validity of the fiscal illusion hypothesis in Sweden. Lowery and 
Berry (1983) use the amount of governmental debt, the complexity of tax 
system and the percentage of revenues collected through indirect taxes.
To test for the fiscal illusion hypothesis in Korea, I will use three variables. 
Following W agner (1976), I include a Herfindahl index of the complexity of 
Korean Tax system, HERF2 . The Herfindahl index will achieve its maximum 
value of unity if it generates all of its own revenues from a single source; the 
minimum possible would be one-fifth if revenues are divided equally among the 
five categories. According to the fiscal illusion hypothesis, the lower value of the 
index is associated with a higher complex revenue system so that a negative 
coefficient for HERF on public expenditure is expected. Fiscal illusion due to the 
invisibility of revenue system is measured by the share of indirect tax in total taxes
2 Wagner's (1976) measure of the Herfindahl Index of simplicity of revenue 
system is defined as;
5
HERF = X  Ri2
i = l
Where Rj is the share of revenue category i in total public revenue.
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INDIR; a positive effect is expected. To examine the fiscal drag effects of 
inflation, I include the rate of inflation (Consumer Price Index) among the 
independent variables. It is expected to exert a positive effect on the size of 
government.
The resultant fiscal illusion model for government growth is as follows, allowing 
for lagged adjustment:
GEGOVt = F(INDIRt, HERFt, CPIt, GEGOVt-1)
Taking logarithms and adding an error term, I specify the following equation 
reflecting the fiscal illusion explanation :
log GEGOVt = a  + COj log INDIRt + CD 2  log HERFt + CD3 log CPIt + CD 4  log GEGOVt-1 
+ Ut (4)
where GEGOVt is government expenditure, INDIRt is the share of indirect tax in 
total taxes, HERFt is a Herfindahl index of the complexity of Korean Tax system, 
CPIt is the rate of inflation (Consumer Price Index), GEGOVt-1 is the lagged 
dependent variable and Ut is the error term. The expected parameter signs 





This type of explanation of the growth of the public sector emphasises the 
stabilisation role of government. It tries to explain the growth of government as 
the process of macroeconomic policy-making.
Since the end of the Second W orld W ar, the primary task of government policies 
has been given on stabilisation of the economy. By varying public expenditure or 
by pursuing money supply targets, government tried to achieve major 
macroeconomic policy objectives. Since Keynesian economists though that fiscal 
policy could affect demand more powerfully than monetary policy, fiscal policy has 
been used more often to control the level of aggregate demand. Public 
expenditure played a significant role in economic stabilisation policy.
In Korea, short-term management of the economy and the control of aggregate 
demand have been important policy objectives since the early 1960s. At various 
times , incomes policies (including maximum price control), fiscal and monetary 
policy have been used as the instruments of stabilisation policy. Keynesian ideas 
have especially influenced Korean economic thinking since the late 1960s. 
Economic growth, price stability , full employment, and the balance of payments 
have been agreed to be the targets of macro-economic policy in Korea. Among 
these objectives, a high rate of economic growth has been considered as the most 
important objective of government policy. During the Korean modernisation
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process, government has used expansionary fiscal policy to increase capital 
accumulation and to stimulate economic growth.
Since the Korean economy has pursued the small open economy, fiscal policy has
I
been considered as the most important instrument which the government can 
control. The government has relied especially on the expenditure rather than 
revenue side of budget.
I This model is closely related to the Election and Bureau Voting model. As
noted previously, the incumbent government may adopt active policies to appeal 
to the electorate. Since the state of the economy influences voters attitudes and 
election outcomes, government manipulate the economy in order to increase their 
chances for re-election (for a brief review of the political business cycle theory, 
see Chapter 1). The important targets of short-run stabilisation policies are full 
employment, price stabilisation and the balance of payment. The government 
will adopt fiscal stabilisation policies to account for short-term fluctuations in the 
rate of unemployment and in the rate o f inflation.
One can expect that public expenditure would increase when the rate of 
unemployment rises, and to decrease when either inflation or current account 
deficit rises. Therefore, public expenditure is expected to be positively related to 
changes in the rate of unemployment (AUNEM P) and in changes in GNP (AGNP) 




A simple stabilisation model of government size can be specified as follows, 
including for lagged expenditure term:
GEGOVt = F(AG N Pt, A CPIt, AUNEM Pt, GEGOVt-1)
To stabilise the variance of the dependent variable, government expenditure 
(GEGOVt) is transformed to logarithmic value. However, the first differences 
are used as explanatory variables. For an estimable equation, I propose the 
following dynamic specification of the simple stabilisation policy model:
log GEGOVt = a  + \ |/ ! (GNPt-GNPt_,) +ij/ 2 (CPIt-C PI^) + \ | / 3 (UNEMPt-UNEMPt. 
j )+  y  4 log GEGOVt-1 + Ut (5)
where GEGOVt is government expenditure, AGNPt (GNPt-GNPt.j) is changes 
in GNP, A CPIt (C PIt-C PI^) is changes in rate of inflation, AUNEMPt 
(UNEMPt-UNEMPt^) is changes in the rate of unemployment, GEGOVt-1 is 
the lagged dependent variable and Ut is the error term. The expected parameter 
signs are \|/ ,> q, V 2 < 0 , V 3 > 0 , V 4 > 0 .
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6.2.6 Centralisation of Power
The final political institutional interpretation of the growth of government is the 
institutional centralisation explanation. This explanation suggests that the size of 
the public sector is positively related to the extent of fiscal centralisation; i.e., 
centralised governments are more likely to grow in the size of the public sector 
than those with decentralised governments.
The fiscal centralisation hypotheses have been put forth by Brennan and 
Buchanan (1977, 1980). In their book, Brennan and Buchanan (1980) claim 
that "Total government intrusion into the economy should be smaller, ceteris 
paribus, the greater the extent to which taxes and expenditures are 
decentralised" (p. 185). According to the Leviathan view, a decentralised public 
sector limits the growth or size of government. Since then, several researchers 
have examined the impact of fiscal centralisation on public sector size.
There are several reasons why the size and growth of the public sector is 
positively related to the extent of fiscal centralisation . First, centralised 
government systems are thought to be better able to control public spending than 
decentralised government. Using 18 nations cross-sectional data, Cameron (1978) 
found that the growth of government was greatest in a unitary, highly centralised 
government structure. He concluded that " federalism tends to dampen the degree 
of expansion of the public economy and centralisation tends to facilitate that
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expansion. ... A high degree of centralisation seems to facilitate the expansion of 
the public economy" (Cameron, 1978, p.1253).
Second, centralised systems are seen to reach an agreement to extract higher 
taxes for the citizens. Brennan and Buchanan (1980) argue that fiscal 
decentralisation is itself a powerful constraint on the growth of government. They 
state that "Within a constitutionally designed federal structure, one would predict 
that there would be constant pressure by competitive lower-level governments to 
secure institutional rearrangements that would moderate competitive pressures" 
(P. 182). According to their view, fiscal decentralisation serves as a powerful 
constraint on Leviathan.
Empirical studies for the fiscal centralisation hypothesis have produced mixed 
results.
Peltzman (1980) found little evidence to the hypothesis and claimed that 
centralism had no effect on the size of government. Lowery-Berry (1983) tested 
the fiscal centralisation hypothesis by adopting the share of government revenues 
collected by the central government and inter-government aid as explanatory 
variables. They found disappointing results to the hypothesis. Oates (1985) 
measured fiscal centralisation as the share of central government tax revenues in 
total tax revenues. He regressed a measure of the size of the public sector on a 
fiscal centralisation ratio, and found a negative relationship between two 
variables. His study casts doubt on the usefulness of the fiscal centralisation 
hypothesis. Recently, Grossman (1992) examined the impact of fiscal 
centralisation on the size of the public sector in Australia. He measured fiscal 
centralisation as the share of local government expenditures in total general 
government expenditures and inter-governmental grants in total lower-level
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governments' finances. Grossman found that fiscal centralisation is positively 
correlated with public sector size in Australia.
To test the fiscal centralisation hypothesis, I take two variables, a fiscal 
centralisation ratio (CENTX, central government tax revenues as a percentage of 
total tax revenues), and intergovernmental aid (AID, central government aid to 
local government as a percentage of total government expenditures). The 
coefficients of CENTX and AID are expected to be positive.
We can specify an institutional centralisation model with the following equation: 
GEGOVt = F(CENTXt, AIDt, GEGOVt-1)
Taking logarithms, I can transform the above model into the following form:
log GEGOVt = a  + V i log CENTXt + V 2 log AIDt + V 3  log GEGOVt-1 + Ut (5)
where GEGOVt is government expenditure, CENTXt is the central government 
tax revenues as a percentage of total tax revenues, and AIDt is the central 
government aid to local government as a percentage of total government 
expenditures, GEGOVt-1 is the lagged dependent variable and Ut is the error 
term. The expected parameter signs are v i;> 0 , v 2 > 0 , v 3 > q.
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6. 3 Testing the Models
Having reviewed growth theories and presented several models of government 
growth, we now turn attention to developing a satisfactory set of tests.
As seen in Table 6 . 1 and Table 6.2, annual data were collected for the 29 
year period of 1963 to 19913. Three different measures are used as dependent 
variables: general government consumption expenditure (GeCon), general 
government transfer expenditure (GeTra) and general government capital 
expenditure (GeCap) (see Table 6.1).
Table 6.1 Dependent Variables Applied to Explain Absolute Government Growth
in Korea, 1963-1991
Dependent Variables Description of variables
GeCon General government consumption expenditures 
deflated by the GNP implicit deflator
GeTra General government transfer payments deflated by 
the implicit price deflator for private consumption
GeCap General government capital expenditures 
deflated by its own deflator
3 For a detailed definition of the variables and data source, see Appendix
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As already explained in Chapter 3, the different components of total 
government expenditures have shown different growth pattern (see Table 3.2, 
Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4 in Chapter 3). Since the growth pattern of the 
different components of total government expenditures is dissimilar, we cannot 
explain all of the growth of the public sector in a single model. We need to 
attempt separate explanations of the three different components of total 
government expenditures. The dependent variables are listed in Table 6.1 
three different components of total expenditures.
In the previous section, we already identified explanatory variables for 
explanation of the growth of government in Korea. The indicators selected to 
measure the independent variables are listed in Table 6.2.
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Table 6.2 Independent Variables Applied to Explain Absolute Government Growth 
in Korea, 1963-1991





Real GNP in 1985 prices (million of won)
Total population in thousand
Ratio of the implicit deflator for general 
government consumption expenditure to 
the implicit GNP deflator






Share of government employees 
in total labour force
Dummy variable that equals 1 in the year of 
presidential election and 0  otherwise
Dummy variable that equal 1 in the year 
of congressional election and 0  otherwise
Interest Group Union Degree of unionisation measured by the share
of union member among total work force
M anuf Share of manufacture employment in total
force
Open Ratio of the sum of imports and exports
to GNP
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Fiscal Illusion Indir Share of indirect taxes in total tax revenues
H e rf 4
CPI
Herfindahl index of the complexity of 
the Korean tax system
Changes in the rate of consumer price index
Stabilisation Policy A Unemp
ACPI 
A GNP
Changes in the rate of unemployment 
Changes in the rate of Consumer Price Index 
Changes in Real GNP in 1985 prices
Centralisation of Power Centx Ratio of local government tax 
to total tax revenues
Aid Central government transfer to local
government as a percentage of general 
government expenditure
4 To derive the Herfindahl index of the simplicity of the revenue structure in Korea, total 
taxes were divided into five major categories; namely direct taxes, indirect taxes, stamp 
revenue, customs duties, and a remaining category.
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The methodology employed in this chapter consists of OLS (Ordinary Least 
Squares ) regressions of the above measures of government size on variables. 
But an analysis of autocorrelation coefficients indicates that the residuals of six 
models have significant autocorrelation. Thus appropriate adjustments for 
first-order serial correlation are made by the Cochrane - Orcutt procedure.
Because the lagged dependent variables are included in each model, we 
search for significant levels of autocorrelation in the residuals. We report p - 
values in the Tables. Since p -  values seem to be significant, the Cochrane - 
Orcutt procedure is applied to correct for the first-order autocorrelation. The 
parameter estimates have been adjusted accordingly.
Our study in this chapter aims at an identification of empirical regularities of 
growth theories which are suggested by many researchers. We do not fully 
specified our models in an exact way. A more sophisticated method for 
empirical estimation will be used in the later stage of our research.
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6.4 Empirical Findings
Table 6.3 Structural and Economic Determinants (1963-1991)
Independent Variables I Dependent Variables
GeCon GeTra GeCap
Intercept 1.98 12.08 73.36
(0.18) (0.23) ( 1 .2 1 )
Real GNP 0.47** 0.96 0.98
(3.09) (1.26) ( 1 .2 1 )
Popu 0.03 -1.72 -7.74
(0.03 ) (-0.31) (-1.17)
Relat 1.28** 0.92 2.37**
(6.35) ( 1 . 1 0 ) (2.87)
Manu -0.18 0.62 0.57
(-1.15) (0 .8 6 ) (0.69)
Lagged Dependent 0.23* 0.14 0.47
(1.73) (0.27) (1-58)
Total R 2 0.99 0.98 0.97
rho (p ) 0.29 0.39 0.63
D.W. / h 2.19 2.05 3.91
Note; All variables are logged in the estimations.
Cochrane-Orcutt estimation, t-values in parentheses.
* and ** indicate significance at the 10, and 5 % levels respectively.
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Table 6.4 Election and Bureau Voting (1963-1991)
Independent Variables I Dependent Variables
GeCon GeTra GeCap
Intercept 0.04 - 1 . 0 1 -1.15
(0.08) (-0.91) (-0 .6 6 )
Pub 0.16 1 . 2 2 1.73
(0.34) (L19) (1.06)
DumElect 0.03 -0.09 0 . 0 2
(0 .6 8 ) (-0.74) (0.18)
DumEy -0.04 -0.08 -0 . 0 1
(-1.17) (-0 .8 8 ) (-0.07)
Lagged Dependent 0.98** 0.92** 0.84**
(22.05) (13.81) (7.99)
Total R2 0.98 0.96 0.96
rho (p ) 0.28 0 . 1 1 0.36
D.W. / h 1.65 0.64 1 . 6 6
Note; All variables are logged in the estimations except DumElect and DumEy. 
Cochrane-Orcutt estimation, t-values in parentheses.
* and ** indicate significance at the 10, and 5%  levels respectively.
i
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Table 6.5 Interest Group (1963-1991)
Independent Variables I Dependent Variables
GeCon GeTra GeCap
Intercept 0.39 -0.42 0.79
(0.95) (-0.58) (0.46)
Union -0 . 0 2 0.09 -0.44
(-0 . 1 1 ) (0.25) (-0.81)
Manuf 0.44 0.63 0 . 6 8
(1.51) ( 1 .0 1 ) (0 .8 6 )
Openness -0.07 0.23 0.90*
(-0.61) (0.84) (1.99)
Lagged Dependent 0.85** 0 .6 6 ** 0.31
( 1 0 .8 6 ) (4.48) ( 1 .6 8 )
Total R2 0.99 0.97 0.97
rho (p ) 0 . 1 2 0.04 0.76
D.W. / h 0.76 0.48 3.02
Note; All variables are logged in the estimations.
Cochrane-Orcutt estimation, t-values in parentheses.
* and ** indicate significance at the 10, and 5%  levels respectively.
\
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Table 6.6 Fiscal Illusion (1963-1991)
Independent Variables I Dependent Variables
GeCon GeTra GeCap
Intercept -0.63 1.84 -0.60
(-0.71) (1.15) (-0.22)
Indtax 0.22 -0.30 0.56
(0.82) (-0.61) (0.70)
Herfind 0.22 0.45 0.07
(0.76) (0.82) (0.08)
CPI 0.03 -0.07 -0.11
(1.21) (-1.23) (-1.44)
Lagged Dependent 1.00** 1.03** 0.84**
(21.91) (21.25) (6.72)
Total R2 0.99 0.97 0.96
rho (p ) 0.39 -0.11 0.55
D . W . / h 1.97 -0.43 1.81
Note; All variables are logged in the estimations.
Cochrane-Orcutt estimation, t-values in parentheses.
* and ** indicate significance at the 10, and 5 %  levels respectively.
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Table 6.7 Stabilisation Policy (1963-1991)
Independent Variables I Dependent Variables
GeCon GeTra GeCap
Intercept 0.50* 0.97** 1.56**
(1.87) (2.71) (2.52)
A GNP 0.0006 0.0003** 0.0003
(0.92) (2.07) (1.61)
ACPI 0.002 0.009* -0.006
(1.44) (1.96) (-1.42)
AUNEMP 0.03 0.04 0.06
(0.90) (0.48) (0.73)
Lagged Dependent 0.95** 0.86** 0.79**
(27.73) (14.92) (8.67)
Total R2 0.99 0.98 0.97
rho (p ) -0.03 -0.03 0.36
D.W. / h 1.11 0.65 1.10
Note; Values in parentheses are t-values.
Cochrane-Orcutt estimation, t-values in parentheses.
* and ** indicate significance at the 10, and 5 %  levels respectively.
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Table 6.8 Centralisation of Power (1963-1991)
Independent Variables I Dependent Variables
GeCon GeTra GeCap
Intercept 0.34 -1.45 1.70
(0.12) (-0.31) (0.22)
Centx 0.09 0.11 -0.16
(0.16) (0.10) (-0.10)
Aid -0.19 0.36 -0.09
(-1.29) (1.31) (-0.20)
Lagged Dependent 0.99** 0.99** 0.92**
(25.52) (25.17) (11-43)
Total R2 0.99 0.97 0.96
r h o ( p ) 0.35 -0.007 0.40
D.W. / h 1.79 0.01 1.87
Note; All variables are logged in the estimations.
Cochrane-Orcutt estimation, t-values in parentheses.
* and ** indicate significance at the 10, and 5 % levels respectively.
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6. 5 Empirical Results
Government Consumption
Concerning the structural and economic determinants, income variable (Real 
GNP) has a positive effect on the growth of government consumption expenditure. 
In equation 1, the GNP elasticity is less than unity, and has a positive significant 
effect. The coefficient of Real GNP is positive, as hypothesised, and significant 
at the 5 % level. The positive correlation between Real GNP and GeCon is 
consistent with the Wagner hypothesis that public consumption expenditures 
will increase in growing economies (see Chapter 4). This evidence offers 
another support for Wagner's Law. Population (Popu) variable has the expected 
positive sign but insignificant even at the 10 % level. Baumol's Disease is an 
important determinant of the expansion of government expenditure in Korea; 
Relative price term (Relat) is highly significant at the 5 % level and positive. As 
explained in Chapter 2, the implicit price deflator for government consumption 
expenditure rose faster than the price index for GNP (see Table 2.3). In this 
section, we find another evidence of relative price effects in Korea. MANU has 
a negative sign, contrary to my hypothesis. The coefficient of the lagged 
dependent variable is positive and significant at the 10% level. This result 
supports the hypothesis that current year's government consumption expenditure 
depends on last year's government consumption expenditure.
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For the election and bureau voting explanation, the only independent variable 
that is significantly different from zero is the lagged expenditure term. DumElect 
has expected positive sign but insignificant at the 10 % level. In contrast, the 
coefficient of DumEy is negative and insignificant. The coefficient estimate of 
PUB is positive, supporting for the bureau voting model that public employees 
in Korea vote for higher government expenditures to raise their salaries or to 
extend their bureaucratic power. The coefficient of the lagged dependent 
variable is positive and significant at the 5 % level. This evidence support for 
the Wildavsky hypothesis that the budget in any given year is extended to 
marginal adjustments to the previous year.
The empirical results of the interest group model are on the whole 
disappointing. The coefficient of UNION is negative, in contrast to the 
expectation of positive value. The reason of this negative finding is that the 
strength of labour union in Korea is not so strong as excepted in the interest 
group model. During the development process, the Korean government did not 
admit the establishment of labour union in major export industries. The share 
of union member among total work force remained constant during the 1970s 
(see Corbo and Suh, 1992). MANUF has the hypothesises positive sign, 
although it is not significant. In contrast to the hypothesis, the proportion of 
openness in the economy (OPEN) appears to be inversely related to the size of 
government sector.
For the fiscal illusion explanation, Herfmd has positive sign in contrast to the 
expectation of negative value. CPI has positive sign (but insignificant) as predicted 
by the theory, but its coefficient estimate is extremely weak. These results
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suggest that a high rate of inflation has the illusion inducing character and these 
serve to increase the size of government.
As with the stabilisation policy model, estimation results are strikingly similar. 
The sign of the inflation coefficient (ACPI) is the opposite as predicted by the 
stabilisation policy model. Although public expenditure should be cut during a 
period of high rates of inflation, government consumption expenditure has been 
increased. The coefficient attaching to unemployment (AUNEMP) has positive 
sign. It suggests that government consumption expenditure increases when 
unemployment is high. Real GNP (AGNP) and lagged expenditure term have had 
a positive effect on the expenditure growth. These empirical results may indicate 
that the pursued macro economic policy in Korea has not been counter-cycle with 
respect to government consumption expenditure.
Finally, the empirical results offer little support for the institutional centralisation 
explanation. AID has negative sign, opposite to those predicted by the theory and 
insignificant.
Transfer Payments
In transfer payments, the empirical results of the structural and economic 
variables are on the whole not satisfactory. The GNP elasticity for transfer 
expenditure is greater than zero but insignificant at the 10% level. The coefficient 
of population (POPU) is negative, opposite to those predicted by the theory and 
insignificant at the 10% level. Relat has positive sign, supporting the relative
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effect hypothesis but the coefficient is insignificant at the 5% level. The lagged 
dependent variable and MANU have also positive sign but insignificant at the 5 
% level.
For the election and bureau voting explanation, all of the coefficient estimates 
have signs opposite to those predicted by the theory. Especially the coefficients 
of election dummy variables (DumElect and DumEy) are negative, contrary to my 
hypothesis. It suggests that although presidential or congressional elections should 
have an expanding effect on public spending, transfer payments in Korea have 
been reduced during election years. During the 1970s and 1980s, the 
presidential election in Korea did not hold regularly. For example, there were 
only two presidential elections between 1970 and 1990 (one in 1971, the other 
in 1987). Since political power in Korea was concentrated in the hands of the 
late Presidential Chung-Hee Park and the incumbent government can manipulate 
the overall economic condition for an election, the coefficient of the election 
variable seems to have a opposite sign.
On the interest group model, UNION, MANUF and OPENNESS have the 
hypothesised positive sign, although these are not significant at the 5 % level. 
Concerning the stabilisation policy, Real GNP has a positive and significant effect 
on the growth of transfer payments. In Korea, social security benefit, especially 
medical care and old age support, has grown considerably since the mid 1970s. 
The coefficient of CPI is significant at the 10% level but has a positive sign, 
contrary to our hypothesis. UNEMP has a positive sign but insignificant.
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On the centralisation model, CENTX has a positive sign in contrast to the 
expectation of negative value and insignificant at the 10% level. AID has a 
positive effect, as hypothesised, but insignificant.
Government Investment
Like the different economic effects of different types of public expenditures, 
various types of public expenditures do not seem to respond to the same factors. 
The most obvious difference appears on the explanation of the growth of 
investment expenditure. Among the variables examined in the model, only a few 
variables are significant. The relative price, the openness of the economy and the 
lagged dependent variable have significant and positive effects.
Concerning the structural and economic determinants, Real GNP has a positive 
effect on government capital expenditure. Especially, like government 
consumption expenditure, relative price term (Relat) is positive and significant 
at the 5 % level. It implies that the price index of government investment 
expenditure rose faster than the price index for GNP.
For the election and bureau model, the coefficients of PUB and DumElect 
are positive as hypothesised but insignificant at the 5 % level. DumEy has a 
negative sign, contrary to my hypothesis. The lagged dependent variable has a 
positive sign and highly significant at the 5 % level. This evidence supports the
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hypothesis of "bureaucratic momentum" that the last year's budget determines 
this year's budget and the bureaucrats in Korea resist a cut in public 
expenditures.
For the interest group model, the coefficient of openness has a positive sign 
and significant at the 10 % level. Since the early 1960s, Korea has pursued an 
export-led growth strategy. In open economy, the need to maintain export 
competitiveness may lead to more concentrated industries. To increase 
advantages of economies of scale in production, government need to increase 
public investment on the capital stock of the public sector. It may lead to a greater 
demand for public investment, and the positive effect of the relative price on 
supply side is consistent with Baumol's Disease theory.
Concerning the stabilisation model, all coefficients have excepted signs. GNP 
and UNEMP have a positive sign, CPI has a negative sign but insignificant at 
the 10% level.
For the fiscal decentralisation hypothesis, empirical results are on the whole 
disappointing. The coefficients of Centx and Aid are negative, contrary to my 
hypothesis and insignificant at the 10 % level.
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6. 6 Reflections on the Growth of Public Expenditure in Korea
Whether measured by the absolute level of expenditure or relative to the 
economy, the Korean public sector has grown rapidly over the last three decades. 
During the rapid development process, the Korean government has exerted an 
enormous influence on the allocation of scare resources in the economy and 
government involvement has increased substantially to promote export and 
economic growth. Many different analytical approaches have been used to 
account for the growth of public expenditure in Korea.
In this chapter, I reviewed six alternative theories of government growth 
which have been most commonly cited in the public finance literature. Since the 
literature concerning the growth of public expenditure is so large and so immense, 
my empirical study must be selective. My study has also been influenced by the 
active research of W estern public finance economists. Compared with the rapid 
appearance of empirical studies devoted to many Western developed countries, 
few empirical studies have been carried out to explain the sustained growth of 
public expenditure in Korea. After reviewing six explanations of public 
expenditure growth, I analysed the applicability of these leading hypotheses on 
public expenditure behaviour with Korean data over the period from 1963 to 
1991. Since reliable data on major explanatory variables (for example, the 
number of government employees in total labour force) have been compiled only 
after 1963, my study has focused on a period of about 30 years of between 
1963 and 1991.
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While I examined six explanations as separate models in this chapter, it 
should be noted that these models were not mutually exclusive. Six explanations 
are closely related and the explanatory variables identified in the various 
explanations may interact with one another in influencing the growth of public 
expenditure. Since many researchers have treated six explanations independently 
in their empirical studies, I have specified each as a separate model of public 
sector growth.
After a brief survey of six explanations of government growth, I identified 
explanatory variables of potential relevance in explaining the growth of public 
spending in Korea. Through an extensive reading of the literature of public 
expenditure growth, I attempted to identify some important independent variables 
which seemed to be of the greatest relevance for the case of Korea over the study 
period. Since the growth of government is a complex and multi-faced 
phenomenon, the process cannot be easily identified by a single indicator. Since 
my study in this chapter aimed at an identification of empirical similarities of 
growth theories, further research is needed on Korean government growth.
For the dependent variables, I adopted three different components of total 
government expenditures: government consumption expenditure, government 
transfer payment and government capital expenditure. The choice of independent 
variables differs from the share version (the ratio of government expenditure in 
GNP) in the previous chapters. A disaggregation has been made because three 
components represent the basic economic categories on which the national 
accounts are constructed, and the different components of aggregate spending 
have shown different growth pattern over the study period.
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The Relevance of Six Explanations to the Korean Public 
Expenditure Growth
The empirical results of the tests of six different explanations are on the whole 
disappointing. Of the six explanations of government growth, only structural and 
economic determinants seem to be of great relevance in explaining the growth of 
public expenditure in Korea over the study period. These disappointing results 
question the validity of these leading hypotheses in the Korean case. In this 
subsection, I will discuss the relevance of these six explanations to the Korean 
public expenditure evolution.
(A) Structural and Economic Determinants; The results presented in Table 
6.3 suggest that Structural and Economic Determinants are the main causes of the 
expansion of public expenditure in Korea. My empirical study shows that real 
GNP is the main determinant of public expenditure growth in Korea. As explained 
in Chapter 3, both government expenditure and real income have increased 
substantially for the period of 1963-1991. The empirical results seem to be prove 
the usefulness of Wagner's approach to Korea. Since Wagner's hypothesis was 
framed in reference to states where real income was increasing as a result of 
industrialisation, it seems to fit the Korean experience quite well after the early 
1960s (see  also Chapter 4).
My empirical study also shows that the lagging productivity between the 
public and private sector is another important determinant of the expansion of 
public expenditure in Korea. As noted in Chapter 2, the price deflator of 
government consumption expenditure rose faster than the implicit price deflator
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for GNP. The positive sign displayed on the Relat variable in this chapter lends 
further support to the Baumol hypothesis and its relevance to the Korean public 
sector expenditure experience. In Korea, government is a labour-intensive 
sector and productivity increases in the public sector are presumed to be smaller 
than that of the private sector. Due to the low productivity of the Korean 
government sector, the relative cost of government services should rise over 
time, and this will lead to the expansion of the public sector. It is apparent that 
the Baumol hypothesis of unbalanced productivity growth is validated for the 
case of Korea.
(B) Election and Bureau Voting; The empirical results for the Election- 
Bureau Voting model are on the whole disappointing. Among five explanatory 
variables, four variables (Intercept, Pub, DumElect, DumEy) are statistically 
insignificant even at the 10% level. Contrary to the Election-Bureau Voting 
hypothesis, the coefficients of election dummy variables are negative. It may be 
claimed that the Election-Bureau model is not relevant for the case of Korea. 
In Western developed countries, electoral competition may lead to an increase in 
the public economy. The incumbent government attempts to stimulate the 
economy at the election time so as to improve its re-election chances. Politicians 
use public spending to buy off demands of the electorate and to increase their 
popularity. The frequency of electoral competition might have an inflationary 
impact on public expenditures. Compared to Western countries where 
representative democracy is well developed, presidential and congressional 
elections in Korea were not held regularly. Over the study period of 1963-1991, 
there were only three presidential elections. Partly due to the dictatorship in the 
Korean political system and partly due to the infrequency of presidential 
elections, the incumbent government did not need to provide favourable economic
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conditions at the election time. In this respect, the impact of election on Korean 
public expenditure seems to be small.
For the election-bureau model, the only explanatory variable that is 
statistically significant is the lagged expenditure term. Due to bureaucratic 
inertia in budget decision-making process, this year's budget is incremental with 
the major proportion of expenditure being that of the previous year. In Korea, 
last year's budget is one of the most important determinants of this year's 
budget. Thus, the lagged expenditure variable is considered as the main 
determinant of government size in Korea.
(C) Interest Group; The empirical results of the interest model show that the 
impact of interest groups on the size of government in Korea is negligible. In 
Korea, there exist a number of interest groups: industry trade association,
citizens' group, farmers' association and labour union. Each interest group 
demands more subsidies for its members and also supports for the expansion of 
public spending. In this chapter, I tested a hypothesis that the existence of 
interest groups leads to greater government expenditure. The important task is to 
find out an appropriate measure of the strength of the relevant interest group over 
time. Due to the non-availability of suitable data, I employed some proxies for 
the key variables to examine the validity of the interest group model. ( Time-series 
data for the number of industry trade association, citizens' group and farmers' 
association are not available in Korea.) In doing so, I strongly assumed that these 
proxies represent the strength of the relevant interest groups over time. Although 
these proxies are imperfect measures of interest group strength, I include these 
variables in the test rather than omit them. By including these variables in the 
model, we can get some insights about the impact of interest groups on the size 
of government in Korea.
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The results shown in Table 6.5 are on the whole disappointing. The 
coefficients of UNION and OPEN are negative, in contrast to the hypothesis and 
insignificant even at the 10% level. It may be claimed that the interest group 
model is irrelevant for the Korean public expenditure evolution. But my 
empirical results must be interpreted with caution. Due to the non-availability of 
alternative data and due to the omission of relevant variables, the model might 
be mis-specified and my empirical results of the effect of interest groups might 
be biased. Further research is needed to refine the testable theoretical model.
(D) Fiscal Illusion; Since the early 1960s, the Korean government has 
introduced many small taxes into the tax structure and the Korean public revenue 
system has become more complex. As the size of government has grown, public 
expenditures have raised from a more complex revenue structure over the last 
three decades. The other important characteristic of the Korean tax structure is 
that it relies very heavily on indirect taxes. More than 60% of total tax 
revenues were collected from indirect taxes until the late 1980s. Due to rapid 
inflation, Korean taxpayers were moved into higher marginal tax brackets and 
fiscal drag effect might exist. Due to the complex revenue structure and due to 
the fiscal drag effect of inflation, fiscal illusion might occur in Korea and this 
illusion might lead to an increase in public budgets.
I adopted three explanatory variables (HERF, INDIR, CPI) to examine the 
validity of the fiscal illusion hypothesis for Korea. The empirical results in Table 
6.6 are on the whole disappointing. I found that the coefficients of the 
Herfindahl index were positive and statistically insignificant, suggesting that the 
fiscal illusion hypothesis did not apply to the case of Korea.
As noted in Chapter 2, Korean off-budget activities have grown rapidly since 
the mid-1960s. When the Korean government faced the choice between direct
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public expenditure and off-budget means, executive government preferred the 
less visible method (off-budget expenditure). Due to the rapid increase of 
Korean extra-budget activities, budgets did not expand easily even though taxes 
were concealed in fiscal illusion. It also seems to be doubtful that Korean 
taxpayers have consistently misperceived their tax prices during the rapid 
development process.
(E) Stabilisation Policy; Like other developing countries, short-term 
management of the economy has become an important policy during the Korean 
modernisation process. Since the early 1960s, the Korean government has 
adopted fiscal stabilisation policies to achieve important policy objectives such as 
economic growth, price stability and full employment. To examine the 
applicability of the stabilisation policy model to Korea, I specified a simple 
stabilisation model.
Using annual data for the period of 1963-1991, I examined the simple 
stabilisation model. The empirical results shown in Table 6.7 are also weak. 
GNP and UNEMP have positive signs as predicted by the theory, but 
statistically insignificant. CPI has positive sign, opposite to the theory and 
statistically insignificant. Only, the coefficients of the lagged dependent 
variables were positive and highly significant at the 1% level.
These disappointing results cast doubt on the applicability of the stabilisation 
model to the Korean case. It might be claimed that Korean macro-economic 
policies have not been counter-cycle. Especially, during the period of the first 
and second oil shock, the Korean government intervened too late to stabilise 
the economy. Due to the policy lags (recognition and action lag), policy
implementation failures existed. Due to the certainty of policy effectiveness,
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Korean stabilisation policies resulted in changes that were unpredictable. In this 
respect, the simple stabilisation model seems to be irrelevant in explaining the 
size of government in Korea.
(F) Centralisation of Power; Finally, I examined the impact of fiscal 
centralisation on public sector size in Korea. Over the period of 1963-1991, the 
share of central government tax revenues in total tax revenues remained 
constant in Korea; about 80 per cent. To examine the applicability of the fiscal 
illusion hypothesis to Korea, I used two explanatory variables (CENTX, AID).
The empirical results shown in Table 6.8 offer no support for the fiscal 
illusion hypothesis. The coefficients of AID were negative, opposite to those 
predicted by the theory. The coefficients of CENTX were weak and the t-ratios 
remained quite small. Contrary to evidence for the US, fiscal centralisation is 
found to have no impact on public sector size in Korea.
The insignificance of fiscal centralisation as a determinant of public sector size 
in Korea is not surprising. According the fiscal centralisation hypothesis, it is 
competition that limits the revenue-maximising instincts of government. The 
voters have to face a wide range of choices, with a wider range of functions 
where these functions are carried out at localised levels of government. 
However, compared to Western developed countries, the number of lower-level 
of governments in Korea is small. At the local level, Korea had 245 local 
government authorities in 1991. Due to the small number of lower-level 
governments, competition among governments was not intensive and centralisation 
of power could not influence public sector size in Korea.
Furthermore, the economic importance of Korean local governments is 
very slight. Korean local governments have a limited range of functions and 
these functions are relatively unimportant. Local government own-source
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financed expenditures accounted for only 20 per cent of total receipts in 1991. 
Partly due to the small number of lower-level governments and partly due to 
the relative economic insignificance of local governments, centralisation might be 
expected to have no significant effect on Korean public sector size.
Further Research
The disappointing empirical results in this study cast considerable doubt on 
the usefulness of these six explanations for the Korean case. Since the existing 
literature of government growth consists of a large number of simple and separate 
models, I specify each as a separate explanation of public sector growth. 
However, my study seems to be adding separate models together and it seems 
to be an ad hoc exercise. Furthermore, a number of other explanations of 
government growth were not tested in this chapter.
To overcome these problems, I need to develop an integrated model which 
may offer greater empirical support. Much further work is needed to extend the 
simple and separate models. Since the growth of government is the result of a 
complex interaction of forces acting on the demand and supply side, my future 
model must integrate the demand and supply side in a coherent manner. My 
public expenditure function can be simply specified as follows:
G = f ( G(D), G ( S ) ) 
where G is public spending, G(D) is the set of demand variables and G(S) is 
the set of supply variables which influences the size of public expenditure.
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As noted previously, it seems to be inappropriate to test the six explanations 
separately. They may not be mutually exclusive. Therefore, I will test 
empirically an integrated model which brings the institutional and non- 
institutional approaches together. After including plausible explanatory variables 
of potential relevance in explaining the Korean experience, I can specify the 
following combined model.
G / G N P  = f (  GNP, MANU, RELAT, OPEN, PUB, G/GNP t-i ) 
where G/GNP is the ratio of public expenditure in GNP, GNP is Real GNP, 
MANU is share of manufacturing product in GNP, RELAT is the ratio of the 
price deflator of government consumption expenditure to the GNP deflator, 
OPEN is the ratio of imports and exports to GNP, PUB is the share of 
government employees in total labour force and G/GNP t-i is the lagged 
dependent term.
The above combined model may give us some useful insights in understanding 
why public expenditure has grown in Korea over the study period. My empirical 
study suggests that the growth of government in Korea can scarcely be 
explained in a simple model by economic factors alone. More theoretical and 
empirical analysis need to be carried out before I specify a meaningful public 
expenditure function. There is still a very long way to go.
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6. 7 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have tried to identify the important determinants of the growth 
of government expenditure in Korea since the early 1960s. Several possible 
explanations have been discussed and tested for the period 1963 to 1991. A 
disaggregation of total public expenditure into consumption, transfers and 
investment has been made because these three components had experienced 
different growth paths, and therefore different estimate parameters are needed for 
each.
Structural economic determinants of public sector growth have been identified. 
Real GNP and Baumol's Disease have had a positive effect on the growth of 
government consumption and investment expenditure. The empirical results of 
the tests of the institutional explanation are on the whole disappointing. The 
impact of election on government expenditure seems to be small. No serious 
indications of influences of interest groups could be found. The fiscal illusion 
model received little support , and the empirical results for the centralisation 
explanation are also disappointing.
Further research will need to refine the testable theoretical models and to 
improve the data base. It would be desirable to build "an integrated model", 
containing the different explanations of the size of public sector. The use of a 
more sophisticated method for empirical estimation and further variation of 
variables over a long period may lead a different finding.
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Appendix Variables and Sources of Data
All expenditure data are drawn from the Korean National Accounts published by 
the Bank of Korea. The implicit deflators are constructed from the National 
Accounts. The following National Accounts publications are used; National 
Income in Korea (1982), New National Accounts (1986), National Accounts 
(1990, 1992, 1993).
Real GNP, MANU, INDIR, OPEN, CENTX and AID are likewise computed 
from the National Accounts.
POPU ,AGE, MANUF, UNEMP and CPI are from Major Statistics of Korean 
Economy (Economic Planning Board, 1983,1993).
Data necessary to construct INDIR and HERF are also drawn from Major 
Statistics of Korean Economy (Economic Planning Board, 1983, 1993).
PUB are drawn from Korean Statistical Yearbook (The Korean Statistical 
Association, 1992).
Data on UNION and Election Year are from Social Indicators in Korea (The 
Korean Statistical Association, 1992).
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Summary and Concluding Comments
As noted in the introduction, the purpose of this thesis was to explain why 
and how public expenditure has grown in Korea during the period 1953-1991. 
We adopted an inductive and deductive approach to explain the growth of 
public expenditure in Korea over the last four decades. By examining the time 
profile of government spending over the study period, we tried to identify the 
major determinants of public expenditure growth in Korea .
We started our study with an overview of the various theoretical approaches to 
the subject of government growth. In Chapter 1, we presented nine alternatives 
theories of public expenditure growth. The two most frequently cited explanations 
for the growth of public expenditures are "Wagner's Law" and the "Displacement 
Effect Hypothesis". We examined Wagner's Law as founded in his own 
writings. Although Wagner's original ideas were broad, we focused on the 
empirical verification of the law. We also discussed differences in subsequent 
interpretations of Wagner's hypothesis and their relevance for empirical testing. 
It provided the theoretical basis of our empirical analysis of Wagner's Law for 
Korea in Chapter 4. In contrast to Wagner's Law, Peacock and Wiseman
introduced the supply side into the public expenditure determination process. We 
discussed the concept of the displacement and inspection effect in their own 
original writings. We also reviewed the displacement literature briefly with the 
purpose of explaining how the displacement effect had been interpreted by
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various authors. This provided the starting point of our empirical study of the 
"Displacement Effect Hypothesis" for Korea in Chapter 5.
Whilst historical development models of government growth were useful 
studies to find out the factors which influenced the long- term trends in public 
spending, they were devoid of any appreciation of the theory of political process. 
Public choice models provided a solid foundation for the analysis of public 
expenditure growth and also produced testable hypotheses. We reviewed six 
formal models of political and economic institutions to account for the growth of 
public expenditure. One of the earliest formal political models of government 
activity is the median voter model developed by Downs (1957) and Black 
(1958). In the simple median voter model, the median voter's preferred 
expenditure level is the most important determinant of government expenditure. 
However, the median voter model holds only under very restrictive 
circumstances. The model ignores the supply side of the public sector, especially 
the role of politicians and bureaucrats. The most widely cited model of 
bureaucracy is that of Niskanen. The Niskanen model focuses on the behaviour 
of a budget-maximising bureaucracy and the bureaucratic mechanism will 
produce larger budget than the optimal level implied by the median voter model. 
The bureaucracy model provides an important proposition that the activity of 
bureaucrats is an important determinant of public expenditure growth. The 
central problem of the bureaucracy model is how to test for bureaucratic power 
growth over time. We also examined the Baumol model of unbalanced 
productivity growth. According to the Baumol hypothesis, there exists a 
productivity differential between the private and public sector, and the low rate 
of productivity increases in the public sector is the main determinant of the growth 
of the public sector. Due to the relative price effect, the relative price of
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government services rises faster than the price of private sector output, and this 
could lead a steadily growing share of the public sector. In Chapter 6, we find 
support for the relative price effect hypothesis in Korea. Finally, we reviewed the 
political business cycle hypothesis briefly. The political business hypothesis 
presumes that governments pursue expansionary policies in order to aid in an 
election. In Western developed countries, politico-economic models are very 
popular and many authors have examined the validity of the political business 
cycle theory. Unfortunately, due to the lack of reliable data on government 
popularity (Gallop-type opinion polls), we could not examine the evidence for 
the political business cycle in Korea. The theories and empirical studies 
reviewed in Chapter 1 are rudimentary. None of the theories is sufficiently 
developed and the factors which influence the growth of the public sector are 
complex. M ore theoretical analysis needs to be carried out in this area of 
public expenditure growth.
After reviewing nine alternatives theories of public expenditure growth, we 
discussed about measurement issues in Chapter 2. When we investigate the 
growth of government activity over time, we suffer from measurement 
problems. There have been a variety of conceptions of government size and 
several different measures have been used to explain the growth of government 
in the economy. Due to the multidimensional nature of the scope of government 
intervention in the economy, no single measure is the right one to explain in all 
instances the size and growth of the public sector. In this Chapter, we have 
adopted public expenditure data which have been presented within the national 
accounts framework in Korea. This is partly due to the ease of measurement and 
availability of data via the Korean national accounting systems. However, the 
national accounts data do not encompass all of the important public sector
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activities (especially, off-budget activities). Therefore, the use of the ratio of 
public expenditure to GNP in the national accounts understates the government 
involvement in the economy. As we mentioned, there are a lot of problems in 
designing a meaningful measure of public expenditure growth.
In Chapter 3, we gave a brief overview of the development of government 
spending in Korea from 1953 to 1991. Since the earliest reliable data on GNP 
and government spending go back to the year 1953, we focus on the growth of 
government expenditure only since the end of the Korean War. We were 
interested in the dynamic relationship between government fiscal activity and the 
growth of the Korean economy over the last four decades. We presented some 
statistical data and described briefly the evolution of the public sector during the 
Korean modernisation process. By studying the specific conditions of the 
Korean economy and examining the changes in the structure of government 
expenditure, we attempted to explain the changing role of government during the 
process of development. The description of the Korean economy and the 
evolution of the Korean public sector gave us the statistics which should be tested 
against the statistical evidence. The theoretical and empirical explanation of this 
changing role of government is the subject matter of the next three Chapters.
Having explained the long-run development of public spending in Korea, we 
proceeded to test for the two classical theories, namely Wagner's law and 
Peacock and Wiseman's displacement effect hypothesis. In Chapter 4, we 
analysed the applicability of Wagner's law on data taken from Korea during the 
period 1953-1991. We tried to assess briefly the possible contribution of 
Wagner's hypothesis to an understanding of the growth of public expenditure in 
Korea. Whilst many empirical studies using time series data have found support
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for the W agner law, we have argued that these findings are likely to be spurious 
because they adopted nonstationary variables. To overcome the econometric 
problems of previous studies, we attempted to test stationarity of each variables 
and to investigate the long-run relationship between real government expenditure 
and real GNP in terms of cointegration analysis. We found that both the 
public expenditure variables and the incomes variables are integrated of the 
same order one and there exists a long-run positive relationship between the 
two variables. Those positive income elasticities confirm the validity of 
Wagner's law for Korea during the study period. However, it should be noted 
that Wagner's original idea was broader than its modem interpretation of the 
income elasticity hypothesis. In this Chapter, we interpreted Wagner's law in 
narrow terms. More research is needed to examine Wagner's original 
hypothesis which attempts to explain the relationship between the process of 
economic development and the size of the public sector.
The other most frequently cited explanation of the growth of the public sector 
is the Peacock and Wiseman "displacement effect" hypothesis. In Chapter 5, 
we tested for the displacement effect on government expenditure in Korea 
associated with the political crises (or military coup). We reviewed the 
displacement literature, and assessed previous econometric tests of the 
displacement hypothesis, and found deficient. Since the original displacement 
hypothesis was concerned with the development of public spending over time, 
we needed to take account of the effect of time on public expenditure growth. 
To examine an upward displacement of government expenditure after the two 
political crises for the period of 1953-1991, we adopted a recent time-series 
modelling technique. Using an ARM A technique, we examined the relevance 
of the displacement hypothesis to explain the time profile of public expenditure
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growth in Korea. Testing the hypothesis for Korea, we found no empirical 
support for the displacement effect on government expenditure associated with 
the two political crises of 1961 and 1979. We found that the two political crises 
in Korea led to a downward shift in government expenditure. There was no 
sharp increase in the level of government expenditure after the two political 
crises. These results disproved the displacement effect hypothesis. The 
Peacock and Wiseman displacement effect hypothesis cannot be taken to give a 
conclusive explanation of the growth of public expenditure in Korea.
At the final Chapter of this thesis (Chapter 6), we attempted to identify the 
main determinants of public expenditure growth in Korea. As previously noted, 
few empirical studies have been devoted to the time pattern growth of public 
expenditure. Six different explanations of government growth have been 
discussed and tested for the period 1963 to 1991. A disaggregation of total 
government expenditure has been made because the growth pattern of different 
components is dissimilar and we cannot explain the growth of public 
expenditure in a single model. Our empirical analysis shows that the income 
effect, the relative price effect and the lagged dependent variable are the main 
causes of the expansion of government expenditure in Korea. The positive income 
elasticity is consistent with the Wagner hypothesis which assumes a positive 
correlation between real government expenditure and real GNP. Baumol's 
Disease is another important source of the growth of public expenditure. As 
previously explained (Chapter 1 and Chapter 2), the relative price of 
government services rises faster than the price of private sector output. In 
Chapter 6, we found another evidence of the relative effect hypothesis. The 
lagged expenditure term is another main cause of government expenditure 
growth. It implies that last year’s public spending is one of the most important
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determinants of this year's public spending in Korea. However, since our thesis 
is not an econometric one and our study aims at an identification of empirical 
regularities of theories, our empirical studies are considered as preliminary 
work. Further research is needed to refine the empirical testable models and to 
improve the data base. The use of more sophisticated methods and further 
variation of variables are another topics for future research.
We hope that this thesis gives useful insights in understanding why and how 
public expenditure has grown in Korea over the last four decades. As previously 
noted, the growth of government is a complex process, and we cannot explain 
the process of public expenditure growth within a relatively small economic 
model. To understand the multi-faced and complex phenomenon of government, 
a broad research is called for, which focuses on how governments make their 
decisions and how governments behaviour on changes in the economic 
environment. This field of research is the subject matter of future research.
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